OUR   NAVY 

AND 

THE   NEXT  WAR 


OUR  NAVY 


AND 


THE  NEXT  WAR 


BY 

ROBERT  WILDEN  NEESER 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 
1915 


COPYRIGHT,  1915.  BY 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 

Published  March,  1015 


PREFACE 

IP  ever  the  navy  of  the  United  States  needed 
the  intelligent  support  of  the  American  people,  it 
is  at  the  present  moment.  And  it  is  fortunate 
that  interest  is  now  growing,  and  that  a  disposition 
on  the  part  of  our  citizens  to  force  action  toward 
the  meeting  of  the  needs  of  the  service  is  beginning 
to  show  itself. 

On  one  point  there  seems  to  be  no  difference  of 
opinion — that  if  we  are  to  have  a  navy  at  all,  it 
should  be  as  efficient  as  it  possibly  can  be  made. 
We  have  to-day  individual  ships  that  are  the  ad- 
miration of  foreign  naval  architects.  We  have 
officers  and  men  on  board  of  them  that  we  believe 
are  the  equal  of  those  in  any  other  service.  We 
have  certain  materials  of  war  that  are  as  good  as 
those  manufactured  for  other  fleets.  But  what 
we  have  not  appreciated  is  that  efficient  individual 
ships  and  efficient  crews  do  not  alone  make  a 
powerful  navy.  These  units  must  be  welded  into 
an  efficient  whole  by  an  organization  and  adminis- 
tration which  co-ordinate  their  capabilities  and 
direct  their  efforts  toward  a  common  end. 


302358 


vi  PREFACE 

In  building  up  our  navy,  the  public  mind  has 
been  centred  too  much  on  the  power  of  the  single 
ship.  It  has  taken  no  account  of  all  the  various 
accessories  essential  to  the  maintenance  of  the 
fleet. 

In  a  recent  article  on  the  British  navy,  Ad- 
miral Lord  Charles  Beresford  said:  "We  have 
had  no  naval  war  that  threatened  our  existence 
for  over  a  century.  But  if  such  a  war  had  occurred 
any  time  in  the  last  forty  years  preceding  the 
creation  of  a  war  staff,  our  disorganization  would 
have  been  complete.  How  in  those  years  the 
navy  ever  carried  out  its  duties  without  a  war 
staff  is  a  marvel;  it  could  only  have  been  done  by 
the  superb  loyalty  of  those  afloat,  who  have  al- 
ways done  their  best  and  never  allowed  the  word 
*  impossible  '  to  exist.  The  Beresford  committee 
of  1909  proved  up  to  the  hilt  the  unreadiness  of 
the  fleet  if  a  sudden  war  had  been  declared.  The 
creation  of  a  war  staff  (as  a  result  of  the  investi- 
gation) has  removed  this  danger." 

In  that  same  year,  1909,  the  President  of  the 
United  States  appointed  a  commission  to  con- 
sider the  state  of  our  own  navy.  The  report  of 
that  board  is  strikingly  similar  to  that  of  the  Beres- 
ford committee.  It  revealed  a  condition  that 
astounded  even  the  service.  But  it  accomplished 
nothing.  For  Congress  refused  to  supply  the 
remedy. 


PREFACE  vii 

Fortunately  the  superb  loyalty  of  our  own 
officers  and  men,  who  "  have  always  done  their 
best  and  never  allowed  the  word  'impossible'  to 
exist,"  enabled  our  ships  to  carry  on  their  work 
since  then  in  a  way  that  has,  on  many  occasions, 
won  the  praise  of  foreign  experts.  In  the  face  of 
a  policy  that  threatened  the  very  existence  of  the 
service,  in  spite  of  an  unbalanced  battle  fleet,  in 
spite  of  a  serious  shortage  in  its  personnel,  in 
the  face  of  every  discouragement,  our  officers 
and  men  have  striven,  and  are  still  striving,  for 
efficiency.  But  this  goal  will  not  be  reached,  nor 
even  closely  approached,  until  the  doctrine  is 
thoroughly  understood  that  there  must  be  an 
intelligent  comprehension  on  the  part  of  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  purpose  for  which  a  navy  exists. 
The  people  through  their  representatives — that 
is,  the  government — must  encourage  further  the 
navy's  legitimate  efforts  and  fill  its  unquestioned 
military  needs.  They  must  develop  a  policy,  free 
from  any  taint  of  partisan  politics,  that  will  se- 
cure the  development  of  the  navy  in  harmony 
with  the  purpose  for  which  it  exists.  They  must 
demand  of  the  navy  a  policy,  for  which  officers  of 
the  navy  should  be  held  to  strict  accountability, 
and  must  secure  with  equal  loyalty  plans  in  sup- 
port of  that  policy. 

Shall  we  continue  to  neglect  our  military  needs 
and  withhold  that  support  which  alone  can  supply 


viii  PREFACE 

the  dynamic  force  that  will  make  of  the  fleet  an 
efficient  instrument  capable  of  fulfilling  the  pur- 
pose for  which  it  exists  ? 

ROBERT  W.  NEESER. 

NEW  YORK,  March  i,  1915. 


CONTENTS 


PACK 

PREFACE     .  v 


CHAPTER 


I.    OUR  SITUATION 3 

II.  OUR  DIPLOMATIC  POSITION     ...  13 

III.  MILITARY  PEACE  PREPARATION  .     .  32 

IV.  NAVAL  PEACE  PREPARATION  ...  51 
V.  OUR  MILITARY  REQUIREMENTS  .     .  83 

VI.  OUR  NAVAL  REQUIREMENTS  ...  98 

VII.    MILITARY  POLICY 116 

VIII.    NAVAL  POLICY 127 

IX.  NAVAL  ORGANIZATION  AND  ADMIN- 
ISTRATION        146 

X.  THE  EMPLOYMENT  OF  THE  FLEET  .  158 

XI.    THE  PERSONNEL 166 

XII.  EVOLUTION  AND  PROGRESS     .    .    .  174 

ix 


x  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

APPENDIX  I — THE  REPORT  OP  THE  GEN- 
ERAL BOARD 179 

APPENDIX  II— THE  REPORT  OF  BOARD  ON 
INCREASED  EFFICIENCY  OF 
THE  PERSONNEL  OF  THE 
NAVY 200 

APPENDIX  III — THE  PRICE  OF  UNPREPARED- 
NESS  204 


OUR  NAVY 

AND 

THE  NEXT  WAR 


"He  that  commands  the  sea  is  at  great 
liberty,  and  may  take  as  much  and  as 
little  of  the  war  as  he  will.  Whereas 
those  that  be  strongest  by  land  are  many 
times  nevertheless  in  great  straits." 

—BACON. 


CHAPTER  I 
OUR  SITUATION 

A  NATION  should  develop  its  physical  power 
for  offense  or  defense  in  the  same  way  that 
an  individual  keeps  his  body  strong  and 
healthy  for  his  daily  tasks.  The  nation  is  but 
an  elaboration  of  the  individual.  Both  are  gov- 
erned by  the  same  laws.  Each  is  endowed  with 
spiritual  and  physical  attributes.  The  develop- 
ment of  these  is  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  na- 
tion or  of  the  individual.  A  nation  that  develops 
its  vital  attributes  but  fails  to  develop  its  spiritual 
and  physical  attributes  is  in  the  class  with  an 
individual  who  has  grown,  through  indolence  and 
overfeeding,  too  obese  to  defend  himself  and  too 
dull-witted  to  avoid  his  antagonist. 

It  is  strange  but  nevertheless  true  that  the 
statesmen  of  our  government  have  never  been 
able  to  appreciate  the  true  meaning  of  Clause- 
witz's  philosophy  that:  "War  is  only  a  continu- 
ation, by  other  means,  of  national  policy."  War, 
by  the  statesman,  must  be  considered  as  an  in- 
strument of  his  nation's  policy.  If  we  accept  the 

3 


4      OUR  NAVT.AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

truth  of  this  philosophy  we  are  confronted  with 
the  conclusion  that  our  statesmen  in  Washing- 
ton are  directly  responsible  to  the  people  for 
the  preparedness  of  its  armed  forces.  The  na- 
tion's policies  are  in  the  keeping  of  its  states- 
men. Such  policies  require,  for  their  continu- 
ance, national  force,  both  moral  and  physical.  If 
the  outside  pressure  against  a  just  policy  is 
strong,  a  greater  national  force  must  be  exerted. 
National  force  is,  in  time  of  peace,  diplomatic. 
Diplomatic  notes,  ententes,  and  understandings 
are  the  life-giving  force  behind  a  policy.  When 
these  have  failed  and  the  policy  is  vital  to  the 
welfare  and  progress  of  the  nation,  military  force 
takes  the  place  of  diplomatic  intercourse.  Thus 
it  is  seen  that  the  nation's  policies  become  the 
starting-point  in  all  calculations  of  war  strength. 
The  statesman  must  distinguish  between  those 
aims  which  his  nation  can  abandon  and  those 
which  are  worth  fighting  for.  The  statesman 
must  be  a  man  of  keen  understanding,  with  a 
grasp  of  the  fundamentals  of  history.  He  must 
study  the  history  of  those  nations  to  which  his 
own  nation  may,  in  the  course  of  time,  draw  near 
in  the  field  of  competition,  with  danger  of  collision. 
Thus  it  becomes  his  duty  to  study  the  purpose 
and  policy  of  those  nations  which  may,  in  the 
course  of  their  own  expansion,  challenge  his  poli- 
cies, and  he  must,  therefore,  understand  the 


OUR  SITUATION  5 

methods  that  can  be  employed  to  assert  his  own 
government's  purpose. 

Unhappily,  in  America,  our  statesmen  have 
not  reckoned  with  the  necessity  of  maintaining 
behind  our  policies  sufficient  armed  forces  to  per- 
petuate them.  They  seem  to  believe  that  if  the 
nations  of  the  world  have  given  their  tacit  con- 
sent to  our  policies  nothing  more  is  necessary. 
They  have  been  sustained  in  this  method  of 
diplomacy  through  the  increasing  acceptance  of 
the  principle  of  arbitration  by  the  people  of 
this  nation,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the 
causes  of  every  one  of  our  own  great  national 
struggles  were  such  as  to  prohibit  settlement  by 
any  other  means  than  a  resort  to  arms.  But 
when  this  creation  of  man's  credulity  has  failed, 
the  nation  will  come  face  to  face  with  a  condi- 
tion from  which  there  can  be  no  turning.  A 
policy  vigorously  challenged  by  another  nation 
can  be  settled  in  two  ways  only:  either  by  the 
abandonment  of  the  policy,  or  else  by  a  war  to 
maintain  it.  There  is  no  more  despicable  figure 
in  history  than  the  man  who  rushes  his  country 
into  a  war  for  which  that  nation  is  unprepared. 
A  true  statesman  aims  to  harmonize  the  national 
policies  with  his  country's  readiness  for  war.  He 
does  not  attempt  to  assert  ideals  which  the  armed 
forces  of  his  country  are  incapable  of  defending. 
Under  the  moral  code  the  true  responsibility  of  a 


6   OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

nation  is  not  for  the  preservation  of  peace,  but  for 
abstention  from  wrong,  and  it  must  be  assumed 
among  the  civilized  nations  that  each  strives  to 
be  morally  right  in  its  dealings  with  others.  Our 
national  policies  are  held  by  the  people  of  the 
United  States  to  be  morally  right  and  necessary 
to  the  life  and  happiness  of  the  people;  yet, 
knowing  this,  we  as  a  nation  refuse  to  face  the 
unpleasant  realization  that  we  may  some  day 
be  called  upon  to  engage  in  war  in  the  defense 
of  these  policies. 

Those  who  champion  the  cause  of  arbitration 
and  universal  peace,  believing  that  thereby  they 
may  cast  off  the  burden  of  armaments,  by  so 
doing  only  bring  the  country  they  serve  nearer  to 
the  very  thing  that  they  wish  most  to  avoid; 
and  when  that  hideous  monster,  War,  is  at  hand, 
their  country  lies  helpless  before  the  nations  that 
have  prepared  themselves  for  the  fray.  Can  any 
man  really  believe  that  such  policies  as  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  the  exclusion  of  Asiatics,  and  the 
guarantee  of  the  neutrality  of  the  Panama  Canal 
can  be  enforced  by  a  court  of  arbitration? 

Yet  these  three  great  policies  of  American  di- 
plomacy are  our  policies  of  self-defense.  They 
are  the  paper  bulwarks  behind  which  the  Ameri- 
can nation  defends  its  position  and  principles  in 
the  world  of  competing  nations.  Once  this  bar- 
rier is  overthrown,  the  very  life  of  the  nation  as 


OUR  SITUATION  7 

an  independent  and  free  people  may  cease  to  exist. 
Once  the  military  nations  of  Europe  or  Asia  have 
secured  a  foothold  on  the  American  continent, 
the  United  States  will  be  forced  to  join  the  ranks 
of  the  military  nations  and,  through  a  long, 
bloody,  and  exhausting  war,  hurl  from  the  con- 
tinent those  who  have  invaded  the  territories  of 
our  assumed  overlordship. 

In  all  discussions  over  armaments  in  this  coun- 
try nowhere  do  we  hear  the  voice  of  the  states- 
men. Their  influence  has  been  directed  to  the 
curtailment  of  our  national  defenses.  How,  then, 
can  they  acquit  themselves  before  the  nation 
when  we  are  face  to  face  with  that  final  arbiter, 
war?  These  statesmen  at  the  head  of  the  gov- 
ernment cannot  shirk  the  responsibility  for  the 
maintenance  of  an  adequate  force  to  insure  vic- 
tory. A  nation  of  90,000,000  people,  once  set 
in  motion  against  aggression,  cannot  easily  be 
checked.  That  the  nation  is  unprepared  for  war 
and  that  defeat  is  inevitable  cannot  be  forced 
home  after  the  patriotic  fervor  of  a  nation  is 
aroused.  The  statesman  who  has  forced  the 
issue,  regardless  of  the  unpreparedness  of  his 
country,  may  well  tremble  and  endeavor  to  avert 
the  danger  so  near  at  hand;  but  his  puny  power 
is  swept  aside  by  the  momentum  of  the  outraged 
nation,  and  he  can  only  impotently  contemplate  the 
unequal  struggle  for  which  he  alone  is  to  blame. 


8   OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

The  only  conclusion  to  be  drawn  is  that  the 
American  nation  to-day  is  sorely  in  need  of  states- 
men who  have  studied  the  problems  of  our  na- 
tional existence  and  are  able  to  apply  to  their 
solutions  organized  knowledge,  which  is  the  only 
basis  of  success  in  modern  life.  The  nation's 
welfare  must  be  intrusted  to  a  continuing  body  of 
statesmen  whom  the  nation  can  hold  responsible. 
If  we  are  to  remain  supreme  in  our  territorial 
possessions,  including  the  Panama  Canal;  if  we 
are  to  enforce  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  spite  of 
the  cupidity  of  nations  that  are  now  ruthlessly 
sacrificing  hundreds  of  thousands  of  their  men  on 
the  battle-fields  of  Europe;  if  we  are  to  exclude 
the  Asiatic  from  our  Pacific  coast;  if  we  are  to 
insist  upon  the  open  door  in  China  for  our  trade, 
then  the  statesmen  of  our  nation  must  keep  in 
closer  touch  with  the  preparedness  for  war  of  the 
two  arms  of  our  national  forces.  They  must 
stand  ready  to  go  before  the  country  and  tell  the 
people  just  which  policies  can  be  maintained 
and  which  policies  must  be  abandoned.  It  is 
the  statesmen,  and  not  the  military  or  naval  men, 
who  should  be  using  their  efforts  to  increase  the 
power  and  efficiency  of  our  nation  for  the  coming 
struggle  for  the  maintenance  of  our  position  in 
the  world. 

In  every  civilized  country  the  organization  and 
application  of  its  resources  is  the  basis  of  success 


OUR  SITUATION  9 

in  war.  Resources,  when  stripped  of  all  collateral 
elements,  reduce  down  to  men,  material,  and 
money.  The  organization  of  these  is  wholly 
within  the  province  of  the  statesmen. 

In  Section  VIII  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  the  authority  is  vested  in  Congress 
to  raise  and  support  armies  and  to  provide  and 
maintain  a  navy,  and,  further,  to  make  rules  for 
the  government  and  regulation  of  the  land  and 
naval  forces.  Who  else  shall  decide  upon  the 
size  of  the  army  and  navy?  If  the  army  and 
navy  are  inadequate  for  the  purpose  of  supporting 
the  national  policies,  whom  must  the  country 
hold  responsible  ? 

In  time  of  war  the  civilian,  as  much  as  the  sol- 
dier,' is  responsible  for  defeat  and  disaster.  Bat- 
tles are  not  lost  on  the  field  alone;  they  may  be 
lost  beneath  the  dome  of  the  Capitol;  they  may 
be  lost  in  the  cabinet ;  or  they  may  be  lost  in  the 
private  office  of  the  secretary  of  war  or  the  secre- 
tary of  the  navy.  But  wherever  they  may  be 
lost,  it  is  our  people  who  will  suffer  and  our  sol- 
diers— patriotic  citizens — who  will  die,  with  a 
sudden,  bitter  knowledge  that  our  military  policy 
is  a  crime  against  life,  a  crime  against  property, 
and  a  crime  against  liberty. 

War  affects  the  life,  the  liberty,  and  the  prop- 
erty of  every  individual  citizen.  Beyond  that, 
it  imperils  the  life  of  the  nation.  On  its  issue 


io  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

necessarily  depend  the  fate  of  governments  and 
the  happiness  of  human  beings,  present  and 
future.  The  statesman  should,  therefore,  con- 
sider it  his  duty  to  study  peace  and  the  causes 
which  tend  to  preserve  or  destroy  peace.  History 
teaches  us  that  peace  ends  in  war.  If  the  causes 
which  terminate  peace  and  produce  war  cannot  be 
removed,  and  if  the  legislator  does  not  recognize 
and  know  how  to  create  a  powerful  army,  he  ceases 
to  be  a  statesman. 

We  thus  see  that  we  cannot  divorce  ourselves 
from  the  fact  that  national  preparedness  must 
remain  in  the  keeping  of  the  statesman — that  is, 
the  representative  of  the  individual — and  that  it 
is  the  statesman  whom  the  nation  must  hold  re- 
sponsible for  the  development  of  its  physical 
powers.  It  is  idle,  nay,  useless,  to  base  the  size 
of  armies  and  fleets  upon  local  opinions.  These 
instruments  of  diplomacy  cannot  be  considered 
as  benefits  to  a  section  of  the  country  only.  They 
are  national  instruments,  to  be  used  by  the  nation 
for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  itself  a  free  agent 
in  the  world  of  nations.  That  the  Pacific  coast 
or  the  Atlantic  coast  is  not  adequately  prepared 
to  repel  an  invader  is  not  the  care  of  the  local 
politicians,  but  of  the  national  statesmen.  They 
must  consider,  in  their  demands  for  military  force, 
the  political  situation  of  the  entire  country  and 
its  probable  enemies.  All  decisions  which  a  gov- 


OUR  SITUATION  n 

ernment  is  called  upon  to  make  are  intimately 
connected,  and  in  the  relations  between  them  is 
to  be  sought  the  continuity  of  design  or  unity 
of  purpose,  which  are  different  names  for  a  policy. 

The  endeavors  of  local  politicians  to  deter  na- 
tional preparedness  are  the  outcroppings  of  self- 
seeking  in  the  nation.  Their  influence  upon 
legislation  is  harmful,  and  their  effect  is  to  drag 
the  national  question  of  national  defense  into  the 
arena  of  local  party  politics. 

A  nation  which  becomes  so  absorbed  in  money- 
making  pursuits  as  to  neglect  to  take  all  those 
steps  which  are  necessary  to  secure  immunity 
from  attack  ceases  to  impose  respect,  and  so 
comes  to  be  looked  upon  as  an  easy  prey.  It  is 
only  by  making  costly  sacrifices  that  a  nation 
can  earn  peace.  History  shows  full  well  that 

"HI  fares  the  land,  to  hastening  ills  a  prey, 
Where  wealth  accumulates  and  men  decay." 

Our  present  lack  of  preparedness  will  force  us 
into  a  slow  and  irregular  transition  to  a  war 
footing,  exposing  the  country  to  the  dangers  of 
the  defensive  and  the  horrors  of  invasion.  The 
real  strength  of  a  definite  force  depends  upon  the 
quality  of  its  soldiers  and  its  officers.  Yet  the 
United  States  has  only  one-tenth  of  one  per  cent 
of  its  men  trained  for  war.  It  is,  therefore,  only 
one-tenth  of  one  per  cent  strong. 


12  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

In  this  agitation  for  naval  and  military  pre- 
paredness the  country  should  not  make  the  mis- 
take of  laying  the  blame  upon  the  shoulders  of 
the  political  party  in  power.  We  must  remem- 
ber that  the  party  of  opposite  beliefs,  during  a 
tenure  in  office  of  nearly  a  score  of  years,  during 
which  our  military  weaknesses  were  just  as  evi- 
dent as  they  are  to-day,  often  did  very  little  to 
remedy  the  defects.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  party 
now  in  power,  after  it  has  seen  the  besetting 
dangers  of  the  country's  situation,  to  push  reme- 
dial legislation.  National  defense  should  become 
a  national  issue.  The  party  out  of  power,  if  it 
is  unpatriotic,  will  grasp  the  opportunity  of  push- 
ing an  advantage  by  declaring  that  the  party  in 
power  is  failing  to  provide  for  the  nation's  safety, 
saying  nothing  of  the  fact  that  itself,  when  in 
power,  was  as  careless  of  the  national  needs. 
With  national  defense  a  party  issue,  those  in 
power  will  try  to  hush  things  up  and  prevent  a 
panic.  The  effect  will  be,  as  usual,  to  defeat  the 
true  ends  of  the  nation.  The  nation  should  be 
sufficiently  patriotic  to  agree  that  national  defense 
is  outside  of  party  lines,  and  both  parties  should 
be  willing  to  bring  the  search-light  of  public 
opinion  to  bear  upon  the  country's  needs  and 
stand  together  to  enforce  the  remedy.  National 
defense  is  not  a  political  issue;  it  is  a  personal 
issue. 


CHAPTER  II 
OUR  DIPLOMATIC  POSITION 

THE  United  States  stands  to-day  as  the  great 
arbiter  of  the  western  hemisphere.  It  has 
expanded,  by  conquest  and  purchase,  from 
the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific.  Its  northern  border 
touches  the  frontier  of  Canada,  its  southern  bound- 
ary is  washed  by  the  waters  of  the  Rio  Grande. 
Conquest  has  carried  the  American  symbol  of 
sovereignty  into  the  waters  of  the  Pacific  to  the 
very  gateway  of  China.  The  Caribbean,  once 
the  spoil  of  European  nations,  now  may  be  said 
to  be  almost  Americanized  by  our  acquisition  of 
Puerto  Rico,  by  our  virtual  political  domination 
of  these  islands  still  under  the  rule  of  tropical 
races,  and  by  our  possession  of  the  Canal  route 
across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  through  which 
will  soon  pass  the  commerce  of  the  world. 

We  have,  in  our  hands,  the  making  of  a  great 
empire — not  an  empire  of  kings,  but  an  empire  in 
whose  womb  lies  the  seed  of  the  nation's  funda- 
mental beliefs,  recorded  with  such  clearness  in 
the  Declaration  of  Independence.  The  power  is 

13 


14  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

ours,  if  we  are  men  enough  to  grasp  it,  to  give 
to  the  great  world  over  which  our  policies  have 
flung  their  protecting  arm  those  principles  of 
social  life  to  us  now  fundamental:  "that  all  men 
are  created  equal;  that  they  are  endowed  by 
their  Creator  with  certain  inalienable  rights ;  that 
among  these  are  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of 
happiness;  that  to  secure  these  rights  govern- 
ments are  instituted  among  men,  deriving  their 
just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the  governed." 

The  individual  has  no  right  to  regard  the  state 
as  a  means  for  attaining  his  own  ambitions.  The 
nation  owes  a  duty  to  posterity  which  can  be  per- 
formed only  through  the  self-sacrifice  of  the  na- 
tion to-day.  The  territories  over  which  flies  the 
American  flag,  and  those  territories  over  which 
our  institutions  have  spread  their  protecting  wing, 
are  a  legacy  from  the  past.  They  were  handed 
down  to  us,  not  to  fritter  away,  but  to  develop 
and  conserve. 

With  the  avowed  object  of  safeguarding  these 
principles  of  government  to  those  over  whom  our 
nation  has  assumed  the  guardianship,  we  have 
laid  down  certain  policies  which  other  nations 
are  called  upon  to  respect.  The  most  important 
of  these  is  contained  in  the  message  which  Presi- 
dent Monroe  sent  Congress  in  1823,  in  which  he 
said:  "We  owe  it  to  candor  and  to  the  amicable 
relations  existing  between  the  United  States  and 


OUR  DIPLOMATIC  POSITION        15 

those  European  powers  to  declare  that  we  should 
consider  any  attempt  on  their  part  to  extend  their 
system  to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere  as 
dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety." 

When  we  contemplate  the  great  struggle  of 
blood  which  is  now  going  on  in  Europe,  a  struggle 
for  survival,  a  struggle  for  domination,  a  struggle 
for  conquest,  where  the  wealth  of  entire  nations 
is  risked,  can  we  still  adhere  to  the  belief  that 
the  mailed  fist  of  some  of  those  nations  will  not 
be  stretched  across  the  seas  to  grasp  the  vast 
resources,  as  yet  untouched,  in  the  countries  to 
the  south  of  us,  from  the  Rio  Grande  to  Terra 
del  Fuego  ? 

The  limited  boundaries  of  Europe  have  become 
too  narrow  to  confine  the  people  of  strong  and 
vigorous  nations  seeking  expansion.  Already 
those  nations  have  peacefully  penetrated  into 
Mexico  and  Central  and  South  America.  Some  of 
these  nations  have  enunciated  the  principle  that 
it  is  the  duty  of  a  state  to  make  war  to  advance 
its  own  ideals  and  its  own  civilization.  Upon  the 
completion  of  this  world  war  Europe  will  be  even 
more  of  an  armed  camp.  The  devastation  of 
war  will  have  reduced  the  resources  within  their 
own  borders.  The  rich  countries  beyond  the 
seas,  basking  under  the  sunshine  of  peace,  will 
offer  them  alluring  inducements  to  sweep  away 
that  doctrine  which  has  been  so  long  distasteful. 


16  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

Whether  this  happens  or  not  will  depend  only 
upon  our  power  to  prevent  it.  That  power  will 
rest  with  our  naval  and  military  forces.  If  they 
are  weak  and  incapable  of  maintaining  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  then  that  doctrine  will  pass  into 
the  unknown.  The  integrity  and  neutrality  of 
the  Panama  Canal  will,  of  necessity,  suffer  the 
same  fate  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and,  unless  we 
are  prepared  to  defend  our'  position  in  the  world, 
we  shall  all  see  the  day  when  the  fruits  of  Ameri- 
can labor,  enterprise,  and  ingenuity  will  be  con- 
trolled and  administered  by  a  foreign  nation. 
Our  colonial  possessions  and  our  control  over  the 
weak  republics  of  the  Caribbean  will  pass  from 
us  because  we  shall  have  demonstrated  our  un- 
fitness  to  control  their  destinies.  Our  trade  with 
the  Orient,  even  that  with  South  America,  will  be 
paralyzed  through  hostile  tariffs.  Our  own  shores 
may  feel  the  iron  tread  of  the  invader,  and  our 
cities  may  suffer  destruction. 

It  is  a  misconception  entirely  unsupported  by 
history  that  nations,  at  the  end  of  a  great  war, 
are  exhausted.  We  have  only  to  look  to  the  con- 
dition of  Germany  after  her  war  with  France  in 
1870  and  to  the  military  strength  of  the  United 
States  after  the  four  long  years  of  the  Civil  War. 
In  1865  the  United  States  had  a  trained  army  of 
a  million  men.  Those  men  were  warriors  with 
fighting  blood  in  their  veins.  Their  love  of  coun- 


OUR  DIPLOMATIC  POSITION        17 

try  was  high  above  the  mere  lust  for  gold.  We 
had  great  men  and  tried  leaders — men  trained  on 
the  battle-field. 

But  wherein  lie  our  dangers,  and  how  can  they 
be  met  ?  The  nearest  and  most  important  danger 
is  in  the  Pacific.  By  our  own  hand  we  freed 
Japan  from  the  isolation  of  centuries  of  seclusion 
into  a  nation  fully  armed  and  equipped  with  that 
military  spirit  of  which  we,  as  a  nation,  are  so 
lacking.  The  rapid  assimilation  of  Western  ideas 
and  the  successful  appropriation  of  all  the  mate- 
rial elements  of  our  Christian  civilization  by  that 
island  empire  have  astounded  the  world.  Within 
the  last  decade  Japan  has  emerged  conqueror 
from  the  struggle  of  two  modern  wars. 

The  growth  of  the  Japanese  naval  power  must 
cause  us  to  look  to  the  efficiency  of  our  navy,  for 
the  interests  of  Japan  and  those  of  the  United 
States  are,  in  some  quarters,  diametrically  op- 
posed. Japan,  at  first  friendly,  has  suddenly 
changed  her  attitude  in  the  tone  of  her  diplomatic 
intercourse  to  one  not  as  amicable.  I  Nations  are 
no  more  mindful  of  past  favors  than  are  indi- 
viduals. Friendship  between  nations  cannot  al- 
ways stand  the  strain  of  a  conflict  of  interests. 

A  peaceful  conquest  of  China,  and  the  domina- 
tion of  its  markets  is  apparently  Japan's  aim — 
peaceful  if  possible,  but  by  force  if  necessary. 
During  the  present  war  Japan  has  seized  the 


1 8  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

islands  that  belonged  to  Germany,  lying  at  the 
door  of  our  own  islands  in  the  Pacific.  These 
new  possessions  of  Japan  threaten,  if  they  do  not 
sever,  the  lines  of  communication  to  our  own 
colonies.  The  occupation  of  Kiauchau  by  Japan 
is  only  another  step  in  that  domination  of  China 
which  the  Japanese  statesmen  have  long  in- 
tended.1 

An  antipathy  between  races  is  not  itself  a 
cause  of  war.  The  true  causes  of  war  between 
nations  have  their  roots  in  trade  rivalry  and  in 
the  necessity  for  an  expansion  of  territory  for  the 
surplus  population  of  a  vigorous  race;  yet  race 
antipathy  in  the  Pacific  contains  germs  of  possi- 
ble danger.  The  exclusion  of  Japanese  from  our 
country  might  be  used  by  Japan  as  a  casus  belli. 
However,  the  underlying  cause  of  a  war  between 
the  United  States  and  Japan  would  not  be  for 
the  settlement  of  such  a  trivial  matter.  The  true 
reason  would  be  to  enforce  the  Japanese  "  Monroe 
Doctrine"  and  cause  the  United  States  to  evacu- 
ate her  commanding  positions  in  the  Pacific.  The 
Japanese  question  may  be  definitely  settled  by 
liberating  the  Philippines  and  Guam  and  retiring 
from  the  Orient;  but  in  the  event  of  such  an  ac- 


1  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Japan's  ultimatum  to  the  Germans 
at  Kiauchau  was  the  identical  one  which  the  Germans  had  pre- 
sented to  the  Japanese  after  the  latter  had  won  Port  Arthur  from 
the  Chinese.  Thus  does  the  Oriental  know  how  to  bide  his  time. 


OUR  DIPLOMATIC  POSITION        19 

tion  the  United  States  must  also  give  up  its  naval 
bases  in  those  islands.1 

There  are  now  only  two  great  powers  that  can 
enter  into  a  war  for  the  supremacy  of  the  Pacific; 
they  are  the  United  States  and  Japan.  Japan's 
advantage  in  such  a  struggle  is  mainly  due  to 
the  fact  that  her  entire  empire  is  not  only  on 
that  ocean,  but  in  the  strategic  centre  of  its 
western  border. 

Until  the  day  when  Japan  has  succeeded  in 
closing  the  ports  of  China  to  the  commerce  of  all 
other  countries  by  hostile  tariffs,  our  commerce 
will  seek  to  compete  for  its  share  in  the  trade  of 
the  Flowery  Kingdom.  That  trade,  once  large, 
is  dwindling  year  by  year.  American  goods  are 
being  forced  out  of  the  Chinese  market  by  similar 
articles  manufactured  more  cheaply  in  Japan. 
To  regain  that  trade  is  impossible  unless  greater 
aid  is  given  by  our  government.  No  country  can 
ever  win  the  trade  of  the  Orient  that  does  not 
make  it  a  national  concern. 

As  long  as  Japan  is  engaged  in  a  commercial 
penetration  of  China  she  may  not  yet  divert  her 
attention  to  a  further  development  of  the  islands 
lying  south  of  her.  Japan,  like  Germany,  is 
dominated  by  the  military  spirit,  which  accepts 

1  So  far  as  the  Philippines  are  concerned,  we  must  either  abandon 
them  or  else  provide  ample  means  for  their  defense.  JThere  is  no 
tcrtium  quid. 


20  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

as  fundamental  the  biological  necessity  of  war 
and  the  duty  of  self-assertion.  Such  a  nation  of 
warriors  will  not  hesitate  to  follow  through  its 
carefully  worked-out  plan  of  national  expansion, 
even  though  it  encounters  a  nation  of  double  the 
population  and  treble  the  resources.  Within  the 
last  few  years  the  contact  with  Western  civili- 
zation has  had  a  marked  effect  upon  the  Japanese 
people.  Their  character  is  undergoing  a  change. 
They  are  losing  their  military  spirit  and  becom- 
ing more  wedded  to  commercialism.  This  fact 
has  been  deplored  by  their  statesmen,  who  were 
born  and  trained  under  the  precepts  of  Bushido, 
"the  soul  of  Japan." 

Thus  we  see  that  in  owning  islands  at  her  very 
doors  there  will  be  many  points  of  possible  con- 
tact with  this  military  nation  of  the  Pacific.  It, 
therefore,  becomes  our  duty  to  prepare  our  armed 
forces  in  the  event  that  we  may  be  called  upon 
to  use  them,  not  for  aggressive  action,  but  to 
maintain  our  dignity  in  the  Orient. 

In  the  Atlantic  our  Monroe  Doctrine  has  ever 
been  distasteful  to  Germany.  For  years  she  has 
been  colonizing  Brazil  until  now  she  has  there  a 
population  of  over  a  million  Germans.  Whoever 
is  the  victor  in  the  present  war  in  Europe,  the 
spirit  of  the  German  nation  cannot  long  remain 
subdued.  Even  if  defeated,  it  will  rise  up  stronger 
than  ever,  with  its  convictions  as  solidly  implanted 


OUR  DIPLOMATIC  POSITION        21 

as  before  the  war.  Germany  is  one  of  the  world's 
greatest  manufacturing  peoples.  She  requires 
colonies  to  supply  the  raw  materials  and  food- 
stuffs needed  in  the  Vaterland  and  colonies 
wherein  to  open  a  field  of  activity  for  the  im- 
mense intellectual  labor  forces  now  lying  unpro- 
ductive in  Germany.  Furthermore,  Germany 
requires,  for  the  protection  of  her  trade,  a  base 
in  the  Caribbean.  She  has  already  entered  into 
negotiations  with  several  of  the  minor  independent 
governments  bordering  on  that  sea  for  the  ac- 
quisition of  such  harbors  for  commercial  pur- 
poses. Will  not  the  occupation  of  such  harbors, 
even  for  commercial  reasons,  be  considered  by 
the  United  States  as  a  step  toward  a  more  general 
occupation  later  on,  and  would  it  not  be  resisted  ? 
If  Germany  should  be  victorious  in  the  struggle 
in  Europe,  which  is  not  beyond  the  realms  of 
possibility — if  Germany  were  to  wrest  the  com- 
mand of  the  sea  from  England — then  our  states- 
men will  have  to  consider  the  question  of  the 
application  and  limits  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
If  we  are  willing  to  engage  in  a  war  with  Germany, 
which  would  probably  be  a  naval  war,  at  least  at 
first,  it  is  doubtful  whether  we  could  protect  our 
interests  in  the  Caribbean  and  in  South  America. 
The  movement  of  a  fleet  across  the  Atlantic 
would  not  be  a  difficult  task  for  her.  It  is  one 
that  the  German  general  staff  has  already  worked 


22  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

out  to  the  minutest  detail.  She  would  have  all 
those  difficulties  of  long  lines  of  communication 
for  the  transportation  of  supplies  from  her  home 
bases  to  her  fleet  that  the  United  States  would 
have  if  it  attempted  to  move  its  fleet  for  hostile 
purposes  across  the  Pacific;  but  those  are  diffi- 
culties that  German  national  efficiency,  as  re- 
flected in  her  army  and  navy,  can  much  more 
easily  overcome. 

While  we  should  be  engaged  with  Germany  in 
the  Atlantic,  Japan,  no  longer  under  the  influence 
of  English  politics,  could  work  her  will  in  the 
Pacific.  All  our  island  possessions  would  fall  be- 
fore her  forces.  America  would  be  driven  in  be- 
hind her  own  original  borders. 

The  United  States  has  long  enjoyed  immunity 
from  the  interference  of  Europe  and  Asia  in  its 
political  affairs.  This  immunity  has  been  due 
largely  to  the  policy  of  Great  Britain.  Through 
the  powerful  sentiment  of  the  blood-tie  between 
England  and  the  United  States  the  former  has 
been  able  to  further  its  purposes  on  the  American 
continent  without  seriously  alienating  the  friend- 
ship of  the  great  republic.  As  long  as  England 
was  able  to  thwart  Germany  in  her  colonization 
schemes  she  was  content  to  tolerate  the  rivalry 
of  America  and  willingly  granted  her  moral  sup- 
port to  our  Monroe  Doctrine,  while  through  her 
alliance  with  Japan  she  held  the  control  over  that 


OUR  DIPLOMATIC  POSITION        23 

country's  aspirations  in  the  Pacific.  With  such 
a  champion  as  England,  our  thoughts  have 
naturally  been  turned  away  from  the  possible 
dangers  to  our  interests  in  case  the  equilibrium 
of  forces  in  the  world  should  become  disturbed. 
We  have,  in  fact,  reasoned,  as  a  matter  of  course, 
that  this  equilibrium  would  always  be  maintained 
and  that  the  United  States  would  never  be  re- 
quired to  exert  any  effort  to  this  end.  This  idea, 
to  the  American  nation,  has  become  an  obses- 
sion. But  the  equilibrium  is  now  about  to  be 
disturbed.  The  present  struggle  in  Europe  can- 
not bring  about  any  other  result.  Either  Ger- 
many will  emerge  vanquished  or  England  will 
surrender  the  command  of  the  sea  to  Germany. 
Whichever  happens,  it  matters  not  which,  the 
time  has  now  arrived  for  the  people  of  the  United 
States  to  awaken  and  realize  the  besetting  dangers 
surrounding  them. 

Let  us  stop  and  consider  the  characteristics 
and  attributes  of  this  military  power  in  the 
Pacific.  Japanese  militarism  is,  perhaps,  difficult 
to  separate  from  patriotism.  One  is  simply  the 
expression  of  the  other.  The  organized  strength 
and  patriotism  of  Japan  is  her  defense.  Every 
Japanese  considers  it  a  privilege  rather  than  a 
mere  duty  to  serve  in  the  army.  Under  her 
efficient  form  of  government  the  strength  and 
efficiency  of  the  army  and  navy  have  kept  pace 


24  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

with  the  nation's  commercial  and  industrial  prog- 
ress. The  well-ordered  organizations  of  her  gov- 
ernment and  of  her  military  services  are  funda- 
mentally sound.  No  conflicting  lines  of  authority 
or  responsibility  are  permitted  to  exist.  There- 
fore the  greatest  efficiency  has  been  realized  with 
the  money  appropriated.  Her  military  and  naval 
development  has  been  guided  by  military  states- 
men and  executed  by  military  and  naval  men. 
The  size  and  power  of  her  army  and  navy  is  based 
upon  a  definite  national  policy.  In  efficiency  and 
strength  both  military  services  have  thus  far  re- 
mained outside  of  politics.  High  command  has 
gone  to  those  who  have  demonstrated  their  abil- 
ity in  active  service  in  war  and  peace.  Such  well- 
ordered  methods  have  given  to  the  personnel  the 
precious  qualities  so  vital  to  successful  cohesion. 
The  Japanese  nation  is  united.  Her  navy  has 
been  trained  in  the  school  of  war.  Her  position 
in  the  Pacific  and  her  instant  preparedness  give 
her  the  advantage  of  initiative.  She  owns  no 
outlying  possessions  which  might,  if  captured  by 
us,  seriously  affect  the  issue,  while  we  have  many 
such  possessions  lying  defenseless  within  her 
sphere  of  operations.  Her  large  and  well-organized 
army  can  be  utilized  to  occupy  as  many  of  our 
possessions  as  she  will  deem  advisable  in  order 
to  deny  them  to  our  fleet.  With  all  possible 
available  bases  in  the  hands  of  the  Japanese,  our 


OUR  DIPLOMATIC  POSITION       25 

fleet  will  have  no  base  near  enough  to  the  Japa- 
nese coast  from  which  it  could  operate  in  order 
to  control  the  seas  in  that  area.  Yet  it  is  only  by 
controlling  the  seas  that  we  can  hope  to  succeed  in 
a  war  with  Japan. 

In  the  event  of  hostilities  in  the  far  East,  then, 
the  first  decision  that  will  have  to  be  made  by 
our  statesmen  will  be:  How  shall  we  bring  the 
war  to  a  successful  conclusion  ?  Hawaii  will  be 
our  only  remaining  island  possession  in  the  Pa- 
cific. With  the  fleet  at  Hawaii,  and  with  Japan 
controlling  the  waters  of  the  far  East  how  shall 
we  operate  to  bring  her  to  terms?  This  is  a 
question  that  would  have  to  be  decided  by  our 
naval  general  staff,  if  one  existed. 

A  study  of  the  history  of  the  conflicts  in  which 
great  nations  have  engaged  reveals  two  underlying 
causes  of  war:  one  is  the  control  of  commerce; 
the  other  is  the  possession  of  the  sources  of  those 
two  great  industrial  necessities — metal  and  fuel. 
But  the  prime  factor  involved  in  the  evolution  of 
a  navy  is  the  protection  of  trade,  for  the  safe- 
guarding of  which  the  laws  of  nations  should  be 
framed  so  as  to  give  every  confidence  to  those 
embarking  on  commercial  ventures  across  the  seas. 
In  other  words,  a  government  should  protect  its 
commerce  as  if  it  were  its  own  enterprise.  In  an- 
cient times  commerce  was  exposed  to  great  risks, 
subject  to  constant  pillage,  and  hunted  down  in 


26  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

peace  as  well  as  in  war.  Nations,  therefore,  ap- 
preciated the  necessity  of  protecting  their  mer- 
chantmen, and  commerce  became  an  armed  force 
in  the  world.  Even  the  purely  commercial  states 
became  armed  powers  for  the  protection  of  their 
trade  routes. 

But,  curiously  enough,  the  great  political  em- 
pires of  the  world  formerly  imperfectly  developed 
their  own  industries  and  had  little  sympathy  with 
any  means  of  prosperity  from  without.  Their  sole 
aim  was  either  to  absorb  under  their  own  power- 
ful sceptre  or  else  to  destroy  whatever  was  rich  or 
great  beyond  their  borders.  Nothing  is  more 
marked  in  the  early  history  of  the  world  than  this 
struggle  of  commerce  to  obtain  security. 

The  strength  of  Rome  lay  in  her  legions;  that 
of  Carthage  in  her  ships.  Carthage  became  the 
greatest  power  in  the  Mediterranean  and  inherited 
the  trade  of  her  Phoenician  ancestors,  and  also  the 
trade  of  Egypt,  Greece,  and  Asia  Minor.  But 
antagonism  between  the  great  military  non-com- 
mercial power  of  Rome  and  the  great  military 
commercial  power  of  Carthage,  whose  interests 
crossed  at  so  many  points,  caused  the  downfall  of 
Carthage  and  her  destruction.  At  the  same  time 
Rome  accomplished  the  destruction  of  another 
great  trade  centre  of  which  she  was  jealous, 
Corinth.  Palmyra  likewise  fell  half  a  century 
after  the  spoliation  of  Athens.  And  this  policy 


OUR  DIPLOMATIC  POSITION        27 

of  Rome,  of  wiping  out  all  the  outlying  centres 
of  trade,  eventually  caused  her  own  downfall,  be- 
cause it  hampered  her  own  power  to  hold  or 
turn  to  profitable  account  these  valuable  con- 
quests. 

Rome  never  became  a  great  trade  centre,  al- 
though the  city  grew  to  great  size  and  required 
immense  imports  of  food  to  support  its  popula- 
tion. These  imports  came  in  the  nature  of  taxes. 
For  Rome  neither  supplied  exports  nor  built  up  a 
carrying  trade.  Her  contribution  to  civilization 
was  her  organization  and  her  administration.  Her 
service  to  humanity  was,  therefore,  political  and 
non-economic  in  character.  In  the  arts  and  in 
diplomacy  her  citizens  excelled,  and  through  their 
skill  in  these  they  succeeded  in  living  on  the  labor 
of  subject  people.  The  "Pax  Romana"  was  the 
commodity  which  Rome  exchanged  for  these  con- 
tributions. 

By  many  the  analogy  between  England  and 
Rome  is  considered  noteworthy.  England  is  the 
Rome  of  to-day,  but,  unlike  Rome,  she  herself  is 
a  great  maritime  nation — a  military  one  on  the 
seas.  Her  geographical  position  was  believed  by 
her  statesmen  not  to  require  a  great  army.  Eng- 
land spread  her  civilization  over  the  other  conti- 
nents, as  did  Rome.  England  has  organized  the 
world's  commerce  and  by  so  doing  has  given 
enormous  impulses  to  the  manufacturing  indus- 


28  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

tries.  But  a  nation,  having  fulfilled  its  mission  in 
civilization  and  reached  the  zenith  of  its  power, 
will  decline.  This  is  the  law  of  nature.  Germany 
and  the  United  States,  and  possibly  Japan,  are 
the  modern  Carthage,  Athens,  and  Venice.  There- 
fore, if  England  is  to  remain  predominant  these 
commercial  powers  must  be  controlled.  Even 
now  England  employs  in  her  industrial  life  many 
Germans  and  Americans,  because  they  are  more 
efficient,  reliable,  and  painstaking  than  English- 
men. And  for  the  maintenance  of  her  enormous 
commerce  England,  to-day,  is  indebted  to  the 
volume  of  American  and  German  trade. 

The  rapid  rise  of  the  economic  power  of  Ger- 
many has  shaken  England's  faith  in  her  own  pre- 
dominance. She  fears  the  loss  of  her  naval  su- 
premacy and  of  her  control  over  the  commerce 
of  the  world.  Her  policy  has  been  to  restrict 
Germany's  colonial  expansion,  for  she  fears  the 
rivalry  of  a  more  efficient  race.  Yet  her  fear 
of  Germany  is  not  half  so  great  as  her  fear  of 
America.  Her  statesmen  see  the  importance  of 
first  settling  with  Germany  before  the  United 
States  waxes  stronger.  Once  the  German  fleet 
has  been  annihilated,  then  the  suppression  of  po- 
tential American  ambitions  will  be  immeasurably 
easier.  So  long  as  the  German  fleet  is  a  force 
to  be  reckoned  with,  England  dare  not  show  her 
cloven  hoof  to  the  United  States.  Great  Britain 


OUR  DIPLOMATIC  POSITION       29 

must  sacrifice  every  consideration  for  the  main- 
tenance of  her  naval  supremacy. 

In  1860  the  United  States  owned  5,000,000  tons 
of  shipping,  England  only  4,000,000.  The  United 
States  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War  was  in  a 
position  to  control  the  carrying  trade  of  the  world. 
The  action  of  England  in  supporting  the  Con- 
federacy and  desiring  their  independence  was 
logical  and  necessary  were  she  to  remain  the  mis- 
tress of  the  sea.  Much  of  the  shipping  of  the 
United  States  was  destroyed  by  war-ships  fitted 
out  by  the  Confederates  in  English  ports;  and 
when  the  Civil  War  was  over,  England's  carrying 
trade  totalled  6,000,000  tons,  while  that  of  the 
United  States  amounted  to  only  4,000,000,  and 
was  rapidly  on  the  decline. 

In  1873  England  owned  43  per  cent  of  the  mer- 
chant carrying  trade  of  the  world.  The  United 
States  owned  14  per  cent,  and  Germany  6  per 
cent.  In  1914  England  owned  53  per  cent,  the 
United  States  9  per  cent,  and  Germany  13  per 
cent.  England's  vital  interest  in  the  rebating  of 
tolls  to  our  coastwise  shipping  through  the  Canal 
is  evident  to  all  students  of  her  commercial 
history.  Even  without  rebating,  the  ship-build- 
ing industry  in  the  United  States  will  increase. 
There  will,  therefore,  be  a  cut  in  England's  carry- 
ing trade,  for  some  of  our  trade  that  is  now  carried 
in  English  bottoms  will  be  carried  under  our  own 


30  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

flag.  With  the  United  States  and  Germany  cut- 
ting into  her  53  per  cent,  England  fears  she  will 
lose  her  advantage. 

We  have  seen  wherein  lie  possible  points  of  con- 
tact between  the  United  States  and  the  three  great 
military  nations  that  are  each  determined  to 
secure  its  proportion  of  the  world's  commerce, 
and  more  than  its  proportion  if  possible.  Be- 
tween these  four  nations — England,  Germany, 
Japan,  and  the  United  States — the  bulk  of  the 
commerce  of  the  world  is  divided.  Where  is  the 
power  capable  of  limiting  the  share  of  each? 
There  is  but  one  power  capable  of  accomplishing 
this.  That  is  the  power  of  diplomacy  backed  by 
force,  or,  in  other  words,  the  power  of  national 
efficiency. 

It  is  not  too  much  to  believe  that  in  the  struggle 
for  commercial  supremacy  England  will  use  every 
tool  within  her  power  to  maintain  her  position. 
It  is  not  too  much  to  believe  that  England,  some- 
time in  the  near  future,  may  employ  the  military 
power  of  her  ally — Japan — for  the  purpose  of 
eliminating  one  of  her  competitors.  We  have 
reason  to  believe  that,  thus  far,  England  has  pro- 
tected us  from  the  military  aggression  of  Japan. 
There  is  a  report  that  in  1907  the  Japanese  mili- 
tary party  had  actually  ordered  operations  against 
the  United  States — which  contemplated  nothing 
less  than  the  occupation  of  the  Philippine  Islands. 


OUR  DIPLOMATIC  POSITION       31 

It  has  been  said  that  troops  were  already  on  board 
the  transports,  and  that  these  vessels  were  loaded 
and  ready  to  sail  at  a  moment's  notice.  Eng- 
land's veto  alone  stopped  this  movement.  She 
was  not  ready  to  see  America  involved  in  a 
struggle  with  her  ally,  for  America's  trade  was 
still  carried  in  British  bottoms.  How  will  she  act 
after  our  merchant  flag  again  covers  the  seas  ? 

America  is  too  prone  to  confound  military  re- 
sources with  military  strength.  Military  resources 
comprise  the  wealth  of  the  nation,  the  number 
of  able-bodied  men  of  military  age,  and  the  num- 
ber of  ships  available  for  war.  Military  strength, 
on  the  other  hand,  is  measured  by  the  number  of 
trained  soldiers  properly  organized  and  equipped 
that  may  be  brought  to  a  given  point  at  a  given 
time,  and  the  number  of  war-ships  fully  manned 
and  trained  that  can  be  quickly  concentrated  for 
the  purpose  of  meeting  the  enemy's  fleet.  Let  us 
remember  that  in  1900  China  had  a  population 
estimated  at  over  400,000,000.  Yet  her  military 
strength  was  so  inadequate  that  she  was  unable 
to  prevent  15,000  foreign  troops  of  Europe,  Asia, 
and  America  from  marching  ninety  miles  inland, 
capturing  her  capital,  and  dictating  terms  of 
peace  humiliating  to  every  inhabitant  of  the 
Middle  Kingdom  from  within  the  very  walls  of 
her  Forbidden  City. 


CHAPTER  III 

MILITARY  PEACE  PREPARATION 

IT  is  easily  within  the  reach  of  every  citizen  to 
discover  the  failure  of  our  military  policy. 
Our  military  writers  have  eloquently  con- 
demned it.     General  Washington,  in  his  corres- 
pondence, dispassionately  set  forth  its  evils. 

It  is  unfortunately  the  popular  impression  that 
our  people  acquitted  themselves  creditably  as  a 
nation  during  the  war  of  the  Revolution,  and  it 
comes  as  a  shock  to  know  that  such  was  not  the 
case.  Even  with  our  country  fanned  to  flame 
by  the  invasion  by  British  troops  it  was  difficult, 
almost  impossible,  for  us  to  raise  men  to  repel  the 
enemy.  Fortunately  there  were  plenty  of  trained 
officers  who  volunteered  their  swords,  and  these 
were  influential  enough  in  their  communities  to 
enroll  volunteers.  In  the  first  skirmishes  of  the 
war,  notably  at  Bunker  Hill,  such  veterans  as 
Prescott,  Putnam,  Stark,  and  Knowlton  were  a 
strong  factor  in  the  behavior  of  the  minutemen. 
But  there  were  many  occasions  when,  even  when 
commanded  by  experienced  leaders,  our  militia 
acquitted  themselves  none  too  well. 

32 


MILITARY  PEACE  PREPARATION    33 

At  this  time  the  nation  was  a  loosely  knit  con- 
federation, an  assemblage  of  small  nations,  each 
sufficient  unto  itself  and  jealous  of  all  the  rest. 
Congress  called  upon  the  colonies  to  furnish  troops. 
Those  that  did  not  feel  the  effects  of  the 
war  in  some  cases  refused  to  obey;  the  others 
grudgingly  sent  men,  but  far  less  than  the  numbers 
needed.  The  necessity  of  a  force  owing  allegiance 
to  the  United  States  exclusively,  consequently 
became  imperative,  and  Congress  fortunately 
heeded  the  timely  advice  and  ordered  the  raising 
of  Continental  troops  in  certain  States  near  the 
points  of  invasion.  It  was  a  small  beginning,  but 
this  handful  of  regularly  enlisted  troops  formed 
the  nucleus  of  the  army  which  finally  won  us  our 
independence. 

Washington,  who  had  the  power  of  appointing 
officers,  at  times  was  greatly  discouraged  at  the 
unpatriotic  attitude  of  those  who  sent  in  their 
names.  Companies  enlisted  in  one  State  refused 
to  serve  under  officers  from  another  State. 
"Many  of  the  officers,"  he  wrote,  "sent  in  their 
names  to  serve  in  expectation  of  promotion; 
others  stood  aloof  to  see  what  advantage  they 
could  make  for  themselves,  while  a  number  who 
had  declined  have  again  sent  in  their  names  to 
serve.  So  great  has  the  confusion  arising  from 
these  and  many  other  perplexing  circumstances 
been,  that  I  found  it  absolutely  impossible  to  fix 


34  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

this  very  interesting  business  exactly  on  the  plan 
resolved  on  in  the  conference.  The  difficulty 
with  the  soldiers  is  as  great,  indeed  more  so,  if 
possible,  than  with  the  officers.  They  will  not 
enlist  unless  they  know  their  colonel,  lieutenant- 
colonel,  major,  and  captain,  so  that  it  was  neces- 
sary to  fix  the  officers  the  first  thing,  which  is,  at 
last,  in  some  manner  done,  and  I  have  given  out 
enlisting  orders." 

So  discouraged  was  Washington  at  the  failure 
of  his  countrymen  that  he  later  added:  " There 
must  be  some  other  stimulus  besides  love  of  coun- 
try, to  make  men  fond  of  the  service.  Instead  of 
pressing  to  be  engaged  in  the  cause  of  their  coun- 
try, which  I  vainly  flattered  myself  would  be  the 
case,  I  find  we  are  likely  to  be  deserted  in  a  most 
critical  time.  Those  that  have  enlisted  must 
have  a  furlough.  The  Connecticut  troops,  upon 
whom  I  reckoned,  are  as  backward,  indeed,  if 
possible,  more  so  than  the  people  of  this  (Massa- 
chusetts) colony.  Our  situation  is  truly  alarming. ' ' 

Again,  in  a  private  letter  to  a  friend  he  unbur- 
dens his  heart  more  completely.  "Such  a  dearth 
of  public  spirit  and  such  want  of  virtue,  such  stock- 
jobbing and  fertility  in  all  the  low  arts  to  obtain 
advantages  of  one  kind  or  another  in  this  great 
change  of  military  arrangement  I  never  saw  be- 
fore, and  pray  God's  mercy  that  I  may  never  be 
witness  to  again." 


MILITARY  PEACE  PREPARATION    35 

But  there  were  so  many  desertions  that  it  was 
almost  impossible  for  Washington  and  his  officers 
to  hold  the  men.  Any  system  of  voluntary  en- 
listment necessarily  places  a  government  in  the 
position  of  a  suppliant,  and  when  patriotism  and 
popular  enthusiasm  no  longer  suffice  to  fill  the 
ranks,  resort  must  be  had  to  the  vicious  practice 
of  giving  bounties  to  recruits.  And  that  system 
has  been  found  necessary  in  almost  all  of  our 
military  operations. 

If  we  read  the  true  military  history  of  our  coun- 
try, and  not  the  highly  colored  accounts  written 
for  the  school-reading  of  our  children,  we  shall 
learn  some  startling  facts  of  the  disastrous  effects 
of  our  past  military  policy.  We  shall  find  out 
that  at  no  time  during  the  Revolutionary  War 
did  we  have  sufficient  dependable  troops.  After 
five  years*  experience,  Washington,  in  a  letter  to 
Congress,  expressed  his  opinion  of  our  policy 
in  these  words:  "Had  we  formed  a  permanent 
army  in  the  beginning,  which,  by  the  continuance 
of  the  same  men  in  service,  had  been  capable  of 
discipline,  we  never  should  have  had  to  retreat 
with  a  handful  of  men  across  the  Delaware  in 
1776,  trembling  for  the  fate  of  America,  which 
nothing  but  the  infatuation  of  the  enemy  could 
have  saved;  we  should  not  have  remained  all  the 
succeeding  winter  at  their  mercy,  with  sometimes 
scarcely  a  sufficient  body  of  men  to  mount  the 


36  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

ordinary  guards,  liable  at  any  moment  to  be  dis- 
sipated, if  they  had  only  thought  proper  to  march 
against  us;  we  should  not  have  been  under  the 
necessity  of  fighting  at  Brandywine,  with  an  un- 
equal number  of  raw  troops,  and  afterward  of 
seeing  Philadelphia  fall  a  prey  to  the  victorious 
army;  we  should  not  have  been  at  Valley  Forge 
with  less  than  half  the  force  of  the  enemy,  desti- 
tute of  everything,  in  a  situation  neither  to  resist 
nor  to  retire;  we  should  not  have  seen  New  York 
left  with  a  handful  of  men,  yet  an  overmatch  for 
the  main  army  of  these  States,  while  the  principal 
part  of  their  force  was  detached  for  the  reduction 
of  two  of  them;  we  should  not  have  found  our- 
selves this  spring  so  weak  as  to  be  insulted  by 
5,000  men,  unable  to  protect  our  baggage  and 
magazines,  their  security  depending  on  a  good 
countenance  and  a  want  of  enterprise  in  the 
enemy;  we  should  not  have  been  the  greatest 
part  of  the  war  inferior  to  the  enemy,  indebted 
for  our  safety  to  their  inactivity,  enduring  fre- 
quently the  mortification  of  seeing  inviting  op- 
portunities to  ruin  them  pass  unimproved  for 
want  of  a  force  which  the  country  was  completely 
able  to  afford,  and  of  seeing  the  country  ravaged, 
our  towns  burnt,  the  inhabitants  plundered, 
abused,  murdered  with  impunity  from  the  same 


cause." 


Such  were  Washington's  thoughts  on  our  mill- 


MILITARY  PEACE  PREPARATION    37 

tary  policy;  on  the  value  of  raw  recruits;  on  the 
value  of  undisciplined  men ;  on  the  value  of  the  pa- 
triotism of  our  people.  Since  then  has  that  value 
increased  ?  Has  it  not,  on  the  contrary,  lessened  ? 
Even  with  our  vast  numbers,  are  we  not  worse 
off  to-day  because  we  shall  have  pitted  against 
us  a  military  force  increased  in  like  proportions 
to  our  great  increase  in  population  ?  Our  small 
army  cannot  furnish  a  sufficient  nucleus  of  trained 
troops.  The  great  disorganization  and  inex- 
perience so  eloquently  condemned  by  Washington 
will  be  magnified  many  times  to-day,  for  the  fibre 
of  the  nation  has  degenerated  since  the  days  of  '76. 
A  truly  dispassionate  investigation  of  our  other 
foreign  wars,  and  of  our  Civil  War,  will  disclose 
almost  identical  defects  in  policy.  Tracing  nearly 
all  of  our  sacrifices  to  the  want  of  a  military  system 
in  our  Civil  War,  and  the  abortive  strategy  of  the 
War  Department,  General  Upton  laid  down  the 
axiom:  "that  a  nation  which  goes  to  war  unpre- 
pared educates  its  statesmen  at  more  expense  than 
its  soldiers."  The  strategy  of  the  Civil  War  was 
decided  by  civilians  who  feared  the  power  of  a 
dictator,  not  realizing  that,  while  armies  are  cre- 
ated by  war,  dictators  are  born  only  of  disaster. 
Washington  was  not  made  a  dictator  until  disaster 
overtook  us.  Yet  this  fear  of  a  dictator  induced 
us,  during  the  Civil  War,  to  dispense  with  our 
general-in-chief  after  our  armies  had  been  disci- 


38  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

plined  and  drilled  ready  for  battle,  with  the  result 
that  the  conflict  was  prolonged  for  four  years 
through  defective  strategy,  the  blame  for  which 
we  must  ascribe  to  the  system  of  government, 
which,  in  every  war  since  the  adoption  of  the 
Constitution  and  during  the  intervals  of  peace, 
has  permitted  a  civil  officer  below  the  President 
to  override  our  military  leaders  and  bring  to 
naught  their  wisdom  and  counsel. 

Is  it  not  time  that  we  recognize  the  moral  duty 
of  the  State  to  train  as  many  of  its  citizens  as 
possible  in  the  use  of  arms  ?  Such  training  is  not 
only  in  preparation  for  war  but  also  in  order  that 
each  individual  may  be  benefited  by  a  certain 
amount  of  military  service  which  unquestionably 
improves  his  physical  and  moral  stamina.  It  is 
far  wiser  yearly  to  spend  sufficient  funds  for  pur- 
poses of  defense  than  to  waste  vast  sums  of 
money  in  futile  attempts,  at  the  last  moment,  to 
avoid  a  peril  that  has  been  disregarded  during  a 
generation  of  fundamental  blunders. 

Military  qualities  are  not  second  nature.  As  a 
nation  the  American  people  shun  military  service. 
The  occupations  of  peace  are  more  pleasing  and 
less  exacting  than  the  duties  of  a  soldier.  The 
individual  looks  upon  military  service  as  one  in 
which  his  individualism  will  be  stifled.  His  in- 
tellect resists  such  repression.  But  military  train- 
ing, on  the  ^contrary,  has  the  opposite  effect. 


MILITARY  PEACE  PREPARATION    39 

For  it  reveals  to  the  recruit  the  true  plane  of  the 
nation's  welfare,  which  is  materially  higher  than 
that  of  the  individual  himself.  If  this  could 
only  be  recognized  by  our  people,  the  American 
soldier's  calling  would  be  better  understood  and 
the  uniform  of  the  government's  defenders  would 
become  to  him  a  badge  of  honor  rather  than,  what 
some  consider  it  now,  a  livery  of  shame. 

Furthermore,  our  military  system  must  be  de- 
veloped. War  is  the  means  of  obtaining  political 
ends  and  of  supporting  the  moral  strength  of  a 
nation  when  those  ends  are  contested  by  rival 
powers.  Without  the  means  of  waging  war  the 
nation's  moral  strength  rapidly  degenerates.  A 
large  standing  army  is  not  essential  if  the  citizens 
of  the  country  are  trained  in  the  use  of  arms.  All 
that  is  required  is  a  workable  military  system  by 
which  we  can  concentrate  at  the  point  of  attack 
a  sufficiently  trained  force  to  repel  an  invader. 

Our  permanent  coast  defenses  are  of  no  value 
against  the  attacks  of  a  military  nation  unless 
we  have  sufficient  trained  men  and  modern  arms 
to  protect  them.  For  the  defense  of  every  har- 
bor of  importance  on  both  our  Pacific  and  At- 
lantic coasts  Congress  has  provided  land  forts. 
These  fortifications  can  prevent  an  enemy  only 
from  landing  on  our  shores  within  the  range  of 
the  fortifications'  guns.  Their  guns  deny  to  the 
enemy  the  facilities  of  a  commodious  harbor  for 


40  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

disembarking  his  troops  until  those  guns  have 
been  silenced  and  captured.  But  recent  wars 
have  demonstrated  that  efficient  military  nations 
can  disembark  large  armies  even  in  localities 
where  harbor  facilities  are  not  available.  The 
United  States,  during  the  campaign  of  Santiago, 
when  that  harbor  was  denied  us  by  Spanish  guns, 
landed  15,000  soldiers  on  the  open  coast  without 
a  single  casualty.  A  more  military  nation  than 
ourselves  can  readily  disembark  several  hundred 
thousand  men  beyond  the  range  of  our  forts' 
guns  and,  if  we  lack  a  mobile  army  of  trained  men, 
can  attack  our  big  guns  from  the  rear  and  in  an 
incredibly  short  time  reduce  our  fortifications  and 
obtain  command  of  our  harbors  for  their  own  use. 
Expensive  fortifications,  unguarded  by  a  mobile 
army  are,  therefore,  in  the  light  of  the  lessons  of 
Liege  and  Maubeuge,  a  waste  of  the  nation's 
money. 

A  military  nation  such  as  Germany  or  Japan 
can,  once  our  fleet  has  been  destroyed  or  blockaded 
in  port,  throw  a  trained  army  upon  our  coast-line 
within  two  weeks  of  the  commencement  of  hos- 
tilities. Even  if  it  were  possible  to  know  the 
point  of  landing,  and  we  had  the  time  to  concen- 
trate our  entire  regular  force  at  that  point,  it 
would  not  be  large  enough  or  sufficiently  equipped 
to  stop  the  invader.  The  militia  and  State  troops 
would  be  of  no  value  to  us  until  they  had  been 


MILITARY  PEACE  PREPARATION   41 

trained  as  soldiers.  This  would  require  many 
months.  Great  Britain  is  now  suffering  the  pangs 
of  remorse  over  her  military  unpreparedness. 
Millions  of  men  are  to-day  being  trained  in  Eng- 
land. If  these  men  could  have  been  despatched 
to  the  Continental  battle-field  in  the  first  week  of 
hostilities,  the  decisive  battle  of  the  war  would 
have  been  fought  long  since,  and  successfully  for 
England !  But  the  very  men  who  should  have 
been  trained  during  peace  in  the  use  of  arms  ar- 
rived on  the  firing-line  too  late. 

To-day  the  United  States  is  justified  in  devot- 
ing most  of  its  energies  to  the  increase  of  its  naval 
power,  for  its  fleet  is  now,  as  it  was  in  1812  and 
in  1898,  the  nation's  first  line  of  defense.  But 
with  our  fleet  weaker  than  our  probable  antago- 
nist's, should  not  our  second  line  of  defense  be 
maintained  at  double  strength?  That  second 
line  comprises  our  land  fortifications  and  our 
mobile  army.  We  all  understand  the  value  of 
boundary  fortifications.  In  following  the  great 
war  in  Europe,  we  have  seen  what  great  towers 
of  strength  they  are  when  used  legitimately  to 
rest  the  flanks  of  an  army.  The  incalculable  value 
of  the  fortifications  of  Verdun,  Toul,  Epinal, 
and  Belfort  is  apparent.  Between  these  fortifica- 
tions the  allied  armies  have  been  drawn  up.  The 
mobile  army  has  saved  the  fortifications  from  de- 
struction, while  the  fortifications  have  supported 


42  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

the  most  vulnerable  points  of  attack.  Forts  and 
mobile  armies  are  supplementary.  Each  is  neces- 
sary to  the  other.  In  the  same  way,  on  our  sea 
frontiers  our  armies  must  rest  their  flanks  upon 
the  fortifications  which  the  enemy  is  bent  upon 
capturing.  The  army  protects  that  part  of  the 
fortifications  in  the  rear  beyond  the  arc  of  fire  of 
the  fort  guns.  The  army  drives  back  the  enemy 
and  holds  it  at  such  a  distance  that  it  cannot  use 
heavy  siege-guns  for  the  reduction  of  the  forts. 

If,  after  the  close  of  the  present  European  con- 
flict, a  great  military  nation  should  emerge  vic- 
torious and  the  policies  of  the  victor  conflicted 
with  the  policies  of  this  republic,  and  if  that  nation 
invoked  a  war  for  the  purpose  of  a  settlement,  on 
obtaining  control  of  the  seas,  that  nation  could 
land,  in  the  vicinity  of  New  York,  an  army  which, 
in  two  weeks  or  even  less,  would  destroy  our  for- 
tifications and  hold  the  city  and  its  millions  of 
citizens  at  its  mercy.  It  is  idle  for  us  even  to 
consider  that  our  defense  would  be  an  insur- 
mountable obstacle  to  such  a  feat.  Our  raw  re- 
serves, supported  by  the  entire  regular  army, 
could  not  make  a  "war  machine"  hesitate  a  single 
moment  in  its  stride.  Like  clockwork  it  would 
advance  from  its  landing-place,  sweeping  away 
our  puny  opposition  until  its  object  was  firmly 
within  its  grasp.  The  destruction  of  property 
entailed  would  amount  to  hundreds  of  millions, 


MILITARY  PEACE  PREPARATION   43 

and  the  indemnity  levied  would  cripple  the  na- 
tion for  years  to  come.  The  cost  of  a  navy  to 
make  such  a  debacle  impossible  is  a  mere  pittance 
compared  to  the  great  financial  loss  which  would 
result  from  a  catastrophe  such  as  this. 

The  loss  to  the  country  through  indemnity, 
through  loss  by  destruction,  and  loss  by  disloca- 
tion would  amount  to  a  figure  beyond  our  com- 
prehension. In  1871  Germany  exacted  an  in- 
demnity from  France  of  $1,000,000,000 — an 
amount  sufficient  to  build  fifty  dreadnaughts. 
The  loss  by  destruction  from  such  a  campaign  in  a 
populous  locality  like  New  York  would  amount 
in  addition  to  even  more  than  the  indemnity  paid 
by  France.  And  the  loss  in  trade  and  commerce 
(for  from  the  day  the  invader's  foot  sullied  our 
shores  all  business  would  stop)  would  amount  to 
additional  hundreds  of  millions. 

No  military  man  of  intelligence  can  refute  the 
possibility  of  such  a  disaster.  And  this  would  be 
only  part  of  the  nation's  losses.  All  of  our  coast 
cities  could  be  as  easily  reduced,  laid  waste,  or 
placed  under  tribute.  Let  us  remember  how,  in 
1814,  the  city  of  Washington  was  burned  by  a 
handful  of  British  troops.  All  the  patriotism  of 
our  colonial  ancestors  did  not  suffice  to  arrest  the 
march  of  a  few  thousand  regular  British  soldiers. 
Patriotism  is  a  military  asset  only  when  it  pro- 
duces trained  soldiers  for  the  nation's  defense. 


44  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

Knowing  all  this,  we  naturally  ask  ourselves 
what  defect  in  our  system  permits  us  to  remain 
so  vulnerable.  The  answer  is  known  already  to 
every  military  student.  It  is  the  lack  of  sound  mil- 
itary policy.  The  statesmen  must  hearken  to  the 
voice  of  the  country's  military  experts.  The 
statesmen  must  be  prevented  from  frittering  away 
the  legacy  which  our  ancestors  have  handed  down 
to  us.  They  must  put  away  the  confusions  that 
waste  human  possibilities.  Good  intentions  do 
not  constitute  a  strong  government,  nor  do  they 
produce  an  efficient  nation.  The  noblest  senti- 
ments can  never  supply  the  want  of  soldiers.  We 
must,  each  one  of  us,  urge  our  statesmen  to  study 
the  problems  of  national  existence,  and  apply  to 
their  solution  the  organized  knowledge  of  the  mili- 
tary experts,  which  can  be  the  only  basis  of  suc- 
cess to  the  nation.  The  statesmen  must  recognize, 
in  their  diplomacy,  the  real  strength  of  the  mili- 
tary and  naval  arm  of  the  nation. 

Universal  military  service  in  some  form  is  the 
only  way  of  saving  the  country  from  itself.  In 
America  the  idea  of  patriotism  is  new,  and  has 
been  shaken  by  the  constant  introduction  of  for- 
eign blood.  This  introduction  of  new  blood  is 
dangerous  for  countries  which  are  not  sufficiently 
strong  to  absorb  it.  The  teaching  of  patriotism 
should  be  one  of  the  fundamental  points  which 
the  educators  should  insist  upon  thejnost.  The 


MILITARY  PEACE  PREPARATION   45 

educators,  especially  those  who  teach  the  child, 
must  always  remember  that  it  is  patriotism  that 
must  dominate  in  order  to  inspire  in  the  child  a 
great  admiration  for  his  own  country.  We  must 
insist  that  the  teachers  of  our  children  do  not  ex- 
pound doctrines  harmful  to  the  nation.  A  teacher 
is  free  to  be  a  peace  man,  an  antimilitarist,  or 
an  antipatriot  if  he  chooses,  but  at  school  he 
must  be  silent  upon  these  subjects.  If  he  re- 
fuses to  be  silent,  he  should  be  at  once  removed. 
The  effect  upon  the  masses  of  those  who  harp 
upon  antimilitarism  and  antipatriotism  is  almost 
as  disastrous  to  the  nation  as  its  effect  upon  the 
growing  child.  This  Utopian  dream  of  a  world 
confederation  and  the  banishment  of  national 
competition  and  war  addresses  itself  to  the  in- 
stinctive reflexes  of  a  man  or  woman,  to  the  spirit 
of  self-preservation  not  of  the  nation  but  of  the 
individual.  The  proletariat,  until  it  has  been 
taught,  cannot  conceive  of  such  an  indefinite 
entity  as  a  nation.  If  our  teachers  are  allowed  to 
instruct  our  children  that  defeat  is  of  small  in- 
terest to  their  future,  and  that  to  fight  is  not  good 
for  them  personally,  then  they  will  no  longer 
fight  when  the  national  safety  is  menaced.  Those 
who  teach  the  masses  that  the  good  of  the  indi- 
vidual is  higher  than  the  good  of  the  nation  teach 
a  lesson  of  cowardice  that  introduces  egotism. 
A  nation  can  live  only  if  its  citizens  possess  ideas 


46  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

in  common,  and  the  idea  of  patriotism  is  the  most 
powerful  one  for  cementing  a  people  together. 
Militarism  may  be  a  relative  evil.  In  its  extreme 
it  is  dangerous  and  ruinous  to  resources,  but 
there  would  be  a  still  greater  danger  to  the  soul 
of  the  people  if  we  attempted  to  repress  patriot- 
ism. The  police  are  very  costly  to  maintain,  yet 
no  one  talks  of  dispensing  with  them. 

Probably  nothing  at  this  moment  is  more  dan- 
gerous to  the  future  of  America  than  the  many 
speeches  that  are  made  by  never-fight  philan- 
thropists upon  disarmament  and  universal  peace. 
If  we  followed  their  advice  our  patriotism  would 
be  entirely  destroyed.  We  should  be  left  at  the 
mercy  of  adversaries  who  have  not  disarmed. 
Let  us  rather  wait  before  disarming  until  we  know 
that  we  have  no  enemies  in  the  world. 

Universal  military  training  should  have  as  its 
aim  the  development  of  moral  qualities  in  the  in- 
dividual— such  qualities  as  attention,  reflection, 
judgment,  and  initiative.  How  seldom  we  find 
these  qualities  among  our  masses  and  yet  how 
frequently  they  are  encountered  among  those  who, 
whatever  their  origin,  have  been  trained  as  sol- 
diers or  sailors!  There  are  other  qualities  which 
military  training  can  produce,  the  most  important 
of  which  are  submission  to  discipline,  a  spirit  of 
solidarity,  perseverance  against  difficulties,  and  a 
will  to  succeed.  These  qualities  cannot  be  acquired 


MILITARY  PEACE  PREPARATION    47 

from  books,  but  only  from  experience,  and  their 
development  results  only  from  their  exercise. 
We  obey  the  laws  of  the  community  because  the 
strong  arm  of  justice  compels  us  to.  As  a  nation 
we  can  do  right  only  when  the  habit  of  doing 
right  and  avoiding  wrong  has  been  learned  by 
the  nation  and  becomes  a  subconscious  act.  By 
training  the  individual,  by  making  him  subcon- 
sciously choose  the  right,  the  nation  composed  of 
individuals  will  subconsciously  act  according  to 
the  principles  of  righteousness.  Military  train- 
ing will  teach  the  individual  to  govern  himself  and 
have  a  respect  for  duty.  This  military  training 
for  the  defense  of  the  nation  will  create  senti- 
ments in  common  and,  above  all,  an  ideal  in  com- 
mon. Moral  rules  will  be  appreciated  and  ad- 
mitted to  be  fundamental.  A  nation  cannot 
build  its  hopes  on  reason.  "Human  reason  has 
only  served  to  build  fragile  edifices  which  fall  in 
ruins  before  they  are  finished.  It  has  built  noth- 
ing solid,  but  has  shaken  everything.  People 
who  have  trusted  in  reason  believe  no  longer  in 
their  gods,  in  their  traditions,  or  in  their  principles. 
They  believe,  to  no  greater  extent,  in  their  chiefs, 
and  they  overturn  them  as  soon  as  they  have  ac- 
claimed them.  Not  possessing  in  any  degree  the 
direction  of  possibilities  and  realities,  they  live 
more  and  more  in  the  unfeasible  and  the  unreal, 
following  continually  delusive  chimeras."  How 


48  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

strikingly  this  reminds  us  of  our  times!  Popular 
heroes  scarcely  rise  in  prominence  before  they  are 
overthrown. 

Of  necessity,  the  ideal  in  whose  defense  a  na- 
tion should  exert  itself  is  always  a  child  of  tradi- 
tion and  never  the  offspring  of  will.  An  ideal 
cannot  be  created  by  human  will,  and  we  must 
accept  it  without  argument.  The  idea  of  "coun- 
try" cannot  be  created  by  our  wills,  and  we  must 
accept  it  without  argument.  This  idea  of  "coun- 
try" represents,  with  us,  a  heritage  of  sentiments, 
of  traditions,  of  thoughts,  of  common  interests. 
To  cherish  and  defend  this  idea  must  be  learned 
in  our  childhood.  It  is  this  idea  in  a  nation  that 
makes  it  strong,  vigorous,  progressive.  Lacking 
this  idea  makes  it  weak,  spineless,  and  leads  to 
its  destruction. 

The  general  indifference  of  our  people  toward 
national  defense,  the  size  and  effectiveness  of  their 
army  and  navy,  is  the  result  of  a  blind  confidence 
in  fate,  which  the  faulty  training  in  the  schools 
fosters.  If  the  children  of  the  nation  could  know 
that  in  every  war  in  which  the  country  has  en- 
gaged our  untrained  soldiers  broke  and  ran  at 
almost  the  first  shot,  while  our  trained  soldiers 
challenged  the  admiration  of  the  world  by  their 
steadfast  courage;  if  the  children  could  be  told 
that  our  wars  have  been  enormously  protracted 
by  the  lack  of  sufficient  trained  forces  in  the  be- 


MILITARY  PEACE  PREPARATION   49 

ginning  to  take  the  initiative;  if  it  could  be  im- 
pressed upon  them  that  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
our  women  were  made  widows,  and  children  or- 
phans, and  that  millions  of  men  were  crippled  for 
life  because  they  were  sent  to  the  battle-fields  un- 
prepared, knowing  nothing  of  what  awaited  them 
there,  with  officers  as  ignorant  and  incompetent 
in  military  duties  as  the  soldiers  themselves;  if 
our  children  could  be  shown  that  $1,000,000  in 
preparation  before  any  of  our  wars  would  have 
saved  $50,000,000  later — if  all  this  could  be  done, 
then  indifference  to  the  nation's  safety  would 
immediately  cease. 

Where  is  the  historian  who  will  write  the  real 
history  of  our  past  and  point  out  to  our  children 
the  lessons  so  bitterly  forgotten  by  this  nation? 
Who  will  tell  them  that  the  superb  isolation 
which  was  once  our  protection  is  no  more;  that 
in  these  days  of  great  fleets  of  swift  merchantmen 
an  army  can  be  moved  by  sea  even  faster  than  by 
land,  and  that  we  owe  our  immunity  from  attack 
not  to  the  enemy's  fear  of  our  latent  strength  but 
to  the  international  jealousies  and  mutual  dis- 
trust of  those  nations  that  desire  to  challenge  our 
commercial  supremacy  and  our  political  control 
over  the  American  continent  ?  Who  will  tell  our 
children  that,  despite  arbitration  treaties  and 
treaties  to  gain  time,  some  day,  not  far  in 
the  future,  that  challenge  will  come?  The  uni- 


So  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

versal  law  must  be  obeyed.  Already  Europe  and 
Asia  are  hungry.  If  we  are  to  maintain  our  posi- 
tion in  the  world  and  acquit  ourselves  with  honor, 
it  cannot  be  done  by  written  peace  doctrines  or 
by  training  one-half  of  one  per  cent  of  our  peo- 
ple to  oppose  millions  of  trained  soldiers.  Who, 
in  the  most  forcible  language  that  can  be  written, 
will  tell  our  children  to  pluck  from  their  hearts 
that  deep-seated  belief  that  somehow  we  could 
beat  off  any  force  that  could  be  thrown  against 
us?  This  faulty  tradition  held  to  so  doggedly 
by  the  American  nation  will  be  its  undoing  if  it 
be  not  eradicated  from  our  national  thought. 


CHAPTER  IV 
NAVAL  PEACE  PREPARATION 

MODERN  history  has  shown  us  the  neces- 
sity for  the  instant  preparedness  not  only 
of  our  land  forces  but  also  of  our  navy. 
How  rapidly  in  these  days  of  rapid  transportation 
and  of  quick  information  a  nation  is  hurried  from 
the  blessings  of  peace  to  the  horrors  of  war  the 
experience  of  the  last  few  years  has  brought  home. 
A  nation  is  given  no  time  to  collect  its  fleet,  to 
repair  it,  to  dock  its  ships,  to  call  in  its  reserves 
(if  it  has  any),  to  fill  up  the  complements  of  the 
personnel.1  Time  spent  in  placing  in  commission 
reserve  ships  is  time  lost.  The  opportunity  for 
target  practice  and  training  is  past.  Even  the 
time  required  to  collect  the  necessary  auxiliary 

1  "We  have  no  reserve  and  never  have  had  one,"  the  secretary  of 
the  navy  recently  wrote  to  the  Senate  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs, 
in  urging  a  small  appropriation  to  perfect  the  organization  of  one. 
"We  are  turning  out  every  year  into  civil  life  3,000  to  4,000  highly 
trained  men,  who,  if  organized,  would  be  ready  on  short  notice  to 
man  our  battleships,  armored  cruisers,  and  other  naval  vessels  in 
reserve,  and  supplement  the  crews  of  the  battleships  of  the  fleet  in 
case  of  war.  No  nation  keeps  in  regular  service  in  time  of  peace 
sufficient  men  to  man  all  its  fighting  vessels,  but  there  is  none  that 

Si 


52  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

vessels,  which  our  fleet  now  lacks,  may  not  be 
given  by  a  ready  opponent.  All  these  are  peace 
preparations  that  should  be  attended  to  in  ad- 
vance of  the  declaration  of  war.  The  fleet  is  an 
instrument  that  should  always  be  ready.  Its 
plans  of  campaign  should  be  prepared  and  known 
to  those  of  its  officers  upon  whom  the  responsi- 
bility of  success  or  failure  in  time  of  emergency 
rests.  Its  administration  during  peace  is  not, 
therefore,  a  civil  concern  but  a  military  one.  The 
disposition  of  the  ships,  their  training,  the  times 
for  their  repairs  and  docking,  or,  more  compre- 
hensively, the  entire  work  of  the  fleet  should, 
in  consequence,  be  outlined  and  decided  by 
the  naval  officers  who  will  be  called  upon  to 
fight  it. 

From  the  beginning,  one  hundred  and  forty 
years  ago,  the  navy  has  been  the  willing  and 
faithful  subordinate  of  the  civil  power  and  the 
indispensable  instrument  of  the  American  people 
for  carrying  into  effect  their  national  policy  as 
expressed  by  their  chosen  representatives  in  Con- 
does  not  provide  for  a  trained  reserve.  The  enlisted  men  of  the 
navy  have  been  for  years  urging  upon  Congress  and  the  department 
the  passage  of  legislation  which  will  permit  of  their  retirement  upon 
graded  rates  of  pay  for  certain  periods  of  service.  This  measure  will 
accomplish  what  they  want  and  at  the  same  time  give  the  country 
a  claim  on  their  services  as  well  as  provide  for  the  much-needed 
reserve." 

This  recommendation,  most  fortunately,  was  favorably  acted 
upon  by  Congress  only  a  few  days  ago. 


NAVAL  PEACE  PREPARATION       53 

gress.  That  control  of  national  policy  lies  in  the 
hands  of  our  statesmen.  The  fleet,  with  its  ships 
and  its  bases,  is  the  means  to  the  end.  Once 
the  statesmen  have  invoked  war  to  continue  the 
policy  of  the  government,  they  call  upon  the 
military  to  act.  From  that  time  forward  an  in- 
strument is  called  into  the  service  of  diplomacy 
which  requires  knowledge  outside  of  the  states- 
man's art.  Its  mastery  requires  a  life  study. 
The  statesmen  indicate  the  end  to  be  attained — 
that  is  a  function  of  the  State — but  the  method  of 
using  that  force  to  accomplish  the  end  requires 
expert  knowledge  beyond  the  knowledge  of  the 
statesman.  The  statesmen  continue  to  control 
the  course  of  the  war  in  so  far  as  its  development 
affects  the  nation's  policies  with  the  enemy  or 
with  other  countries.  They  must  stand  ready 
to  open  negotiations  whenever  they  feel  that  by 
so  doing  their  country  will  be  benefited.  When- 
ever a  statesman  at  the  head  of  the  administra- 
tion of  our  military  departments  assumes  that 
his  position  gives  him  the  right  of  making  military 
decisions,  he  materially  weakens  the  efficiency 
of  that  instrument  of  power  which  he  should 
consider  it  his  duty  to  increase.  Even  during 
the  years  of  peace  the  same  principles  of  conduct 
for  the  statesmen  and  civil  administrators  hold 
good.  The  creation  of  the  instruments  of  force, 
their  number  and  character,  the  location  and 


54  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

equipment  of  naval  bases,  the  number  of  sailors 
required  to  man  the  fleet,  the  employment  and 
training  of  the  fleet,  the  military  administration 
and  up-keep  of  the  fleet,  together  with  all  those 
things  upon  which  the  fleet  is  dependent — all 
these  are  functions  which  the  military  must  per- 
form. Untechnical  civilian  influence  over  any 
of  these  functions  must,  in  the  end,  prove  dis- 
astrous. 

The  civilian  brings  to  his  council  the  idea  of 
economy.  His  training  in  civil  life,  in  mercantile 
pursuits,  where  the  object  of  all  business  is  finan- 
cial gain,  has  warped  his  mind  to  a  worship  of 
economy.  To  him  military  efficiency  has  no 
meaning.  His  attitude  is  a  material  one.  When 
forced  to  decide  between  several  articles  of  ma- 
terial, all  of  which  in  his  unscientific  eye  appear 
equally  efficient,  his  decision  naturally  will  go 
to  the  one  in  which  the  least  money  is  involved. 
In  consequence  the  article  accepted  by  him  may 
be  totally  unserviceable  to  the  military  require- 
ment. The  military  man,  on  the  other  hand, 
takes  no  thought  of  the  cost  where  efficiency  is 
at  stake.  For  him  there  is  no  second  best.  One 
gun  that  will  reach  the  enemy  is  worth  a  hundred 
whose  range  is  just  too  short.  A  million  dollars 
spent  where  military  necessity  demands  may  save 
a  hundred  million  when  war  is  declared.  All 
such  questions  are  military  ones,  and  where 


NAVAL  PEACE  PREPARATION       55 

these  are  involved  the  military  decision  alone 
should  be  considered. 

Naval  ships  are  built  each  for  its  peculiar  role 
in  the  service  of  the  nation.  Battleships,  cruisers, 
scouts,  destroyers,  and  submarines  should  be 
called  upon  to  perform  only  those  duties  which 
will  perfect  their  training  as  instruments  of  war. 
Their  organization  and  service  should  be  con- 
trolled solely  by  military  minds.  These  ships 
should  not  be  scattered  or  dispersed  on  diplo- 
matic service.  Their  power  lies  in  unity  of 
action  and  in  co-ordinate  training.  Their  func- 
tion is  battle  and  the  preparation  for  battle. 
They  should  always  be  kept  in  the  pink  of  con- 
dition, fully  manned  and  trained  for  the  object 
for  which  they  alone  owe  their  existence.  The 
statesman's  control  over  this  force  should  be  only 
to  unleash  it  against  an  enemy's  fleet  for  the 
purpose  of  emphasizing  the  national  will.  The 
peace  duty  of  representing  the  nation  on  a  foreign 
coast  belongs  to  gunboats,  the  non-military  units 
of  the  fleet,  which  should  be  built  for  that  sole 
purpose.  Such  vessels  may  carry  few  guns  and 
small  crews,  but  the  emblem  of  nationality  flying 
at  their  flagstaffs  is,  nevertheless,  still  the  em- 
bodiment of  the  diplomatic  and  military  power 
of  the  nation.  Such  a  representative  in  a  foreign 
port  carries  with  it  the  same  quantity  of  prestige 
as  the  entire  fleet,  were  it  there  assembled.  It 


56  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

is  a  mistaken  idea  of  our  diplomacy  that  a  pur- 
pose can  be  better  accentuated  with  many  ships 
of  war  than  with  one.  Such  a  conception  reveals 
only  a  glaring  weakness  in  a  diplomacy,  pointing 
to  the  hope  of  avoiding  more  drastic  measures 
by  the  use  of  a  great  show  of  force.  If  diplomacy 
has  proved  its  strength  and  its  determination  of 
purpose,  then  the  sending  of  one  gunboat  will  be 
sufficient  to  announce  that  our  diplomacy  calls 
for  certain  action,  which,  if  refused,  will  lead  to 
acts  of  coercion  that  will  impose  the  dictum. 
Keeping  the  battle  fleet  as  a  unit  at  its  work  of 
preparation  strengthens  the  hands  of  diplomacy; 
scattering  it,  using  the  units  on  eccentric  mis- 
sions, destroys  the  unity  and  cohesiveness  of  the 
fleet  as  an  instrument  of  war. 

This  is  a  point  of  view  which  the  naval  officer 
often  finds  it  most  difficult  to  explain  to  the 
civilian.  Between  him  and  his  civilian  friends 
there  lies  a  great  gulf  which  neither  seems  able 
to  bridge.  Each  apparently  thinks  in  a  different 
language.  Words  and  phrases  do  not  convey 
the  same  meaning  to  each  of  them.  It  has  been 
repeatedly  asserted  by  some  of  our  naval  officers 
for  many  years,  and  with  more  emphasis  during 
the  last  two  years,  that  the  navy  was  not  pre- 
pared for  war.  The  civilian  looked  at  the  naval 
list  and  at  the  types  and  numbers  of  ships,  he 
considered  our  great  navy-yards,  and  refused  to 


NAVAL  PEACE  PREPARATION       57 

believe  that  the  naval  man  was  in  earnest.  He 
then  went  aboard  a  battleship,  he  observed  the 
officers  and  men  at  work;  he  saw  the  marvellous 
organization  that  exists  on  board  our  ships  of 
war;  he  made  a  cruise  in  a  single  ship  or  with 
the  fleet;  he  noted  the  precision  with  which  the 
ships  kept  position  and  the  ease  with  which  the 
ships  were  handled  in  manoeuvres,  and  then  he 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  naval  man  is 
wrong  and  belittled  the  efficiency  of  his  own 
instruments. 

But  the  naval  man  knows.  He  has  studied 
and  observed  the  work  of  other  nations.  He 
knows  that,  while  we  have  the  ships,  the  other 
nations  not  only  have  them  also  but  use  them 
legitimately  in  preparation  for  war.  He  appre- 
ciates that  the  foreign  governments  make  appro- 
priations each  year  for  mobilizations  and  for 
manoeuvres  in  which  each  type  falls  into  the  place 
that  it  would  actually  occupy  in  war.  He  knows 
that  his  country  will  spend  the  money  to  build 
ships,  and  to  partially  man  them,  but  that  it  be- 
grudges the  money  for  the  training  essential  to 
make  them  proficient  in  the  art  of  fighting  an 
enemy's  fleet.  He  knows  that  while  other  na- 
tions have  created  general  staffs,  whose  sole  care 
is  the  making  of  plans  and  directing  of  the  peace 
administration  and  training  of  the  fleet,  that  in 
his  own  country  this  most  technical  and  neces- 


$8  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

sary  work,  when  it  is  done  at  all,  is  usually  directed 
by  civilian  control.1  He  knows  that  military  ad- 
vice upon  the  use  of  the  fleet,  upon  the  prepara- 
tion of  the  fleet,  upon  the  training  of  the  fleet, 
although  given,  is  not  always  accepted. 

What  we  civilians  do  not  seem  to  appreciate  is 
that  the  naval  men  have  more  than  a  personal 
interest  in  the  navy.  They  have  a  personal  in- 
terest in  the  welfare  of  their  country  which  the 
navy  alone  can  protect.  The  ban  of  secrecy  has 
prevented  them  from  openly  expressing  their  full 
views.  Occasionally,  an  anonymous  writer  dares 
to  raise  his  voice  against  the  methods  of  naval 
control.  His  criticisms  are  honest,  and  usually 
reflect  the  unanimous  opinion  of  his  colleagues. 
The  mouthpiece  of  the  navy — the  United  States 
Naval  Institute — has  published  article  after  article 
condemning  our  naval  administration  as  faulty 

1  The  General  Board  of  the  Navy  has  the  supervision  of  the  mak- 
ing of  war  plans,  but  as  it  has  no  legal  status  or  executive  power, 
it  can  neither  compel  action  nor  interest  the  "civilian  control"  to 
understand  them  and  take  the  action  necessary.  The  civilian  secre- 
tary of  the  navy,  thanks  to  our  faulty  system  of  administration,  is 
left  in  a  state  of  complete  isolation  as  regards  the  general  manage- 
ment of  the  navy  at  large.  There  exists,  as  Secretary  Moody  testi- 
fied before  the  Naval  Committee  of  the  House,  on  April  n,  1904, 
"no  body  charged  with  the  duty  of  giving  responsible  advice  upon 
military  matters."  "  It  is  not  enough,"  he  added,  "  that  there  should 
be  plenty  of  officers  ready  to  give  him  advice  when  he  seeks  it. 
There  should  be  those  charged  expressly  with  the  duty  of  studying 
military  questions,  and  of  giving  advice  for  which  they  can  be  held 
responsible."  What  this  "defect  in  a  vital  part"  of  our  naval  ad- 
ministration is,  will  be  shown  further  on. 


NAVAL  PEACE  PREPARATION       59 

in  principle,  disastrous  to  the  efficiency  of  the 
navy,  and  dangerous  to  the  welfare  of  the  nation. 
The  civil  administrators,  whenever  they  feel  that 
they  have  been  personally  attacked,  defend  them- 
selves by  appealing  to  our  form  of  government, 
which,  according  to  their  statements,  provides  for 
civilian  control  over  the  military.  But  such 
statements  are  only  true  in  the  wording  and  not 
in  the  intention  of  our  form  of  government. 

Our  government  reflects  the  will  of  the  people. 
Our  people  are  civilized  and  scientific  in  their 
commercial  dealings.  If  our  citizens  would  stop 
and  consider  that  one  like  themselves,  untrained 
and  uneducated  in  naval  matters,  was  making 
far-reaching  military  decisions;  that,  in  fact,  he 
held  in  his  hand  the  military  direction  of  our  navy, 
with  all  that  goes  with  it,  he  would  be  aghast  and 
doubtless  tremble  for  the  future  of  the  nation  in 
case  it  went  to  war.  The  spirit  of  our  govern- 
ment requires  a  civilian  at  the  head  of  the  Navy 
Department  to  administer  the  financial  expendi- 
tures allotted  to  the  service  by  Congress.1  That 

1  "It  has  been  asserted,"  wrote  Admiral  Luce  a  few  years  ago, 
"that  a  naval  officer  of  rank  and  experience  should  be  placed  at  the 
head  of  the  navy.  But  naval  officers  are  not  fitted  by  training  or 
habits  of  thought  for  making  good  ministers  of  state.  This  is  well 
illustrated  by  the  experience  in  England,  where  the  civilian  First 
Lord,  assisted  by  naval  men,  has  proved  the  ideal.  From  the  ex- 
perience of  the  greatest  naval  power  of  the  day,  we  are,  therefore, 
led  to  conclude  that  a  civilian  secretary  of  the  navy,  assisted  by  a 
board  of  naval  officers,  is  the  main  point  in  a  naval  administration 
that  will  stand  the  test  of  a  great  war." 


60  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

civilian  should  bring  to  the  Navy  Department  a 
knowledge  of  business  methods.  The  business  ad- 
ministration of  the  Navy  Department  is  in  his 
hands.  He  is  intrusted  by  the  nation  with  this 
great  instrument  of  force,  and  the  nation  will  ex- 
pect him  to  render  an  account  of  his  stewardship. 
The  ultimate  test  of  his  success  in  war  will  be  in 
the  exploits  of  the  fleet.  If  he  is  truly  honest  with 
himself  and  big  enough  to  acknowledge  that 
there  is  a  great  field  of  effort  beyond  his  mental 
capabilities,  through  no  fault  of  his  own,  he  will, 
as  any  man  would  upon  whom  has  been  thrust 
a  great  responsibility,  surround  himself  with  men 
of  known  integrity  and  ability  to  direct  those 
parts  of  his  organization  to  which  his  knowledge 
does  not  extend.  These  men  would  further  sur- 
round themselves  with  men  whose  knowledge 
was  more  minute  in  the  collateral  branches  of  the 
naval  profession.  In  this  way  in  the  office  of  the 
civil  administrator  of  the  navy  would  be  formed 
what  is  termed  in  Europe  a  general  staff. 

Our  navy,  in  time  of  peace,  is  kept  at  peace 
strength.  For  the  purposes  of  war,  either  in  the 
Atlantic  or  in  the  Pacific,  a  great  increase  of  our 
fleet  would  be  necessary.  There  would  have  to 
be  purchased,  or  chartered,  merchant  ships,  col- 
liers, oilers,  supply  vessels,  ammunition  ships, 
tenders,  mother  ships,  hospital  ships,  mine-laying 
ships,  and  trawlers  for  mine-sweeping.  Many  of 


NAVAL  PEACE  PREPARATION       61 

these  vessels  would  be  ready  for  immediate  use, 
but  some  would  require  conversion  for  their  new 
military  duties.  It  has  been  found  that,  in  order 
to  supply  these  auxiliary  vessels  to  the  number 
and  kind  required  for  an  oversea  campaign,  80 
per  cent  of  the  American  merchant  marine  on 
the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  would  have  to  be  im- 
pressed on  the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  The  ac- 
quisition of  all  these  vessels  by  the  government 
would  completely  paralyze  our  coastwise  traffic 
and  decrease  the  efficiency  of  the  nation  in  its 
manufacturing  and  commercial  activities  during 
the  continuance  of  military  operations.  If  the 
war  is  in  the  Pacific  the  transcontinental  railroads 
will  have  to  utilize  their  fuel-carrying  facilities 
to  the  utmost  to  carry  the  navy's  fuel  from  the 
great  coal  and  oil  fields  of  the  east  to  the  Pacific 
slope.  Foreign  merchant  vessels  might  be  bought 
by  the  government  in  large  numbers,  but  their 
purchase  would  have  to  be  completed  before  the 
declaration  of  war,  and,  besides,  under  our  form 
of  government  no  funds  would  be  available  for 
such  purpose  until  actually  appropriated  by  Con- 
gress. After  the  declaration  of  war  no  neutral 
country  would  permit  its  citizens  to  sell  merchant 
vessels  for  war  purposes  to  a  belligerent.  A 
workable  scheme  must,  therefore,  be  prepared 
and  prepared  immediately  to  furnish  the  fleet 
with  this  required  quota  of  auxiliary  ships,  and, 


62  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

at  the  same  time,  secure  the  nation's  coastwise 
trade  to  the  purposes  of  the  nation.  This  vast 
field  requires  a  study  by  both  military  and  com- 
mercial men  for  its  successful  accomplishment. 

The  responsibility  for  the  preparation  of  this 
necessary  means  of  prosecuting  a  naval  war  rests, 
in  the  meantime,  with  the  navy.  It  would  be 
the  duty  of  a  naval  general  staff,  did  we  have 
one.  The  broad  field  of  naval  mobilization  must 
be  scientifically  investigated.  Investigation  by 
independent  individuals  or  by  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment bureaus  working  within  themselves  may 
accomplish  a  result,  but  it  will  be  dearly  bought 
and  at  the  expense  of  the  fleet.  We  must  bring 
to  this  study  a  concentration  of  effort.  The 
work  already  accomplished  by  others  should 
be  co-ordinated  under  a  responsible  military 
leader.  The  entire  plan  of  mobilization  must  be 
understood  through  all  its  ramifications  by  the 
executive  military  authority  in  order  that  the 
machinery  of  mobilization  may  work  smoothly 
and  quickly  when  the  order  to  mobilize  is  issued. 
A  study  of  the  work  of  a  foreign  general  staff, 
such  as  that  of  Germany,  Italy,  France,  Austria, 
England,  Japan,  and  even  China,  must  show  us 
that  we  cannot  afford,  in  these  days  of  progress 
and  civilization,  to  remain  indifferent.  Other 
departments  of  the  government  may  continue 
their  unscientific  methods;  there  but  little  harm 


NAVAL  PEACE  PREPARATION       63 

is  done.  But  unscientific  methods,  a  lack  of 
system,  want  of  preparation,  or  civil  interference 
mean  more  in  the  great  military  departments. 
Unpreparedness  spells  disaster  to  the  nation,  the 
loss  of  many  thousand  trained  lives  of  our  citizens, 
sailors,  and  soldiers.  It  means  yet  more — it  in- 
volves national  dishonor. 

Unfortunately  for  the  human  race,  half-disasters 
do  not  awaken  nations;  otherwise  our  nation 
would  have  appreciated  its  dearly  bought  lessons 
after  the  Spanish  War.  Prussia  should  have 
awakened  after  Valmy,  but  Jena  was  necessary 
to  open  the  eyes  of  the  German  people.  Eventu- 
ally, however,  the  revelation  took  place,  and  in 
the  modern  Germany  we  see  what  whole  dis- 
asters accomplished  for  the  nation.  In  every 
civil  occupation  we  have  learned  to  bring  science 
to  our  aid  in  organizing,  systematizing,  and  ad- 
ministering our  business.  Commercial  men  point 
with  pride  to  their  planning  department,  where 
every  detail  of  the  business  is  worked  up,  and  each 
step  in  the  process  of  manufacture  is  carefully  laid 
out  and  followed.  Yet,  in  the  business  of  govern- 
ment, those  fundamental  truths  that  we  apply  to 
our  private  business  are  strangely  ignored.1 

*How  long  would  it  be  before  a  business  conducted  along  the 
lines  of  our  present  naval  administration  went  into  the  hands  of  a 
receiver?  That  was  what  happened  to  our  navy  from  1842  to  and 
including  the  year  1889,  during  which  there  was  a  gradual  but  sure 
decadence.  The  truth  of  this  statement  is  amply  borne  out  by  the 
annual  reports  of  successive  secretaries  of  the  navy. 


64  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

In  the  evolution  of  man  from  a  protoplasmic 
cell,  about  the  last  step  was  the  creation  of  intelli- 
gence. The  Department  of  the  Navy  is  following 
this  law  of  evolution.  But  it  must  yet  be  struck 
with  the  fairy  wand  to  be  made  into  a  thinking 
entity.  This  creation  of  intelligence,  in  order  that 
the  organization  may  bring  system  into  its  life, 
means  the  forming  of  a  general  staff — not  merely 
a  vest-pocket  encyclopaedia,  where  important  in- 
formation may  be  instantly  obtained,  but  an  ex- 
ecutive body,  endowed  with  power  of  execution 
for  which  it  will  stand  responsible  to  the  country 
as  regards  the  navy's  preparation  for  war.  The 
creation  of  a  general  staff  for  the  navy  is  im- 
portant when  we  realize  that  the  government 
has  no  continuing  body  of  men  whose  duty  it  is 
to  prepare  the  entire  nation  for  a  conflict,  to  study 
the  policies  of  competing  nations,  to  discover 
where  our  policies  are  liable  to  create  diplomatic 
friction,  to  study  the  means  of  averting  conflicts, 
to  decide  as  to  the  quantity  of  means  needed  for 
the  purpose — in  a  word,  to  co-ordinate  the  policies 
of  the  nation  with  the  means  at  hand  to  give 
them  effect.1 

1  At  present  there  exists  a  general  board  and  Naval  War  College, 
but  neither  is  equipped  for  adequately  performing  the  duties  of  a 
naval  general  staff.  The  demands  upon  the  staff  of  the  War  College 
and  the  members  of  the  general  board  for  other  questions  involving 
the  efficiency  of  the  personnel  and  material  of  the  navy  are  such 
that  they  have  had  neither  the  time  nor  the  opportunity  to  fully 
prepare  in  detail  and  perfect  this  work.  After  hearing  the  opinions 


NAVAL  PEACE  PREPARATION       65 

The  army  and  the  navy  are  for  the  purposes 
of  war.  This  fact  is  simple  of  comprehension, 
yet  how  many  are  willing  to  understand  it  ?  If, 
then,  the  army  and  the  navy  are  for  the  purposes 
of  war,  the  question  arises:  "War  with  whom?" 
This  question  is  not  one  for  the  army  man  or  the 
navy  man  to  answer.  It  is  a  question  which  the 
statesmen  of  the  country  must  answer.  Once 
this  question  is  answered,  and  definite  opponents 
are  pointed  out,  then  the  nation  should  ask  those 
responsible  in  the  control  of  the  army  and  the 
navy:  "Are  the  army  and  the  navy  ready  for  war 
with  this  or  that  enemy?"  Readiness  is  a  com- 
parable term.  The  army  and  the  navy  may  be 
ready  for  war  with  Mexico,  with  South  America, 
with  China,  with  Africa,  and,  maybe,  with  Turkey; 
but  those  countries  are  not  our  probable  enemies. 
If  the  enemy  pointed  out  by  the  statesmen  were 
England,  Germany,  or  Japan,  the  opinion  of  the 
army  and  navy  would  be  that  we  were  not  now 
ready  for  war,  and  that,  to  wage  a  war,  any  one 
of  those  countries  would  tax  to  its  limit  the 
resources  of  the  entire  country.  Vast  sums  of 


of  naval  officers  on  this  subject,  the  Naval  Committee  of  the  House 
of  Representatives  urged  the  necessity  for  an  office  in  the  naval 
establishment  that  would  fill  this  great  and  vital  need  of  an  executive 
and  military  branch  for  the  proper  employment  of  the  vessels  of 
our  navy.  The  naval  appropriation  bill  recently  passed  by  Congress 
fortunately  contains  a  provision  for  the  creation  of  such  a  legalized 
chief  of  naval  operations. 


66  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

money  would  have  to  be  spent  hurriedly  and 
without  opportunity  for  proper  consideration. 

Perhaps  an  outline  of  our  naval  organization 
would  not  here  be  amiss. 

The  present  system  of  administration  in  the 
Navy  Department  was  established  in  1842,  to 
succeed  the  Board  of  Navy  Commissioners,  who 
are  generally  supposed  to  have  been  supplanted 
because  they  had  no  individual  duties  or  respon- 
sibilities.1 At  its  head  is  a  civilian  secretary  of 
the  navy,  who  is  assisted  in  his  administration 
by  an  assistant  secretary  of  the  navy.  Under 
the  secretary  the  civil  and  industrial  work  of  the 
department  is  carried  on  by  bureaus  whose  chiefs 
are  each  personally  responsible  to  him  for  the  per- 
formance of  the  duties  assigned  to  them  by  law. 
These  chiefs  of  bureaus  have  executive  authority 
extending  even  to  the  fleet.2  The  Bureau  of 
Navigation  is  charged  with  the  maintenance  of 

1  These  commissioners  assisted  the  secretary  of  the  navy  by  their 
counsel  in  the  "employment  of  vessels  of  war,"  and  "executed  such 
orders  as  the  secretary  shall  receive  from  the  President." 

2  This  is  a  violation  of  the  fundamental  military  principle,  the 
granting  to  a  subordinate  executive  powers  equal  to  those  of  his 
superior  in  rank;   it  is  a  direct  infringement  upon  the  prerogatives 
of  the  secretary  of  the  navy — a  fatal  defect  in  the  law.    In  fact,  this 
provision  of  the  act,  in  practice,  creates  eight  secretaries  of  the  navy, 
each  one,  in  his  own  particular  sphere,  clothed  with  executive  au- 
thority equal  to  that  of  the  constitutional  commander-in-chief. 
This  is  what  has  created  the  dire  confusion,  duplication  of  work, 
extravagance,  and  irresponsibility  which,  according  to  several  secre- 
taries of  the  navy  in  the  past,  have  characterized  the  business  methods 
of  the  Navy  Department  for  the  last  seventy  years. 


NAVAL  PEACE  PREPARATION       67 

the  personnel  of  the  naval  establishment  and 
with  the  discipline  and  education  of  the  service. 
The  Bureau  of  Ordnance  is  charged  with  the  de- 
sign and  manufacture  of  guns,  armor,  torpedoes, 
ammunition,  and  explosives.  The  Bureau  of  Con- 
struction and  Repair,  composed  of  naval  architects, 
is  charged  with  all  that  relates  to  the  construction 
and  repair  of  the  ships  of  the  navy.  The  Bureau 
of  Steam  Engineering  designs  and  builds  the 
machinery  for  all  our  vessels  of  war.  The  Bureau 
of  Yards  and  Docks,  the  chief  of  which  is  a  civil 
engineer,  has  charge  of  the  designing,  building, 
and  maintenance  of  the  dry  docks,  wharfs,  and 
buildings  at  the  navy-yards.  The  Bureau  of 
Medicine  and  Surgery  is  charged  with  the  health 
of  the  personnel.  And,  lastly,  the  Bureau  of 
Supplies  and  Accounts  is  charged  with  the  pur- 
chase of  all  food,  clothing,  supplies,  and  even 
ships,  and  with  the  disbursing  of  all  moneys  ap- 
propriated for  the  naval  service. 

In  addition  to  the  bureaus,  the  organization 
of  the  Navy  Department  includes  the  judge- 
advocate  general,  whose  duties  are  to  consider 
and  report  upon  all  legal  questions  relating  to  the 
personnel;  the  solicitor,  who  attends  to  the  other 
legal  matters,  such  as  contracts  pertaining  to 
the  service;  the  general  board,  which  considers 
the  plans  for  the  preparation  and  maintenance 
of  the  fleet  for  war;  and  the  office  of  naval  intel- 


68  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

ligence,  which  collects  information  relating  to 
foreign  navies  and  to  other  subjects  of  interest 
to  the  naval  service. 

The  various  activities  essential  to  so  complex 
an  institution  are  thus  accounted  for.  But,  as 
Mr.  Meyer  pointed  out  in  his  annual  report  for 
1909,  the  business  of  the  department  has  entirely 
outgrown  its  original  1842  organization  and  its 
reorganization  of  1862.  The  most  serious  defects 
he  mentioned  were  the  deplorable  lack  of  a  branch 
dealing  directly  and  solely  with  the  military  use 
of  the  fleet  and  the  lack  of  responsible  expert 
advisers  to  aid  the  secretary  in  reaching  conclu- 
sions in  case  of  disagreement  between  the  co-ordi- 
nate branches  of  the  department. 

The  business  administration  of  the  Navy  De- 
partment seemed  logically  to  divide  itself  into 
groups  under  personnel,  material,  and  the  opera- 
tions or  management  of  the  personnel  and  ma- 
terial. So,  to  provide  himself  with  professional 
and  responsible  advisers  in  co-ordinating  the  work 
of  the  department,  Mr.  Meyer  detailed  four 
officers  of  the  rank  as  aides  to  the  secretary  of  the 
navy  in  matters  of  general  policy.  These  officers 
have  been  continued  by  the  present  secretary  of 
the  navy.  They  act  solely  in  an  advisory  ca- 
pacity and  have  no  supervisory  or  executive 
power.  The  aide  for  operations  advises  the 
secretary  as  to  strategic  and  tactical  matters  and 


NAVAL  PEACE  PREPARATION       69 

regarding  the  movements  of  the  fleet.  The  aide 
for  material  advises  him  upon  the  material  con- 
dition of  the  fleet.  The  aide  for  personnel 
advises  him  upon  matters  affecting  the  officers 
and  men  of  the  fleet.  The  aide  for  inspections, 
recently  abolished,  advised  him  upon  the  con- 
dition of  the  fleet  and  upon  the  state  and  manage- 
ment of  the  navy-yards.  The  aide  for  education, 
recently  appointed,  advises  him  upon  the  academic 
education  of  the  fleet,  not  upon  its  education 
for  battle. 

The  statutes  assume  that  if  a  secretary  has  a 
head  for  each  of  the  activities  required  by  the 
fleet,  that  he  can  decide  the  best  way  to  act. 
This  the  last  secretary  of  the  navy,  Mr.  Meyer, 
realized  was  erroneous.  The  heads  of  the  techni- 
cal bureaus  are  usually  too  much  immersed  in 
their  own  specialties  to  assist  the  secretary,  a 
civilian  and  not  a  military  man,  in  making  cor- 
rect military  decisions.1  Mr.  Meyer,  therefore, 

*To  quote  from  Secretary  Moody's  testimony  before  the  House 
Committee  on  Naval  Affairs,  April  n,  1904: 

"It  may  be  said  that  the  secretary  already  has  the  chiefs  of  bureaus 
as  advisers.  At  the  heads  of  those  bureaus,  now  established  by  law, 
there  are  and  will  be  competent  officers  with  adequate  technical  and 
military  information.  They  are  abundantly  able  to  give  safe  coun- 
sel on  the  important  duties  with  which  their  respective  bureaus  are 
charged;  but  they  are  engrossed  with  the  duties  of  the  administra- 
tion of  their  bureaus.  They  have  no  responsibility  for  the  con- 
sideration of  these  military  questions  to  which  I  have  referred,  nor 
any  duty  to  give  advice  upon  them;  and  the  world's  experience  has 
shown  that  no  advice  is  good  except  that  for  which  advisers  are  held 


70  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

instituted  the  policy  of  having  advisers  to  the 
secretary.  In  other  words,  he  realized  that  in 
his  short  tenure  of  office  as  secretary  he  could  not 
make  himself  into  a  military  man;  that  he  could 
not  get  the  military  training  required  to  efficiently 
manage  the  military  organization  unaided.  He 
knew  that  he  was  a  good  business  man,  and  a 
successful  one,  but  his  business  had  not  been 
that  of  the  navy.  He  did  not  have  behind  him 
an  experience  of  thirty  odd  years  of  sea  service. 
He  felt  that  the  information  given  to  him  by  the 
bureaus  must  be  placed  in  such  shape  by  his 

responsible.  The  volunteer  adviser  is  not  usually  of  much  assis- 
tance. Much  as  I  have  profited  by  the  advice  of  the  bureau  chiefs, 
I  know  by  practical  experience  that  it  is  impossible  for  them  to  take 
from  their  administrative  duties  the  time  which  will  enable  them  to 
consider  these  questions  with  such  deliberation  as  would  render 
them  willing  to  accept  responsibility  for  advice. 

"There  is  another  side  to  the  question.  On  the  other  side,  I  deem 
it  of  the  greatest  importance  that  no  body  should  be  created  which 
would  usurp  the  powers  of  the  secretary  and  make  him  its  mere 
mouthpiece  or  reduce  him  to  a  mere  figurehead  in  naval  organiza- 
tion. I  believe  that  is  not  only  of  importance  to  the  country  but 
of  equal  importance  to  the  navy  itself.  It  is  the  secretary  alone 
who  can  bring  effective  influence  to  bear  upon  the  national  adminis- 
tration or,  in  conference  with  the  representatives  of  the  legislative 
part  of  our  government,  carry  such  weight  that  proper  measures 
will  be  enacted  by  Congress  and  proper  supplies  afforded.  Of  course, 
it  is  ultimately  upon  the  action  of  Congress  that  all  naval  efficiency 
must  depend.  I  do  not  care  how  efficient  a  general  staff  may  be, 
or  any  body  called  by  another  name,  however  well  that  body  may 
understand  the  needs  of  the  navy:  they  can  never,  in  my  opinion, 
except  in  times  of  great  emergency,  wield  that  influence  which  brings 
into  harmonious  co-operation  the  national  administration,  the  mili- 
tary power,  and  the  authority  of  Congress  which  governs  us  all." 


NAVAL  PEACE  PREPARATION       71 

aides  that  he,  untrained  in  naval  matters,  could 
handle  it  as  a  business  man.  In  fact,  his  aides 
were  for  the  purpose  of  translating  the  naval  facts 
into  language  within  his  grasp  and  understand- 
ing. When  once  these  facts  were  so  presented 
to  him,  he,  as  a  good  business  man,  could  render 
a  correct  decision.  Then,  once  this  decision  was 
given,  the  naval  aides  were  delegated  the  power 
of  the  secretary  to  carry  out  that  decision.  The 
secretary  and  his  naval  aides  looked  upon  the 
questions  confronting  the  navy  from  the  point  of 
naval  efficiency,  and  each  decision  was  made 
with  the  idea  of  gaining  efficiency  for  the  navy, 
and  the  execution  of  the  idea,  in  consequence, 
steadily  increased  the  efficiency  of  the  fleet. 

One  of  the  first  acts  of  Congress  should  be 
logically  to  legalize  the  council  of  aides  and  to 
make  one  of  the  aides  paramount,  like  first  sea 
lord  of  the  British  navy,  to  whom  the  English 
people  look  for  efficiency  of  their  fleet. 

We  have  seen  recently  how  a  similar  democ- 
racy, England,  upon  going  to  war,  placed  a  mili- 
tary man  in  control  of  her  War  Office.  Lord 
Kitchener  was  about  to  start  for  Egypt  when 
the  war  in  Europe  broke  out.  But  the  English, 
knowing  the  unpreparedness  of  their  army  and 
appreciating  that  its  preparation  could  be  ac- 
complished in  a  relatively  short  time  only  by  a 
military  man  of  the  caliber  of  Kitchener,  at  once 


72  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

installed  him  as  the  first  war  lord  of  England. 
On  the  other  hand,  Admiral  Sir  John  Fisher 
is  practically  in  control  of  the  admiralty;  the 
first  lord  doubtless  accepts  his  plans  in  all  naval 
matters,  for  it  is  to  Sir  John  Fisher  that  the 
English  people  look  for  naval  results  and  not  to 
Winston  Churchill. 

Some  years  ago,  in  1909,  a  commission  was  ap- 
pointed by  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
whose  report  should  be  known  to  every  American. 
It  is  no  more  or  less  than  a  recapitulation  of  the 
fundamental  principles  underlying  a  military  ad- 
ministration for  the  Navy  Department.  This 
document  clears  the  atmosphere.  Its  language  is 
so  plain  and  so  eloquent  that  any  one  upon  reading 
it  must  be  convinced  of  its  soundness.  The  board 
was  composed  of  men  whose  honesty  of  purpose 
cannot  be  questioned.  They  were  William  H. 
Moody,  Paul  Morton,  Stephen  B.  Luce,  Alfred 
T.  Mahan,  and  A.  G.  Dayton.  Unfortunately, 
these  men  are  of  a  persuasion  in  politics  different 
from  those  now  in  power,  but  their  decisions,  as 
can  be  seen,  are  divorced  from  any  conception  of 
partisan  politics. 

The  report  of  the  commission  is  as  follows: 

i.  The  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  being  execu- 
tive in  character,  nothing  should  be  admitted  into  an 
organization  of  the  Department  which  would  qualify  his 
authority  or  diminish  his  ultimate  responsibility.  He 


NAVAL  PEACE  PREPARATION       73 

has  been  in  the  past,  and  in  the  future  should  be,  a  civil- 
ian. He  is  the  representative  of  the  President,  the  con- 
stitutional Commander-in-Chief  of  the  army  and  navy, 
under  whose  direction  his  authority  is  exercised. 

2.  The  duties  in  charge  of  the  Secretary  divide  under 
the  principal  heads,  closely  related,  but  generically  dis- 
tinct: military  and  civil. 

The  civil  duties  embrace  the  provision  or  preparation 
of  all  material  of  war.  This  is  the  function  of  the  present 
bureaus. 

The  military  duties  concern  the  use  of  that  material, 
whether  in  war  or  in  such  exercises  as  conduce  to  fitness 
for  operations  of  war.  For  the  direction  of  these  military 
duties,  no  subordinate  provision  corresponding  to  the 
bureaus  on  the  civil  side  exists  in  the  present  organization. 

3.  The  discharge  of  both  these  classes  of  duty  involves 
a  multitude  of  activities,  quite  beyond  the  immediate 
personal  knowledge  and  supervision  of  a  single  man. 
This  necessitates  a  subdivision  of  the  duties,  by  which 
means  the  supervision  of  the  Secretary  is  exerted  through 
the  medium  of  responsible  subordinates.    In  this  sub- 
division the  PRINCIPLE  OF  UNDIVIDED  RESPONSIBILITY, 
WITHIN  THE  APPOINTED  FIELD  OF  SUBORDINATE  SUPER- 
VISION, should  obtain  as  it  does  in  the  superior  office  of 
the  Secretary. 

The  bureau  system,  as  now  established  by  law  for  the 
civil  activities  of  the  department,  insures  for  each  bureau 
this  undivided  responsibility,  qualified  only  by  the  au- 
thority of  the  Secretary,  which,  if  exerted,  does  not 
divide  the  responsibility,  but  transfers  it  to  the  Secretary 
himself.  INDEPENDENT  AUTHORITY,  with  UNDIVIDED  RE- 
SPONSIBILITY, though  in  principle  proper,  suffers  histori- 
cally from  intrinsic  inability  to  co-operate,  where  a  num- 
ber of  such  independent  units  are  present.  The  Marshals 


74  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

of  the  first  Napoleon— especially  in  Spain — in  the  absence 
of  the  Emperor,  offer  a  familiar  illustration.  The  bureau 
system  constituted  by  law  contains  no  remedy  for  this 
inherent  defect. 

4.  The  co-ordinating  power  is  in  the  Secretary's  au- 
thority;  but,  owing  to  the  shortness  of  tenure  in  office, 
and  to  the  inevitable  unfamiliarity  with  naval  conditions 
with  which  an  incumbent  begins,  authority,  though  ade- 
quate in  principle,  is  not  so  in  effect.    This  inadequacy 
consists  in  lack  of  personal  familiarity  with  the  subjects 
before  him,  not  merely  severally,  but  in  their  collective 
relations;  in  short,  lack  of  specific  knowledge  and  experi- 
ence.   The  organization  should  provide  him  with  such 
knowledge  and  experience,  digested  formally,  so  as  to 
facilitate  his  personal  acquirement;  in  short,  an  advisory 
body,  equipped  not  with  advice  merely,  but  with  reasons. 
In  order  to  avoid  the  interruption  of  continuity  attend- 
ing each  new  administration,  entailing  the  recurrent  tem- 
porary unfamiliarity  of  each  new  Secretary,  it  is  expedient 
that  this  advisory  body  be  composed  of  several  persons; 
but  while  this  provision  would  insure  the  continuity 
which  inheres  in  a  corporate  body,  in  this  case  continuity 
of  knowledge  and  progress,  the  principle  of  undivided 
responsibility  would  dictate  that  ONE  only  of  them  should 
be  responsible  for  the  advice  given  to  the  common  superior, 
the  Secretary. 

5.  As  regards  the  composition  of  the  advisory  body, 
the  principles  to  be  regarded  are  two: 

(4)  The  end  dictates  the  means. 

(B)  The  responsibility  must  be  individual,  in  advice 
as  well  as  in  executive  action. 

(A)  The  end  is  efficiency  in  war.  The  agents  in  war 
are  the  military  naval  officers.  Their  profession  qualifies 
them  best  to  pronounce  upon  the  character  of  the  prepa- 


NAVAL  PEACE  PREPARATION       75 

rations  of  every  kind  for  war,  including  not  only  schemes 
of  campaign  and  tactical  systems,  but  the  classes,  sizes, 
qualities,  and  armaments  of  ships  of  war. 

What  the  Secretary  needs,  specifically  and  above  all, 
is  a  clear  understanding  and  firm  grasp  of  leading  military 
considerations.  Possessed  of  these,  he  may  without  great 
difficulty  weigh  the  recommendations  of  his  technical 
assistants,  decide  for  himself  and  depend  upon  them  for 
technical  execution  of  that  which  he  approves. 

However  constituted  in  detail,  the  advisory  body  should 
be  taken  entirely  from  the  class  to  which  belongs  the  con- 
duct of  war,  and  upon  them  will  fall  in  war  the  responsi- 
bility for  the  use  of  the  instruments  and  for  the  results 
of  the  measures  which  they  recommend. 

(B)  As  regards  individual  responsibility  for  advice,  it 
is  suggested  that  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  nominate  to 
the  President  the  officer  whom  he  deems  best  fitted  to 
command  the  great  fleet  in  case  of  war  arising;  and  that 
this  officer,  irrespective  of  his  seniority,  should  be  head 
of  the  advisory  body.  He  alone  should  be  the  responsi- 
ble adviser  of  the  Secretary. 

The  provision  of  a  responsible  adviser  does  not  compel 
the  Secretary  to  accept  his  advice,  nor  prevent  his  con- 
sulting whomsoever  else  he  will.  The  provision  sug- 
gested does  not  limit  the  authority  of  the  Secretary;  but 
it  does  provide  him  with  the  weightiest  and  most  instructed 
counsel,  and  it  lays  upon  the  prospective  Commander- 
in-Chief  the  solemn  charge  that  in  all  he  recommends 
he  is  sowing  for  a  future  which  he  himself  may  have  to 
reap. 

An  essential  principle  in  the  constitution  of  such  an 
advisory  body  is  that  the  majority  of  the  members  should 
be  on  the  active  list  and  should  go  afloat  at  no  infrequent 
intervals;  and,  specifically,  the  head  of  the  body,  the 


76  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

prospective  Commander-in-Chief,  should  during  the  sum- 
mer months  take  command  of  the  fleet  when  concentrated 
for  manoeuvres,  etc.,  to  sustain  his  familiarity  with  ad- 
ministrative routine  and  other  practical  matters. 

6.  In  the  two  principal  classes  into  which  the  duties 
of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  divide,  civil  and  military, 
as  enunciated  in  Section  2  above,  the  word  "civil"  cor- 
responds largely  to  the  activities  known  as  technical; 
and  there  is  no  reason  apparent  why  the  same  principle 
of  undivided  immediate  responsibility  should  not  be  re- 
alized in  the  Navy  Department  in  two  chief  subordinates, 
responsible,  the  one  for  military  supervision,  the  other 
for  technical  supervision,  and  for  all  information  and  ad- 
vice given  to  the  Secretary  under  these  two  heads.  It  is 
of  course  apparent  that  a  perfectly  suitable  Secretary 
may  come  to  his  office  with  as  little  previous  knowledge 
of  the  kind  called  technical  as  he  has  of  military;  nay,  he 
may  be  perfectly  efficient,  and  yet  not  acquire  in  his  four 
years  of  office  either  the  technical  or  the  military  knowl- 
edge presumable  in  men  whose  lives  have  been  given  to 
the  two  professions.  Under  the  most  favorable  condi- 
tions, every  superior  must  take  decisions  largely  on  advice; 
which  means  not  accepting  another's  opinions  blindly, 
but  accepting  statements  of  facts  and  weighing  reasons. 

The  principle  of  the  Secretary's  ultimate  individual  re- 
sponsibility dictates  that  he  be  at  libery  to  consult  as 
many  advisers  as  he  thinks  necessary;  but  the  principle 
of  the  individual  responsibility  of  two  chief  advisers,  for 
the  advice  given,  tends  to  insure  the  most  exhaustive 
consideration  on  the  part  of  men  selected  for  their  special 
competency.  Careful  consideration  with  special  com- 
petency give  the  best  guarantees  for  advice,  and  a  Secre- 
tary overruling  it  would  do  so  under  the  weightiest  sense 
of  personal  responsibility. 


NAVAL  PEACE  PREPARATION       77 

Can  any  one  doubt  the  soundness  of  these  prin- 
ciples? They  apply  not  only  to  a  military  ser- 
vice, but  to  any  great  commercial  organization. 
For  instance,  the  president  of  a  railroad  must  be 
ultimately  responsible  for  the  efficiency  of  his 
road,  yet  he  will  not  invade  the  provinces  of  his 
subordinates  who,  in  their  specialties,  are  thor- 
oughly capable  of  giving  efficient  and  loyal  ser- 
vice. Each  brings  to  his  work  a  special  knowl- 
edge and  experience  which  may  or  may  not  be 
had  by  the  president.  The  president  will  hold 
each  responsible  for  his  acts.  The  president  and 
his  council  will  decide  the  broad  policies  of  the 
road.  These  policies  will  guide  the  subordinates 
in  their  work.  The  general  manager,  assistant 
general  manager,  general  superintendent,  etc., 
through  their  intimate  knowledge  of  the  require- 
ments of  the  railroad,  will  also  guide  the  president 
and  his  council  in  their  work.  The  president  of 
a  railroad  would  not  disregard  the  responsibility 
of  his  traffic  manager  by  directing  against  his 
technical  advice  the  introduction  of  special  trains 
or  changing  the  existing  schedules,  for  in  so  doing 
the  president  of  a  railroad  knows  that  dangerous 
collisions  would  result  and  many  lives  would  be 
lost. 

Let  us  look  back  into  our  history  and  see  how 
the  Navy  Department  prepared  for  the  war  with 
Spain.  As  early  as  the  middle  of  March,  1898, 


78  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

the  government  in  Washington  began  to  prepare 
for  war.  In  the  next  six  months  102  vessels  of 
all  sorts,  even  tugs  and  ferry-boats,  were  bought. 
They  were  inspected  by  boards  of  naval  officers, 
but  the  emergency  was  great  and  thorough  in- 
spections were  impossible.  There  had  been  no 
inspection  of  vessels  before  the  war  as  to  their 
fitness  for  war  purposes.  Twenty-one  million 
four  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  dollars  were  spent 
on  these  vessels.  During  the  war  the  active  fleet 
was  increased  by  130  ships.  Many  of  the  pur- 
chased vessels  were  converted  into  auxiliary 
cruisers,  the  conversion  of  which  required  at  least 
a  one  month's  stay  at  the  navy-yards.  The  navy 
personnel  was  increased  from  13,000  to  25,000. 
Vast  supplies  were  purchased  at  exorbitant  prices. 
In  many  cases  there  had  been  no  contract  for  sup- 
plies before  the  war,  and  the  Navy  Department 
was  forced  to  accept  the  best  terms  it  could  get. 
In  Washington  all  was  confusion  until  Captain 
Mahan  arrived,  bringing  with  him  an  atmosphere 
of  calm  and  sound  deliberation  and  a  compre- 
hensive knowledge  of  fundamental  strategical 
principles.  A  naval  war  council  was  immediately 
formed.  A  state  of  war  having  arisen,  the  secre- 
tary of  the  navy  at  once  realized  the  necessity  of 
a  general  staff.  This  war  board,  or  general  staff, 
organized  an  information  service  which  gave 
Admiral  Sampson  his  only  certain  news  among  the 


NAVAL  PEACE  PREPARATION       79 

vast  amount  of  rumors  as  to  the  movements  of 
the  enemy.  Admiral  Mahan  was  a  typical  gen- 
eral staff  officer.  He  had  studied  for  years  at  the 
Naval  War  College  the  strategical  situation  of  the 
United  States.  In  his  lectures  before  the  War 
College  he  had  developed  a  sound  strategy  for  the 
navy  which,  upon  the  outbreak  of  war,  became 
the  navy's  plan  of  campaign.  Whatever  merits 
there  were  in  the  conduct  of  our  naval  war  with 
Spain  belong  to  him.  His  genius  was  the  navy's 
guiding  star. 

The  war  having  been  brought  to  a  successful 
end,  the  naval  board  was  dismissed. 

Any  one  who  witnessed  the  confusion,  not  only 
in  the  Navy  Department  in  Washington,  but  at 
all  the  navy-yards  and  recruiting  stations  in  1898, 
can  multiply  that  confusion  by  about  six  and  then 
obtain  a  fair  picture  of  what  would  happen  in 
case  the  United  States  went  to  war  within  the 
year.  The  size  of  our  present  navy,  ships  and  men, 
is  just  six  times  its  size  in  1898.  To  plan  the 
opening  moves  in  our  mobilization  requires  a 
general  staff  composed  of  men  who  have  given 
several  years  to  a  close  study  of  the  conditions  of 
naval  war.  They  must  prepare  that  plan  to  the 
most  minute  detail,  and  have  it  always  ready 
for  promulgation. 

The  next  war  will  probably  not  be  with  another 
Spain.  It  will  be  with  a  country  which  has  worked 


8o  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

out  such  a  plan  of  mobilization,  and  who,  doubt- 
less, knows  of  our  unpreparedness.  The  enemy, 
therefore,  will  use  his  utmost  endeavors  to  cut 
short  our  time  of  preparation,  and  force  us  to  fight 
unprepared  by  striking  swiftly  and  secretly. 

The  United  States  is  considered  to  be  one  of  the 
world's  most  scientific  nations.  Methods  of  sci- 
entific management  are  the  rule  in  business.  The 
army's  methods  are  becoming  more  scientific, 
due  to  the  tutelage  of  the  general  staff  and  the 
Army  War  College,  but  the  navy  is,  if  anything, 
still  deep  in  the  mire  of  red  tape.  Our  navy-yards 
are  so  congested  with  work,  and  the  hand  of  the 
politician  rules  there  so  strongly  that  even  the 
supreme  influence  of  the  commander-in-chief  of 
the  Atlantic  fleet  has  been  powerless  to  limit 
the  prolonged  stay  of  ships  at  navy-yards.  The 
methods  of  buying  material  for  the  navy  require 
such  a  length  of  time  that  repairs  to  ships  which 
should  be  effected  in  a  few  weeks  are  delayed 
often  many  months.  There  are  battleships  and 
other  vessels  that  have  spent  at  the  navy-yards 
50  per  cent  of  their  first  few  years  in  commission, 
and  against  this  disorganizing  condition  the  com- 
mander-in-chief of  the  fleet  seems  powerless. 

One  of  the  greatest  authorities  in  naval  matters, 
in  discussing  our  naval  administration,  has  said: 

It  is  conceded  that  the  present  organization  of  the 
Navy  Department  .  .  .  has  performed  the  business  of 


NAVAL  PEACE  PREPARATION       81 

the  Navy  Department  adequately;  its  shortcomings  have 
not  been  due  to  any  deficiency  in  skill  or  want  of  business 
capacity  in  administration,  but  rather  because  the  or- 
ganization has  lacked  the  principle  of  responsible  mili- 
tary advice  to  the  Secretary. 

The  object  and  ultimate  end  of  the  Navy  Department 
are  to  build,  arm,  equip,  and  man  the  fleet  in  order  to 
prepare  it  for  war.  It  is  conceivable  that  in  a  highly 
developed  industrial  community  like  our  own  the  busi- 
ness of  the  Navy  Department  might,  under  its  Secretary, 
be  restricted  to  its  military  duties  only,  the  supplies  of 
every  nature,  including  the  vessels  themselves  and  their 
entire  war  outfit,  being  obtained  by  purchase,  as  has  been 
illustrated  in  certain  foreign  countries.  The  predominant 
character  and  importance  of  efficient  military  counsel 
will  thus  be  appreciated. 

The  convincing  soundness  of  this  advice  upon 
military  administration  has  ever  since  been  dis- 
regarded. It  was  given  six  years  ago. 

The  navy-yards  and  the  controlling  bureaus  of 
the  Navy  Department  are  merely  outfitters  and, 
if  properly  controlled,  should  work  in  cordial  and 
intelligent  support  of  each  other  to  meet  the  de- 
mands of  consumers,  who,  in  this  case,  are  the 
naval  officers  who  use  the  material  provided  for 
them.  To  control  the  naval  outfitters,  to  make 
them  work  in  cordial  and  intelligent  support  of 
each  other,  is  the  duty  of  a  general  staff. 

It  must  always  be  remembered  that  any  suc- 
cessful business  represents  an  accumulation  of 
the  ideas  of  many  men.  These  ideas  must  have 


82  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

a  repository  where  they  can  be  sifted  out,  tagged, 
and  labelled  to  be  used  for  the  betterment  of  the 
service. 

The  cycle  of  our  naval  administration  is  not  a 
closed  one,  and  for  that  reason  men  untrained  in 
the  art  of  war  are  incapable  of  assaying  profits. 
Congress  appropriates  the  money  wisely  and  un- 
wisely. This  money  is  converted  into  raw  ma- 
terial and  labor,  and  this  raw  material  and  labor 
are  in  turn  converted  into  the  finished  product 
and  service.  But  these  finished  products  and  ser- 
vice are  not  converted  back  into  money.  They 
have  become  something  intangible,  a  potential 
power — a  weapon  ready  for  immediate  use,  but 
one  the  nation  hopes  it  may  never  have  to  use. 
The  steel  of  the  blade,  however,  must  be  kept 
bright  and  sharp.  Can  a  civilian  secretary,  with 
no  experience  in  the  art  of  war,  tell  by  examining 
that  instrument  whether  or  not  its  blade  is  of 
true  temper  ? 


CHAPTER  V 
OUR  MILITARY  REQUIREMENTS 

AIERICA,  as  has  been  shown,  has  the  his- 
torical calling  of  guardian  over  the  repub- 
lican forms  of  government  which  have 
been  established  by  the  various  peoples  of  this 
continent.  Those  traditional  policies  we  must 
safeguard  by  preparedness,  for  our  present  posi- 
tion we  shall  not  be  able  to  maintain  indefinitely 
without  an  appeal  to  arms.  Fortunately,  such 
an  appeal  does  not,  of  necessity,  mean  war.  Mili- 
tary preparation  is  an  asset  to  the  statesman. 
By  the  threat  of  an  appeal  to  arms  victories  in 
peace  can  be  won  as  lasting  as  those  achieved  on 
the  field  of  battle.  This,  history  has  taught 
since  the  beginning  of  things.  But  let  us  also  be 
forewarned;  such  a  threat,  given  without  the 
necessary  force  to  back  it,  is  futile  and  has  al- 
ways led  to  war. 

Two  principles  that  must  govern  the  action  of 
a  nation  in  its  preparation  for  possible  conflict 
must  be  accepted  by  Americans.  They  are:  (a) 

83 


84  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

that  the  fleet  is  our  first  line  of  defense,  and  (6) 
that  it  is  the  duty  of  every  male  citizen  to  prepare 
himself  for  the  military  service  of  his  country. 

The  naval  and  military  armaments  of  the 
present  day  must  be  ready  at  all  times  if  they 
are  to  be  effective  in  time  of  need.  The  size 
of  our  fleet  must  be  based  upon  that  of  its  pos- 
sible opponents.  In  order  that  we  may  have  a 
fleet  capable  of  achieving  the  aim  of  our  naval 
strategy,  the  probable  theatre  of  war  must  be 
studied  and  a  knowledge  gained  of  the  character 
of  the  struggle  which  will  have  to  be  waged  to 
gain  command  of  the  seas.  The  defense  of  our 
coast  is  assured  when  our  control  of  the  seas  is 
secured.  For  the  protection  of  our  coast,  al- 
though the  end  is  defensive,  the  means  will  not 
be  defensive.  The  fleet  cannot  merely  stand 
on  guard.  Its  fighting  power  cannot  be  frittered 
away  by  being  thinly  spread  along  our  entire 
coast-line.  It  must  have  "force"  as  a  fleet; 
it  must  have  mobility.  And  that  fleet  must  have 
more  than  that  mobility;  it  must  be  capable  of 
gaining  information  of  the  enemy's  movements 
and  able  to  maintain  its  activity  in  whatever 
area  of  hostilities  it  may  be  drawn.  Its  primary 
duty  is  to  find  and  engage  the  naval  power  of 
the  enemy.  "Force"  rests  on  battleships,  battle 
cruisers,  destroyers,  and  submarines.  ' '  Mobility ' ' 
indicates  great  individual  size  and  steaming 


OUR  MILITARY  REQUIREMENTS    85 

radius.  To  gather  information  of  the  enemy,  to 
avoid  surprise,  and  to  bring  the  hostile  squadrons 
to  action  require  fast  scouts  of  great  steaming 
radius.  To  maintain  the  fleet's  activity  in  the 
area  of  probable  hostilities  requires  well-equipped 
and  protected  naval  bases,  colliers,  repair  ships, 
mother  ships  for  submarines  and  tenders,  ammu- 
nition ships,  mine-layers,  mine-sweepers,  and  hos- 
pital ships.  The  study  of  the  creation,  organi- 
zation, administration,  and  management  of  such 
a  fleet  is  a  scientific  one  solely.  The  statesman, 
a  civilian,  points  out  the  probable  antagonist. 
This  information  is  in  the  keeping  of  the  states- 
man. The  question  of  the  disposition  and  the 
use  of  a  fleet  to  accomplish  the  national  purpose — 
that  is,  the  perpetuation  of  its  policies — cannot 
be  intrusted  to  those  whose  sole  fitness  for  the 
task  lies  in  their  capabilities  as  leaders  in  the 
internal  politics  of  the  country.  The  nation  must 
insist  that  where  a  question  arises  concerning 
the  navy  as  a  fighting  machine,  that  question 
shall  be  decided  by  those  who  have  given  a  life 
of  study  to  naval  affairs.  To  permit  a  politician, 
be  he  ever  so  patriotic,  to  make  military  or  naval 
decisions,  is  to  court  disaster. 

On  the  side  of  organization  alone,  it  is  well  to 
bear  in  mind  that  a  military  force — a  fleet  or  an 
army — cannot  be  levied  en  masse  and  led  at 
once  successfully  into  battle.  It  is  first  neces- 


86  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

sary  to  train  the  personnel  and  prepare  the  vast 
material  required.  Military  preparation  we  must 
consider  in  the  light  of  a  great  social  benefit. 
Such  preparation  raises  the  capabilities  of  the 
nation  as  a  unit,  which  is  a  great  national  asset 
and  a  strong  card  in  the  hands  of  the  statesman. 
In  its  more  technical  sense,  preparation  provides 
for  the  conduct  of  a  war  and  supplies  the  means  to 
carry  it  through.  In  our  every-day  walks  of  life, 
in  business,  in  the  arts  and  sciences,  social  com- 
petition is  evident  on  every  hand.  Those  hold 
the  field  who  are  intellectually  well  equipped  for 
the  contest.  So  it  is  with  nations.  Military  ser- 
vice is  well  known  to  develop  the  intellectual  and 
moral  fibre  of  the  individual.  Through  him  it 
benefits  the  nation  by  rendering  him  more  effi- 
cient for  the  occupations  of  peace.  Military 
training  gives  a  man  the  full  mastery  of  his  body; 
exercises  and  increases  his  initiative;  develops 
self-reliance  and  decision  of  character.  It  teaches 
him  to  subordinate  his  will  to  a  higher  recognized 
authority.  It  develops  in  him  those  necessary 
qualities,  self-respect  and  courage,  both  moral 
and  physical.  It  is  time  that  we  realized  that 
training  in  the  profession  of  arms  is  a  national 
asset  which  increases  the  wealth  of  the  nation 
by  increasing  the  efficiency  of  its  individuals  in 
the  arts,  in  industries,  in  trade,  and  in  commerce. 
A  military  nation  will  successfully  embark  in 


OUR  MILITARY  REQUIREMENTS    87 

enterprises  which  the  non-military  nation,  fear- 
ing the  risk  involved,  will  refuse  to  undertake. 

It  is  now  a  well-recognized  fact,  that  our  his- 
tories have  suppressed  the  military  lessons  which 
should  have  been  forcibly  brought  before  the 
people  of  the  country.  Our  studied  lack  of  pre- 
paredness in  the  military  art  has  now  been  tested 
during  more  than  a  century.  We  have  engaged 
in  foreign,  domestic,  and  Indian  wars,  and  have  in 
every  one  achieved  the  final  success.  But  how 
many  Americans  have  realized  the  price  at  which 
that  success  has  been  bought,  or  considered  the 
delays  and  disasters  that  prolonged  our  wars  till, 
in  nearly  every  instance,  our  national  resources 
were  completely  exhausted?  Has  not  the  final 
outcome  in  each  case  deluded  the  popular  mind 
into  the  belief  that  we  are,  as  a  nation,  invincible? 

How  many  Americans  have  any  conception  of 
the  outrageous  extravagance  in  men  and  money 
that  has  characterized  our  past  wars?  With  a 
first-class  power  we  have  never  yet  been  engaged. 
England,  in  her  wars  with  us,  has  always  been 
occupied  elsewhere  and  never  could  spare  more 
than  a  small  part  of  her  forces  to  war  on  us.  Yet 
in  the  Revolutionary  War  it  took  231,771  of  our 
Continental  troops  and  164,000  minutemen  to 
defeat  the  150,605  soldiers  that  England  sent  to 
the  discontented  colonies.  Our  regulars  bore  the 
brunt  of  the  fighting  heroically,  but  our  undisci- 


88  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

plined  militia  tarnished  the  honor  of  our  arms 
on  more  than  one  occasion. 

In  the  War  of  1812  the  navy  alone  saved  us 
from  national  dishonor.  But  the  successful  cruises 
and  the  brilliant  victories  of  the  Constitution  and 
of  her  consorts  were  not  the  entire  record  of  those 
years  of  almost  uninterrupted  disasters  on  land. 
Our  56,032  regular  troops  and  the  471,622  militia 
that  we  called  into  the  field  were  shamefully 
routed,  time  and  again — except  at  Lundy's  Lane 
and  at  New  Orleans — by  less  than  55,000  British 
and  Canadians.  Again,  in  the  Mexican  War  of 
1846  were  we  fortunate.  Our  antagonist  here 
was  racially  weaker,  yet  no  less  than  30,000  reg- 
ular troops  and  73,532  militia  and  volunteers  were 
required  to  conquer  less  than  47,000  ill-fed  and 
ill-equipped  Mexicans. 

And  in  1861  our  national  resources  were  almost 
completely  exhausted  by  the  delays  and  disasters 
that  characterized  the  first  few  months  of  the 
conflict — disasters  that  could  have  been  avoided 
in  every  case  by  adequate  preparation.  It  is 
questionable  whether  there  ever  would  have  been 
a  war,  had  the  Federal  Government  had  the 
proper  trained  force  at  hand.  Yet  a  few  months 
before  the  war  it  was  actually  proposed  in  Con- 
gress to  abolish  the  navy.1 

1In  the  Civil  War  the  United  States  employed  67,000  regulars, 
and  2,605,000  militia  and  volunteers  to  defeat  978,664  Confederates. 
And  in  the  Spanish- American  War  of  1898  we  were  compelled  to 


OUR  MILITARY  REQUIREMENTS    89 

Do  we  realize  that  if  our  fleet  were  defeated 
to-day,  nothing  would  stand  between  us  and  the 
invasion  of  our  territory?  Our  pitifully  small 
army  could  not  possibly  defend  our  entire  sea- 
coast,  and  the  undisciplined  hordes  that  would  be 
called  to  the  colors  would  be  almost  as  useless  for 
military  purposes  as  would  a  like  number  of  sheep 
or  horses.  The  average  American  believes  that 
if  the  danger  of  invasion  were  imminent,  the  na- 
tion would  rise  as  one  man  to  repel  the  invader; 
but  nations  cannot  rise  as  one  man  unless  their 
organization  for  the  purpose  has  been  carefully 
worked  out  beforehand,  and  they  themselves  have 
been  previously  trained  for  the  task. 

Leaving  out  of  consideration  the  possible  men- 
ace of  the  European  nations,  let  us  consider  the 
case  of  Japan.  In  the  'go's  her  policy  clashed 
with  the  policies  of  China  over  the  kingdom  of 
Corea,  which  neither  had  a  right  to  consider 
its  prize.  A  war  resulted.  The  subjects  of  the 
Japanese  Empire  had  all  been  trained  in  the  use 
of  arms.  Even  at  that  date,  Japan  had  organized 
a  general  staff,  consisting  of  her  greatest  military 
intellects.  The  nation  was  fully  prepared  for  the 

raise  58,688  regulars,  and  223,235  militia  and  volunteers  to  subdue 
less  than  200,000  Spaniards.  Two  hundred  thousand  volunteers 
were  called  for  by  the  President  in  April,  1898,  yet,  though  every  State 
responded  instantly,  the  work  of  mobilizing  these  troops  was  con- 
ducted in  so  bungling  a  fashion  that  by  the  beginning  of  June  only 
three  regiments,  in  addition  to  the  regulars,  had  reached  the  rendez- 
vous at  Tampa,  Florida. 


90  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

struggle  which  her  statesmen  had  foreseen.  China, 
in  a  manner  strikingly  similar  to  the  methods  of 
this  republic,  refused  to  believe  that  war  was 
possible.  In  China,  the  military  was  considered 
of  an  inferior  cloth  to  the  scholar,  the  idealist,  the 
civilizer,  the  poet.  War  came  suddenly,  but  it 
came  at  the  very  moment  when  the  statesmen  of 
Japan  had  decided  it  should  come.  Japan  won, 
of  course,  but  she  was  deprived  of  the  fruits  of 
the  war  through  the  acts  of  a  coalition  of  Euro- 
pean nations.  All  that  was  left  to  her  was  the 
island  of  Formosa,  in  which  she  now  has  a  naval 
base  that  will  prove  most  useful  in  her  next  war, 
when  the  probable  area  of  naval  hostilities  will 
be  in  the  waters  of  the  Philippines. 

Russia  forced  Japan  to  give  up  the  territory 
won  by  the  sword  in  Manchuria,  and  occupied  it 
herself.  Japan,  from  that  moment,  began  to 
prepare  herself  for  a  war  with  Russia.  The  Em- 
peror called  his  military  and  naval  advisers  to- 
gether at  the  imperial  palace  at  Tokio.  He  said 
to  them:  "We  must  fight  Russia."  They  an- 
swered: "Your  Majesty,  it  is  impossible;  we 
cannot  win.  Give  us  ten  years  and  we  shall  be 
ready  to  fight/'  In  nine  years  the  statesmen  and 
military  and  naval  advisers  of  the  Emperor  went 
to  him  and  said :  "We  are  ready."  Russia  mean- 
while had  expended  money  and  resources  in  build- 
ing the  great  railroad  from  Saint  Petersburg  to 


OUR  MILITARY  REQUIREMENTS    91 

Vladivostock  and  Port  Arthur.  Her  people  had 
peacefully  penetrated  vast  areas  of  Manchuria. 
Manchuria  was  becoming  rapidly  Russianized. 
The  war  that  followed  is  too  fresh  in  our  minds 
for  us  to  forget.  The  surprise  of  the  world  was 
great  when  Japan,  that  small  island  empire, 
began  the  war  precipitately,  and  with  victory 
after  victory,  finally  beat  the  Russian  giant  to 
his  knees,  and  won  back  the  territory  that  Russia 
had  taken  from  her  through  the  power  of  diplo- 
macy, backed  by  the  threat  of  a  coalition  of  force 
too  powerful  to  resist.  Since  this  war,  Japan  has 
been  able  to  direct  all  her  energies  toward  the 
preparation  for  a  war  which  her  statesmen  have 
foreseen  to  be  necessary  in  order  to  carry  out  her 
purpose,  which  is  the  political  control  of  the 
Pacific  Ocean  and  its  commerce. 

To  resist  the  attack  of  such  a  nation  as  we  have 
seen  Japan  to  be,  our  preparation  must  be  me- 
thodical and  scientific.  No  longer  can  we  afford  to 
continue  our  unscientific  and  haphazard  meth- 
ods of  building  a  fleet  and  administering  it.  No 
longer  can  we  afford  to  believe  that  our  small 
army  will  be  capable  of  meeting  the  demands 
which  it  will  be  called  upon  to  meet  in  the  event 
of.  a  war  with  Japan. 

Our  fleet  in  the  Atlantic  Ocean  now  consists 
of  8  dreadnaughts,  2  semidreadnaughts,  n  pre- 
dreadnaughts,  21  destroyers,  17  submarines,  2 


92  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

armored  cruisers,  3  scout  cruisers,  and  about  8 
gunboats.  This  fleet  is  manned1  and  ready  for 
service.  In  addition,  there  are  in  reserve  7  pre- 
dreadnaughts,  and  13  destroyers.  The  reserve 
fleet  has  only  a  nucleus  crew.  In  the  case  of  the 
reserve  battleships,  only  20  men  of  the  thousand 
required  to  man  them  efficiently  are  on  board. 
In  the  event  of  hostilities,  they  would  require 
from  600  to  800  additional  men  each.  But  we 
have  no  reserves  to  draw  upon,  and  every  re- 
cruit would,  therefore,  be  without  previous  train- 
ing. 

A  battleship,  and,  in  a  lesser  degree,  a  destroyer 
and  a  submarine  follow  the  biological  law  of 
growth.  In  order  to  develop  power,  the  ship  must 
become  a  distinct  entity.  When  first  the  crew  is 
received,  the  ship  is  an  awkward  recruit,  incapable 
of  military  service.  If,  while  in  this  condition,  it 
is  put  in  the  fleet,  it  weakens  that  fleet  instead  of 
strengthening  it.  The  force  of  a  battleship  has 
too  long,  in  this  country,  been  reckoned  solely  by 
the  size  and  power  of  its  guns.  No  one  seems  to 

*But  not  fully  manned,  since  the  21  battleships  in  commission 
alone,  according  to  the  statement  of  the  fleet's  commander-m-chief, 
Admiral  Fletcher,  were,  on  January  28,  1915,  339  officers  and  5,219 
men  short  of  the  complements  required  to  man  them  properly  to 
efficiently  fight  them  in  battle.  The  dreadnaught  Utah  was  in  need 
of  27  commissioned  officers  out  of  55  required;  the  Florida  was  short 
26  officers  out  of  55  required;  the  South  Carolina  had  only  21  out 
of  48,  and  the  Michigan  22  out  of  48.  In  the  case  of  only  three  ships 
of  the  first  battle  line  was  the  shortage  under  double  figures ! 


OUR  MILITARY  REQUIREMENTS    93 

have  thought  of  the  psychological,  the  spiritual 
side,  which  is  of  such  overwhelming  importance. 
On  paper,  the  Atlantic  fleet  is  said  to  be  com- 
posed of  the  following:  8  dreadnaughts,  2  semi- 
dreadnaughts,  and  18  predreadnaughts,  and  in 
destroyers  34  modern  vessels.  Of  these,  8  pre- 
dreadnaughts and  1 6  destroyers  are  immature  in 
their  development  as  fighting  units.  Naval  ex- 
perts agree  that  at  least  one  year  is  required  for 
the  development  of  a  raw  crew  into  an  efficient 
battle  unit.  Recently  the  world  was  amazed  at 
the  ease  with  which  two  German  armored  cruisers, 
the  Scharnhorst  and  the  Gneisenau,  destroyed,  in  a 
battle  off  the  Chilean  coast,  the  British  armored 
cruisers  Good  Hope  and  Monmouih,  with  but  neg- 
ligible damage  to  themselves.  True,  the  arma- 
ment of  the  German  vessels  was  superior  in  caliber 
and  in  carrying  power  to  that  of  their  opponents, 
but  this  alone  could  not  account  for  the  reason 
why,  in  an  hour's  engagement,  the  British  cruisers 
failed  to  damage  their  victorious  enemy.  The 
vaunted  British  marksmanship  had  failed  signally 
in  the  hour  of  battle.  Then  a  veiled  statement 
from  the  British  admiralty  gave  the  full  explana- 
tion. The  crews  of  the  Good  Hope  and  the  Mon- 
mouth  were  not  regulars.  They  were  militia — 
reservists.  The  Good  Hope  and  the  Monmouth 
were  not  effective  righting  units  of  the  British 
fleet.  Their  crews  were  greatly  augmented  by 


94  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

recruits  upon  the  outbreak  of  war.  Their  doom 
must  be  laid  at  the  door  of  that  faulty  conception 
of  naval  administration  which  keeps,  in  time  of 
peace,  war-ships  in  reserve,  or  in  "cold  storage," 
and  mans  them  hurriedly  with  raw  and  untrained 
crews  in  time  of  war. 

This  naval  catastrophe  should  not  have  been 
needed  to  demonstrate  the  unfitness  of  a  vessel 
manned  in  such  a  way.  Naval  men,  in  their 
studies  and  in  the  council  chamber,  should  have 
been  able  to  foretell  the  result  of  such  a  method 
of  organization.  We  cannot,  therefore,  consider 
that  our  8  reserve  battleships,  and  our  16  reserve 
destroyers  are  full  units  of  our  battle  fleet,  since 
we  have  no  "reserves"  to  call  upon  to  fill  up 
their  complements.  In  a  war  with  Japan  or 
Germany  we  can  count  on  only  those  vessels  that 
have  been  maintained  in  time  of  peace  continu- 
ously in  full  commission.  In  those  vessels  a  soul 
has  been  created.  They  are  spiritually,  physically, 
and  vitally  full-grown  organizations,  capable  of  us- 
ing to  a  maximum  the  great  power  of  offense  and 
defense  embodied  in  the  material,  in  the  arma- 
ment of  the  ship.  The  thinking  naval  men  of  this 
country  have  endeavored,  for  some  years,  to  cor- 
rect this  grievous  fault  in  our  naval  policy.  They 
have  stood  for  permanency  in  the  personnel  of  our 
fighting  units.  They  have  condemned  the  policy 
of  reserve  fleets.  But  the  civil  administrators,  dis- 


OUR  MILITARY  REQUIREMENTS    95 

regarding,  if  knowing,  the  biological  law  which 
governs  the  actions  of  organizations,  have  never 
been  able  to  see  that  the  ship  must  be  something 
more  than  the  armor  and  guns  it  carries.  An  un- 
wise economy  has  prevented  an  increase  of  per- 
sonnel to  keep  pace  with  the  increasing  number  of 
the  ships  of  our  fleet.  In  order  to  keep  the  new 
vessels  fully  manned,  the  old  vessels  were  retired 
into  the  reserve  fleet,  where  they  were  left  with 
only  sufficient  men  on  board  to  oil  and  paint  their 
machinery  and  armament.  In  all  our  statistical 
comparisons  with  foreign  navies,  we  have  counted 
our  reserve  ships  as  full  fighting  units.  The  battle 
off  the  Chilean  coast  now  forces  the  conclusion 
that  we  must,  in  our  next  comparison  of  fighting 
strength,  scratch  from  the  list  our  vessels  of  the 
reserve  fleet,  or  else  give  them  full  crews  and  allow 
them  to  begin  their  growth  to  manhood. 

If  we  scan  our  fleet  in  the  Pacific  we  shall  find 
in  the  active  fleet  2  armored  cruisers,  7  cruisers 
and  gunboats,  5  destroyers,  and  n  submarines. 
In  the  reserve  fleet  on  that  coast  are  i  battleship, 
3  armored  cruisers,  3  large  protected  cruisers,  4 
destroyers,  and  2  old  submarines.  On  the  Asiatic 
station  there  is  an  active  fleet  of  i  first-class 
cruiser,  2  monitors,  2  cruisers,  10  gunboats,  5 
old  destroyers,  and  9  submarines  of  the  oldest 
type.  Using  the  same  argument  in  marshalling 
our  war  strength,  we  must,  therefore,  subtract 


96  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

from  our  total  strength  in  the  Pacific  i  battleship, 

3  armored  cruisers,  3  large  first-class  cruisers,  and 

4  destroyers,  which  are  only  the  shells  of  fighting 
ships.    Their  spirit  has  not  been  created. 

The  result  of  the  battle  off  Chile  had  a  parallel 
a  century  ago  in  our  own  history  when  the  Chesa- 
peake fought  the  Shannon  off  Boston.  The 
Shannon  had  been  in  commission  for  several  years. 
Her  crew  was  well  trained,  and  had  become  a  full- 
grown  and  matured  organization.  Her  striking 
power  was  intellectually  controlled.  Her  fighting 
capacity  was  the  product  of  the  power  of  guns  and 
the  capacity  to  use  them.  The  Chesapeake,  on  the 
other  hand,  left  the  navy-yard,  having  just  been 
fitted  out.  As  a  psychological  entity  she  was  in  her 
incipiency.  She  had  just  begun  to  "grow."  She 
was  a  child  in  swaddling-cloths;  yet  she  went 
out  to  fight  a  ship  with  a  full-grown  organization, 
leaving  the  melancholy,  if  heroic,  tradition  of  a 
battle  lost  against  odds.  This  lesson  of  the  ne- 
cessity for  time  in  the  evolution  of  a  fighting  unit, 
be  it  a  regiment  on  land  or  a  ship  on  the  ocean, 
has  been  one  difficult  for  the  American  people  to 
grasp.  A  hundred  years  later  in  time  of  war  we 
stand  ready  to  commit  the  same  military  crime 
and  would  send  against  the  Japanese  and  German 
fleets,  composed  entirely  of  fully  matured  units, 
our  9  reserve  battleships,  3  reserve  armored 
cruisers,  3  reserve  first-class  cruisers,  and  16  re- 


OUR  MILITARY  REQUIREMENTS    97 

serve  destroyers.  We  would  actually  handicap 
our  fleet  with  the  care  of  these  charges,  while  the 
people  of  the  United  States  firmly  believed  that 
they  had  increased  the  power  of  the  fleet  by  that 
number  of  ships.  Let  us  take  this  second  lesson 
of  unpreparedness  and  use  it  to  advantage.  Let 
us  fully  man  all  our  ships  that  are  capable  of 
offense,  and  keep  them  continually  in  full  com- 
mission. Those  for  which  we  have  not  the  per- 
sonnel we  must  scratch  off  our  lists  of  fighting 
ships  and  no  longer  consider  them  in  the  computa- 
tion of  our  naval  strength.  A  fully  organized 
and  fully  manned  navy  may  repel  an  invasion, 
or,  at  least,  detain  it,  until  the  army  has  the  time 
to  mobilize.  But  without  such  a  naval  force  we 
are  helpless. 


CHAPTER  VI 

OUR  NAVAL  REQUIREMENTS 

A  NATION'S  foreign  policy  and  the  means 
of  carrying  it  out  must  harmonize.  Foreign 
policies,  consequently,  determine  the  size 
of  a  nation's  fleet.  This  means  that  the  determi- 
nation of  the  naval  forces  necessary  for  national 
security,  the  principal  characteristics  of  the  units 
composing  such  forces,  and  the  location  and  re- 
sources of  bases  of  operation  from  which  the  action 
of  the  fleet  is  to  be  supported  require  previous 
knowledge  of  what  may  be  termed  the  "con- 
stants," the  fixed  factors,  of  the  international 
situation.  This  fundamental  idea  is  known  and 
accepted  in  every  civilized  country  except  Amer- 
ica. We  have  international  obligations  and  am- 
bitious policies,  but  a  fleet  inadequate  both  in 
numbers  and  characteristics  and  deficient  in  actual 
bases  of  operations  to  support  these  ambitions. 

When  peace  again  has  come  to  Europe  no  one 
can  tell  what  naval  forces  will  remain  to  the  war- 
ring combatants.  If  Germany  is  successful,  she 
will  be  stronger  than  ever,  numerically  and  in 
morale.  If  she  is  defeated,  many  years  will  be 

98 


OUR  NAVAL  REQUIREMENTS       99 

necessary  before  she  can  again  compete  in  mil- 
itary and  naval  armaments. 

On  July  i,  1914,  Germany  had  17  dreadnaughts 
and  battle  cruisers  in  commission  against  8  for  the 
United  States,  while  Japan  holds  only  4.  In  two 
years  more,  1916,  Germany  would  have  had  28 
dreadnaughts  and  battle  cruisers  against  the 
United  States'  12  and  Japan's  10.  If  our  policies 
are  in  conflict  with  those  of  Germany,  by  what 
course  of  reasoning  can  we  dare  to  say  that  12 
dreadnaughts  are  sufficient  to  maintain  our  in- 
tegrity against  28  ?  In  armored-cruiser  strength 
Germany,  the  United  States,  and  Japan  are  about 
equal.  In  cruiser  strength,  the  advanced  cavalry 
of  a  fleet,  in  1916,  Germany  would  have  had  46, 
the  United  States  14,  and  Japan  13.  In  destroyers, 
Germany  154,  the  United  States  62,  and  Japan  52. 
In  submarines  the  United  States  will,  at  that  date, 
be  on  an  equality  with  Germany  and  will  be  in  ad- 
vance of  Japan,  but  the  German  submarines  are 
all  of  greater  tonnage  than  those  of  the  United 
States,  and  their  effectiveness  with  the  fleet  will 
be  vastly  greater.  We  thus  see  that  the  United 
States  has  built  a  naval  force  at  haphazard  and 
without  considering  what  is  to  be  its  ultimate  use. 
It  is  not  the  fleet  of  our  policy.  It  can  neither 
defend  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  the  Atlantic  nor 
force  the  open  door  in  the  Pacific.  Its  weakness 
in  scouts  and  destroyers  for  the  purpose  of  locat- 


loo  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 


SEA  STRENGTH— JULY  i,  1914 
VESSELS  BUILT 


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1  Battleships  having  a  main  battery  of  all  big  guns  (n  inches  or  more  in  caliber). 

1  Battleships  of  (about)  10,000  tons,  or  more  displacement,  and  having  more  than 
one  caliber  in  the  main  battery. 

» Armored  cruisers  having  guns  of  largest  caliber  in  main  battery  and  capable  of 
taking  their  place  in  line  of  battle  with  the  battleships.  They  have  an  increase  of 
speed  at  the  expense  of  carrying  fewer  guns  in  main  battery,  and  a  decrease  in  armor 
protection. 

4  Includes  all  unarmored  cruising  vessels  above  1,500  tons'  displacement. 

•  Includes  smaller  battleships  and  monitors.  No  more  vessels  of  this  class  are  be- 
ing produced  or  built  by  the  great  powers. 

•England  has  no  continuing  ship-building  policy,  but  usually  lays  down  each  year 
4  or  5  armored  ships  with  a  proportional  number  of  smaller  vessels. 

1  Germany  has  a  continuing  ship-building  programme,  governed  by  a  fleet  law 
authorized  by  the  Reichstag.  For  igi3  there  are  authorized  i  battleship,  i  battle 
cruiser,  2  cruisers,  12  destroyers.  Eventual  strength  to  consist  of  41  battleships, 
20  armored  cruisers,  40  cruisers,  144  destroyers,  72  submarines. 

'$78,837,569  authorized  to  be  expended  from  1911  to  1917  for  the  construction  of 
war  vessels. 

9  Includes  vessels  of  colonies. 

18  Russian  ship-building  programme  provides  for  the  completion  by  1918  of  4  battle 
cruisers,  8  small  cruisers,  38  destroyers,  and  18  submarines. 


OUR  NAVAL  REQUIREMENTS      ipi 

ing  an  advancing  enemy  in  the  Atlantic  and  bring- 
ing it  to  action  is  lamentable.  Its  power  to  carry 
on  war  in  the  Asiatic  is  rendered  ineffective  by 
its  lack  of  auxiliaries  and  a  secure  base  in  the  far 
East  from  which  to  operate. 

This  lack  of  preparedness,  this  failure  to  build 
a  navy  commensurate  to  our  purpose,  speaks  ill 
of  the  effectiveness,  in  practice,  of  popular  gov- 
ernment. In  the  continual  strife  between  the 
two  great  rival  parties  in  America,  the  navy  has 
been  the  shuttlecock.  The  indifference  of  our 
statesmen  has  permitted  the  questions  of  national 
defense  to  become  party  issues. 

The  difference  in  method  between  Germany 
and  the  United  States  in  gaining  their  purpose  is 
one  only  of  degree.  By  Germany,  force  is  con- 
sidered the  proper  instrument,  but  with  us  we 
prefer  bluff  !  The  United  States  possesses  a  great 
empire  and  has  only  to  preserve  it,  while  Germany 
must  establish  her  economic  independence  and 
security  of  national  supply.  Germany  was  forced 
to  resort  to  extreme  militarism  in  order  to  achieve 
efficiency.  Without  that  efficiency  the  German 
Empire  would  long  ago  have  been  destroyed. 
The  United  States,  on  the  other  hand,  is  inefficient 
in  organized  endeavor  of  government.  Our  re- 
publicanism has  developed  individualism  and  char- 
acter, but  has  failed  to  provide  us  with  unity  as 
a  nation. 


102  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

It  has  been  explained  that  a  fleet  is  not  only 
for  the  defense  of  the  nation,  but  also  is  the  force 
behind  a  policy  believed  to  be  essential  to  the 
growth  of  the  nation.  Therefore,  those  who  con- 
trol the  policies  of  the  nation  must  consult  with 
the  naval  and  military  authorities  in  order  to  ob- 
tain their  expert  advice  on  the  military  strength 
required  by  the  United  States  to  maintain  its 
policies,  by  war  if  need  be.  A  policy  cannot  be 
maintained  through  arbitration  unless  the  nation 
is  strong  enough  to  enforce  arbitration.1  Arbitra- 
tion plus  force  is  a  fact,  but  arbitration  without 
force  is  a  dream.  Now  the  fault  lies  not  only  in 
that  our  statesmen  seldom  consult  with  the  naval 
and  military  authorities,  but  in  that,  when  they 
do  obtain  their  advice,  they  refuse  to  accept  it 
and,  instead,  advance  their  own  opinions  as  to 
the  country's  preparedness,  and  act  upon  those 
opinions. 

Since  1903  the  general  board  of  the  navy,  whose 
duty  it  is  to  study  the  fleets  of  foreign  nations 
and  recommend  a  naval  programme  to  meet  our 
international  requirements,  has  advised  the  build- 
ing of  two  dreadnaughts  a  year  as  a  minimum. 
Failing  to  provide  this  minimum  number  for 
several  consecutive  years,  four  were  advised. 
This  latter  advice  has  been  given  each  secretary 

1  This  was  most  emphatically  proved  in  the  case  of  the  Alabama 
claims  after  our  Civil  War. 


OUR  NAVAL  REQUIREMENTS      103 


of  the  navy  since  1910,  but  has  never  been  ac- 
cepted.1 The  result  is  that  we  have  dropped  from 
second  place  to  third  place,  and  this  loss  in  rank- 
ing has  been  not  only  a  material  one,  but  also  a 
moral  one,  for  the  personnel  of  our  navy  is  to-day 

1  The  general  board, in  1904,  was  instructed  to  prepare  a  programme 
of  construction  that  would  assure  the  United  States  a  navy  ade- 
quate to  present  requirements  and  future  possibilities.  The  board 
submitted  its  report  and  proceeded  from  year  to  year,  in  accordance 
with  its  instructions,  to  recommend  the  number  of  ships  Congress 
should  authorize  in  order  to  keep  the  actual  construction  up  to  the 
requirements  of  the  policy  formulated  by  the  board. 

The  ships  recommended  to  Congress  from  1904  to  1914,  inclusive, 
included  all  types  from  the  biggest  battleships  to  colliers.  Congress 
put  its  "enlightened"  civilian  wisdom  against  the  scientific  knowl- 
edge of  the  highly  trained  members  of  the  general  board,  and  per- 
sistently cut  down  the  number  of  ships  asked  for.  How  Congress 
has  slighted  the  advice  of  the  general  board,  and  how  Congress  it- 
self has  known  from  year  to  year  that  it  has  been  making  a  travesty 
of  our  naval  construction  policy,  are  shown  by  placing  in  tabular 
form  the  recommendations  of  the  general  board  and  the  performances 
of  Congress.  The  following  table,  covering  the  period  1904-7,  is 
illustrative  of  the  apathy  of  the  people's  representatives: 


1904 

I9°S 

IQ06 

IQ07 

Total  4 
years 

Total  ships,  all  types,  recommended 
by  general  board 

n; 

27 

2* 

2O 

8<? 

Total  authorized  by  Congress  
Battleships  asked  for  by  board  
Battleships  authorized  by  Congress 

14 

2 

I 

2 

3 

2 

12 
3 

I 

3 

2 

I 

3i 
10 

5 

This  table  shows  that,  in  four  years,  the  ships  of  all  classes  au- 
thorized by  Congress  were  only  a  little  more  than  a  third  of  those 
recommended  by  the  general  board,  or  exactly  36  per  cent,  while  the 
proportion  of  battleships  authorized  to  those  asked  for  was  fifty 
per  cent.  In  the  decade,  1904-14,  the  general  board  recommended 
a  total  of  326  ships  of  all  classes,  and  Congress  authorized  only  153, 
or  20  fewer  than  half.  Each  year  the  recommendations  of  the  board 


104  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

so  inadequate  that  many  of  our  fighting  units  are 
mere  shams.1 

This  lack  of  co-ordination  between  statesman- 
ship and  military  force  occurs  on  account  of  the 
absence  of  a  responsible  head  of  our  government, 
and  the  shameful  situation  has  continued  because 
the  people  have  been  often  kept  in  ignorance  and 
have  been  taught  their  history  only  from  highly 
colored  accounts.  There  should  be  no  doubt  in 
the  mind  of  any  thinking  man  that  there  must  be 
a  definite  responsibility  for  war  preparedness. 

In  the  last  analysis  it  is  the  people  who  gov- 

and  the  demands  of  the  Navy  Department  have  been  discussed  at 
congressional  committee  hearings  which  have  been  reported  sten- 
ographically  and  republished  in  the  newspapers.  If  the  public  has 
not  been  informed  it  is  because  the  popular  mind  has  been  distracted 
from  the  consideration  of  the  question  of  national  defense  by  the 
claims  of  the  peace  enthusiasts  that  there  would  be  no  more  war, 
and  by  the  belief  that  Uncle  Sam  can  "lick  all  creation,"  prepared 
or  unprepared. 

The  navy  has  two  great  departments,  that  of  material  and  that 
of  personnel.  The  preceding  table  shows  how  Congress  has  responded 
to  the  urgings  of  the  general  board  as  to  the  property  needed  for  the 
navy.  On  that  all-important  question  of  the  personnel,  one  needs 
but  to  glance  over  the  pages  of  the  Proceedings  of  the  U.  S.  Naval 
Institute  and  other  service  publications  to  appreciate  how  thoroughly 
the  shortcomings  of  the  United  States  navy  in  the  matter  of  per- 
sonnel have  already  been  set  before  the  American  people. 

1  "In  addition  to  the  number  at  present  authorized  by  law,  there  are 
needed  to  complete  the  complements  of  all  the  ships  at  present  on 
the  Navy  Register,  933  officers,  and  18,556  men,  while  in  21  battle- 
ships in  commission,  and  now  composing  the  Atlantic  fleet,  there  is 
a  shortage  of  5,219  men  and  339  officers  required  to  fill  all  stations 
necessary  to  efficiently  fight  the  ships  in  battle."  (Rear-Admiral 
F.  F.  Fletcher  to  the  chairman  of  the  House  Naval  Committee, 
January  14,  1915.) 


OUR  NAVAL  REQUIREMENTS      105 

ern,  it  is  the  people  who  must  be  informed  of  their 
military  condition.  The  regulations  which  for- 
bid military  and  naval  men  writing  for  publication 
for  the  purpose  of  discussion  should  be  rewritten. 
The  freest  discussion  on  all  military  and  naval 
topics  by  officers  of  both  services  should  be  en- 
couraged, such  writings  to  be  signed  by  the 
authors,  for  which  they  would  assume  the  entire 
responsibility.  When  this  privilege  has  been 
given,  then  the  people  will  have  a  means  of  get- 
ting at  the  truth,  and  the  authority  in  each  case 
will  be  known.  Sealing  the  lips  of  those  capable 
of  giving  the  truth,  we  have  encouraged  scare- 
head  articles  upon  our  naval  preparedness,  which 
carry  little  weight  and  make  no  lasting  impression 
upon  the  minds  of  the  people. 

If  the  recommendations  of  the  general  board 
of  the  navy  since  1903  had  been  followed,  the 
United  States  would  now  possess  a  naval  force 
equal  to  that  of  any  nation  except  England.  The 
expense  of  construction  and  maintenance  would 
have  been  spread  over  a  number  of  years  and 
would  hardly  have  been  felt.  But  now  we  are 
suffering  from  the  accumulation  of  error.  We 
find  ourselves  hopelessly  short  of  battleships, 
battle  cruisers,  armored  cruisers,  cruisers,  de- 
stroyers, submarines,  and  auxiliaries  of  all  kinds. 
In  the  Caribbean,  where,  no  doubt,  will  be  waged 
our  next  naval  war  in  the  Atlantic,  there  has  been 


106  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

provided  no  suitable  base  from  which  the  fleet 
can  operate — the  navy  having  been  refused  the 
development  of  its  most  vital  base — Guantanamo 
Bay.  Our  army  is  too  small  to  furnish  the  neces- 
sary troops  to  protect  the  Panama  Canal,  to  man 
the  defenses  of  Hawaii  and  the  guns  on  Corre- 
gidor  Island  in  Manila  Bay.  The  personnel  of 
all  of  our  coast  fortifications  on  the  Atlantic  and 
the  Pacific  is  at  less  than  half  strength.  It  is 
now  possible  to  man  only  from  one-third  to  one- 
half  the  guns  of  our  coast  fortifications  with  trained 
coast  artillerymen.  Our  ammunition  supply  for 
the  navy  is  now  almost  sufficient  for  war  purposes. 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  not  a  single  United  States 
battleship  afloat  to-day  is  equipped  with  modern 
long-range  torpedoes,  our  mine  defenses  are  in- 
adequate in  number,  and  our  aeroplane  service 
has  been  permitted  to  stand  still  for  several  years, 
while  other  nations  have  rapidly  progressed. 

Admiral  Mahan  often  endeavored  to  force  home 
to  us  the  appreciations  of  political  conditions  as 
an  essential  factor  in  all  military  plans.  "When 
Germany  shall  have  finished  the  ships  contem- 
plated in  the  naval  programme  which  she  has 
formally  adopted,"  he  wrote,  "she  will  have  a 
navy  much  superior  to  that  of  the  United  States 
unless  we  change  our  present  rate  of  building  and 
also  provide  more  extensive  plants.  Where,  then, 
will  be  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  where  the  secur- 


OUR  NAVAL  REQUIREMENTS      107 

ity  of  the  Panama  Canal?  The  enforcement  of 
both  these  depends  upon  the  fleet."  He  then 
went  on  to  show  how  "the  superior  fleet  domi- 
nates if  the  margin  of  superiority  be  sufficient.  It 
is  the  question  of  political  relations  which  intro- 
duces perplexing  factors;  and  the  military  adviser 
of  a  government  is  not  competent  to  his  task  un- 
less, by  knowledge  of  conditions  and  practice  in 
weighing  them,  he  can  fairly  estimate  how  far  in- 
ferior numbers  may  be  reinforced  by  the  pressure 
which  other  conditions  may  bring  on  a  possible 
enemy.  Every  naval  officer  should  order  his 
study  and  his  attention  to  contemporary  events, 
abroad  and  at  home,  by  the  reflection  that  he 
may  some  day  be  on  a  general  staff,  and  in  any 
case  may  beneficially  affect  events  by  his  correct 
judgment  of  world- wide  conditions." 

There  is  much  presented  to  us  in  the  above 
paragraph  for  earnest  reflection.  How  far  do 
Germany's  relations  with  other  European  states 
permit  her  embarking  her  fleet  on  a  transatlantic 
adventure?  If,  perchance,  Germany  finds  her- 
self free  after  this  war  in  Europe  to  send  to  the 
Caribbean  a  superior  fleet,  then  our  Monroe  Doc- 
trine will  be  put  aside.  In  our  long  contention 
with  England  over  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  our 
progress  was  due,  not  to  the  size  of  our  navy, 
which  was  ludicrously  small,  but,  as  Admiral 
Mahan  said,  to  the  political  relations  of  England 


io8  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 


with  other  powers,  which  made  it  unwise  for  her 
to  embark  in  a  contest  with  the  United  States. 

It  does  not  take  naval  learning  to  conclude 
that  the  United  States  is  too  weak  on  the  seas, 
that  we  require  more  battleships,  more  cruisers, 
more  destroyers,  more  submarines,  more  auxil- 
iaries, and  more  naval  bases,  and  that  we  would 
also  be  wise  to  build  a  division  of  battle  cruisers, 
which  have  not  only  the  offensive  power  of  modern 
battleships,  but  also  the  greatly  higher  speed  es- 
sential to  long-distance  scouting.1  Furthermore, 

1  When  the  battle  cruiser  first  came  into  prominence  in  the  foreign 
navies,  our  naval  officers  were  quick  to  realize  the  importance  of 
this  new  class  of  fighting  craft,  which  is  merely  a  development  and 
improvement  of  the  old  type  of  armored  cruiser.  If  the  recommenda- 
tions of  the  general  board  since  1904  had  been  followed  by  Congress, 
it  would  have  been  possible  to  build  battle  cruisers  for  our  navy  when 
the  type  first  came  out  without  imperiling  our  rank  in  battleship 
strength.  But  the  refusal  of  Congress  to  listen  to  expert  advice 
retarded  the  development  of  our  fleet  along  the  most  advanced  lines. 
As  a  result,  the  situation  in  which  we  find  ourselves  to-day  is  as  fol- 
lows: Our  fastest  battleship,  the  Wyoming,  has  a  speed  of  21.22 
knots.  Our  fastest  armored  cruiser  (carrying  lo-inch  guns)  is  the 
North  Carolina,  with  a  speed  of  22.48  knots.  But  how  completely 
outclassed  both  of  these  ships  are  by  the  corresponding  capital  ships 
of  foreign  navies  is  demonstrated  in  the  following  table: 


Fastest  Battle  Type  Ship 

Type 

Dis- 
place- 
ment 
Tons 

Speed 
Knots 

Armament 

Queen  Mary  (England)  .  .  . 
Seydlitz  (Germany)    . 

Battle  cruiser 
Battle  cruiser 

27,000 
24,385 

35-7 
29.  o 

8  13-inch 
10  n-inch 

Kongo  (Japan) 

Battle  cruiser 

27,500 

28.0 

8  i4-inch 

Wyoming  (United  States)  . 
North    Carolina     (United 
States)  

Battleship 
Armored  cruiser 

26,000 
14,500 

21.22 
22.48 

12  i2-inch 
4  lo-inch 

OUR  NAVAL  REQUIREMENTS      109 

and  this  is  more  important  than  any  other  single 
consideration,  our  navy  must  have  units  of  trained 
men,  and  all  the  fighting  ships  of  the  fleet  must  be 
manned  or  else  stricken  from  the  list  of  available 
vessels  for  war. 

We  are  told  by  naval  experts  that  in  case  of 
hostilities  the  duty  of  the  navy  is  to  further  mili- 
tary operations  designed  to  bring  hostilities  to  a 
speedy  and  favorable  conclusion,  and  also  to  gain 
command  of  the  sea  in  order  that  our  commerce 
may  continue  as  tranquilly  as  in  times  of  peace. 
This  control  of  the  sea  is  not  a  concrete  thing  in 
itself.  It  does  not  assure  every  merchantman 
flying  our  flag  safety  from  capture  by  the  enemy's 
vessels.  But  it  does  assure  a  steady  flow  of  com- 
merce to  and  from  our  home  ports.  For  the  busi- 
ness of  controlling  the  sea,  the  prime  factor  is  a 
dominating  force  of  capital  ships,  capable  of 
moving  swiftly  and  carrying  with  it  sufficient 
power  to  dominate  any  disturbed  locality  of  the 
ocean.  Command  of  the  sea  gives  the  nation 
that  has  won  it  the  power  to  interrupt  at  will  the 
commerce  of  the  enemy,  to  convoy,  without  un- 
due risk,  troops  from  the  home  country  to  the 
enemy's  territory,  and  to  deny  the  sea  to  the 
enemy's  troop-ships.  A  nation  at  wrar  will  desire 
primarily  to  seek  out,  with  its  fleet,  the  enemy's 
squadrons  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  them. 
If  the  enemy  refuses  action  and  remains  in  its 


no  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

own  fortified  bases,  then  it  must  be  blockaded 
and  prevented  from  interfering  with  commerce. 
It  has  often  been  shown  that  in  all  wars  one  fleet, 
the  stronger,  has  endeavored  to  bring  the  other 
to  action,  while  the  latter  has  attempted  to  avoid 
action.  If  fleets  were  composed  solely  of  battle- 
ships, then  the  commerce  of  each  nation  would 
remain  safe  until  it  came  into  the  area  controlled 
by  the  fleet  of  its  enemy.  In  order  to  be  able  to 
keep  the  heavy  fighting  ships  concentrated,  na- 
tions have  built  cruisers  of  high  speed  for  the 
purpose  of  preying  upon  the  commerce  of  the 
enemy  while  their  fighting  ships  are  employed 
against  the  fighting  ships  of  the  enemy.  By 
means  of  these  cruisers,  operating  over  vast  areas 
of  the  sea,  the  nation  possessing  them  has  been 
able  materially  to  affect  the  financial  resources 
of  its  opponent,  and  eventually  to  force  the  en- 
emy's battle  fleet,  in  desperation,  to  give  battle. 

Upon  the  outbreak  of  the  war  in  Europe,  Ger- 
many had  a  number  of  fast  cruisers  on  the  high 
seas.  While  the  German  battle  fleet  lay  bottled 
up  in  German  ports,  these  corsairs  roamed  the 
ocean,  playing  havoc  with  the  mighty  commerce 
of  Great  Britain;  but  lacking  bases  and  depending 
only  upon  their  speed,  they  were,  with  one  or 
two  exceptions,  soon  rounded  up  and  destroyed 
by  the  numerically  stronger  cruisers  of  the  Brit- 
ish fleet,  which  were  sent  out  against  them.  And 


OUR  NAVAL  REQUIREMENTS      in 

now  that  the  German  cruisers  have  been  prac- 
tically annihilated,  the  control  of  the  seas  lies 
absolutely  with  the  Allies,  while  the  German 
merchant  marine  has  been  swept  away.  But 
cruisers  of  this  type,  designed  for  the  purpose  of 
preying  on  the  enemy's  commerce,  may  be  said 
not  to  exist  in  our  fleet.  Nor  have  we  the  means 
of  preventing  depredations  of  the  enemy's  com- 
merce destroyers,  or  the  raids  of  his  high-powered 
battle  cruisers.  There  is  not  on  the  navy  list  of 
the  United  States  to-day  a  single  cruiser  that  could 
have  overtaken  the  Emden. 

Since  the  strategical  advantage  of  being  able 
to  sweep  the  seas  of  the  enemy's  commerce  is 
denied  us,  the  small  merchant  marine  that  we 
have  will  fear  to  leave  port  while  the  enemy's 
cruisers  are  at  large.  We  thus  see  that  even 
with  a  superior  fleet  we  would  not  be  able  to  com- 
mand the  trade  routes,  except  in  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  our  battle  fleet.  Our  merchandise  in 
neutral  bottoms  might  even  be  seized  by  the 
enemy's  cruisers,  and  all  merchandise  bound  to 
United  States  ports  might  be  declared  contra- 
band and  turned  back  by  enemy's  vessels  after 
visit  and  search.  We  would  then  find  ourselves 
in  a  very  anomalous  position:  having  a  superior 
fleet  yet  forced  to  permit  the  weaker  enemy  to 
control  the  carrying  trade  routes.  Therefore, 
can  we  not  see  that  by  refusing  to  keep  pace  with 


112  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

probable  enemies  in  fast  vessels  of  the  cruiser 
type,  we  are  permitting  any  one  to  hold  against 
us  a  distinct  and  valuable  handicap?  If,  by 
chance,  we  operate  at  a  distance  from  our  base, 
it  will  be  necessary  for  our  fleet  to  depend  upon 
shipments  of  coal,  oil,  and  supplies  from  home. 
How,  then,  shall  we  be  assured  that  these  vessels 
carrying  those  things  that  our  fleet  so  urgently 
needs,  will  reach  the  fleet  safely  ?  The  answer  is 
childishly  simple.  We  cannot !  They  will  be 
open  to  the  raid  of  the  enemy's  fast  cruisers, 
against  which  we  are  impotent.  Our  fleet  may 
even  find  itself  derelict  for  want  of  the  necessities 
to  its  continued  mobility.  If  we  should  endeavor 
to  convoy  our  supplies,  using  battleships  for  the 
purpose,  our  navy  would  risk  annihilation  while 
so  divided. 

If,  perchance,  the  nation  takes  its  lesson  from 
the  war  in  Europe,  and  gives  an  impetus  to  the 
building  of  a  merchant  marine,  our  weakness  in 
cruisers  will  become  more  manifest,  and  our  loss 
during  a  war  would  be  more  disastrous.  Thus, 
we  see  that  our  development  of  types  has  been 
based  upon  faulty  conceptions  of  naval  warfare. 
But  even  if  the  enemy  were  willing  to  do  that 
which  would  be  most  advantageous  to  us  in  case 
we  had  a  superior  fleet,  i.  e.,  to  come  out  and  fight 
us,  then,  once  the  decision  being  won,  our  battle- 
ships and  other  fighting  units  could  be  scattered 


OUR  NAVAL  REQUIREMENTS      113 

for  the  purpose  of  protecting  our  commerce,  but 
we  can  hardly  expect  our  enemy  to  be  so  obliging. 
He  will  do  that  which  will  inconvenience  us  most, 
and  when  war  has  begun  we  shall  sorely  regret  our 
neglect  of  that  class  of  vessel  which  alone  can 
safeguard  our  commerce  during  the  continuance 
of  hostilities.  Furthermore,  the  service  of  scout- 
ing by  cruisers,  although  appearing  auxiliary,  is 
of  capital  importance.  Our  lack  of  scouts  for  the 
fleet  places  the  navy  in  a  position  of  manifest  in- 
feriority to  a  probable  enemy.  This  omission 
will,  in  war,  compel  our  fleet  to  act  without  definite 
information  of  the  movements  of  the  enemy's 
force. 

We  thus  see  that  the  control  of  the  sea,  in  the 
case  of  a  nation  having  no  fast  cruisers,  is  encom- 
passed within  the  narrow  area  through  which  the 
battle  fleet  moves,  while  shipping  upon  the  re- 
mainder of  the  ocean  will  lie  vulnerable  to  attack 
by  the  enemy's  fast  cruisers.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  submarine  has  had  a  meteoric  entrance  into 
publicity  in  the  present  war,  which  has  thrown 
many  of  our  citizens,  most  noticeably  those  in 
Congress,  off  their  mental  balance.  They  have 
argued  that  since  a  submarine  may,  under  favor- 
able circumstances,  be  able  to  sink  a  battleship, 
therefore  the  battleship  is  doomed,  and  should  not 
be  perpetuated.  The  same  argument  could  as 
readily  be  applied  to  the  mine,  which  is  twice  as 


U4  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

powerful  as  the  torpedo.  The  submarine  is  a 
weapon  of  opportunity,  as  is  the  mine.  We  must 
not  mistake  the  end  for  the  means.  The  end  is 
the  control  of  the  sea.  Force  must  be  opposed  by 
force.  The  radius  of  activity  of  a  submarine  is 
limited.  It  is  simply  a  projectile  launched  from  a 
naval  base,  capable  of  operating  to  a  limited  dis- 
tance ;  then  it  must  return  to  that  base.  A  battle- 
ship, or  a  cruiser,  is  a  projectile  of  greater  range. 
It  may  be  fired  for  thousands  of  miles,  and  may 
roam  and  operate  and  destroy  for  weeks  at  a  time. 
The  battleship  is  the  1 4-inch  shell,  while  the  sub- 
marine is  a  missile  of  minor  caliber.  The  sub- 
marine on  the  surface  has  no  chance  against  a 
vessel  armed  with  a  gun,  and  while  submerged  its 
effective  cruising  radius  is  restricted.  The  evolu- 
tion of  the  submarine  is  tending  upward.  Before 
many  years  we  may  see  a  submarine  capable  of 
accompanying  the  battleship  fleet.  It  will  be 
used  in  naval  actions  as  is  the  destroyer.  It 
will  submerge  to  escape  pursuit  while  the  de- 
stroyer uses  its  speed.  But  battleships  will  remain 
the  mistresses  of  the  seas,  and  the  nation  having 
the  greatest  force  of  battleships  will  retain  con- 
trol of  the  seas.  Those  nations  that  read  incor- 
rectly the  true  evolution  of  types,  and  depart  on 
eccentric  missions,  will  find  themselves  left  be- 
hind in  the  race  for  domination.  We  thus  see 
the  necessity  for  a  well-rounded  fleet.  Each  unit 


OUR  NAVAL  REQUIREMENTS      115 

has  been  evolved  for  its  particular  part  in  war. 
Our  present  unpreparedness  in  these  essential 
auxiliaries  will  be  difficult  to  correct,  and  the 
blame  for  these  omissions  will  be  as  difficult  to 
locate.  The  question,  however,  is  not  where  has 
our  maladministration  led  us,  but  do  the  Ameri- 
can people  desire  to  see  continued  a  condition  of 
affairs  that  will  lead  to  certain  disaster  ? 


CHAPTER  VII 
MILITARY  POLICY 

MILITARY  policy  determines  the  prepara- 
tion made  by  a  nation  in  support  of  its 
international  policy.  Military  policy  is 
ambitious  where  the  nation's  diplomacy  is  ambi- 
tious. It  naturally  receives  its  impetus  through 
the  necessities  of  the  nation.  A  nation  having 
nothing  to  lose  need  have  no  military  policy.  A 
nation  having  much  to  lose  requires  a  strong  and 
consistent  policy.  But  a  strong  military  policy 
does  not  necessarily  mean  militarism.  It  means 
simply  that  the  nation  will  systematically  cultivate 
its  muscles  and  strengthen  the  moral  tone  of  its 
structure.  It  assures  that  the  treaties  in  which 
the  nation  has  entered  will  be  enforced. 

The  peculiar  position  of  our  country  is  such 
that  the  best  and  most  efficient  security  is  offered 
by  building  up  the  military  spirit  among  its  cit- 
izens. The  protection  of  his  home  is  a  funda- 
mental instinct  of  the  male,  but  in  these  days 
such  protection  for  a  nation  can  be  accomplished 
only  through  organization.  A  million  men  with- 
out organization  are  of  very  little  use.  An  assem- 

116 


MILITARY  POLICY  117 

blage  of  men  untrained,  undisciplined,  and  with- 
out leaders  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than  a  crowd 
or  a  mob.  We  all  know  that  a  crowd  does  not 
reason,  and  that  it  is  not  influenced  by  argument. 
Its  imagination  is  very  active.  It  is  susceptible 
of  being  powerfully  aroused.  A  crowd  may,  there- 
fore, be  quickly  thrown  into  a  panic.  Being  in- 
capable of  reflection  and  of  reasoning,  it  cannot 
understand  what  is  improbable,  and  the  improba- 
ble things  are  the  most  striking.  But  when,  on 
the  other  hand,  a  crowd  has  once  been  disciplined 
and  is  well  led,  then  it  becomes  a  powerful  force. 
No  one  would  compare  the  consciousness  of  a  mob 
to  that  of  a  brigade  of  soldiers  drawn  up  on  the 
parade-ground  for  a  review.  In  the  first,  there 
is  no  idea  in  common,  no  underlying,  co-ordinating 
force ;  it  is  simply  unreasoning,  and  when  aroused 
it  knows  no  extremes  of  action  and  is  susceptible 
to  all  kinds  of  influences.  But  the  soldiers  are 
held  together  by  a  common  idea  and  can  be  con- 
trolled by  the  will  of  a  leader. 

It  has  been  said  that  "a  people  is  an  organism 
created  by  the  past,  which,  like  every  organism, 
can  only  modify  itself  by  slow,  hereditary  accumu- 
lations. Without  tradition  there  is  neither  na- 
tional soul  nor  civilization  possible.  Hence  the 
two  great  occupations  of  man  since  his  existence 
have  been  to  create  for  himself  a  system  of  tra- 
ditions, and  then  to  try  to  destroy  them  when 


Ii8  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

their  beneficial  effects  have  been  exhausted. 
Without  the  traditions,  no  civilization.  Without 
the  destruction  of  these  traditions,  no  progress." 

Traditions  represent  the  ideas,  the  needs,  the 
sentiments  of  the  past.  They  are  the  synthesis 
of  the  race,  and  bear  down  upon  us  with  all  their 
weight.  The  national  traditions  that  cause  the 
maintenance  of  a  weak  military  policy  are  tra- 
ditions that  must  be  destroyed,  for  they  are  now 
a  danger  to  us.  But  the  question  is,  how  can  they 
be  destroyed?  They  cannot  be  destroyed  by 
law  or  by  the  issue  of  decrees.  Nations  are  gov- 
erned by  their  genius,  and  all  institutions  which 
are  not  ultimately  moulded  on  this  genius  rep- 
resent but  a  transitory  disguise.  Institutions 
cannot  remedy  the  defects  in  our  national  genius, 
and  national  progress  will  not  come  through  per- 
fecting our  institutions. 

Instruction  and  education  will  in  time  remove 
false  traditions  that  should  be  destroyed,  but  this 
process  is  slow.  A  generation  or  more  will  be 
required  before  dangerous  beliefs  can  be  erased 
from  the  national  mind.  Unfortunately,  mili- 
tary institutions  are  not  in  harmony  with  the 
genius  of  our  people,  and  until  they  become  so 
the  attempt  to  make  the  nation  a  strong  one  will 
fail.  Even  though  this  be  true,  the  seed  must 
be  planted,  while  time  alone  can  produce  the 
flowering  tree. 


MILITARY  POLICY  119 

Socialism  has  for  one  of  its  objects  the  elevation 
of  the  masses.  Its  ideal  is  to  accomplish  universal 
happiness  among  a  people.  It  undertakes  to  feed 
the  hungry,  to  shelter  the  homeless,  and  to  drag 
down  the  plutocrat  to  a  befitting  level.  Universal 
military  service,  if  accepted  as  a  fundamental 
duty,  will,  in  effect,  partially  accomplish  socialism. 
Military  training  cannot  fail  to  elevate  the  masses, 
to  make  them  capable  of  earning  a  living  wage, 
and  to  provide  suitable  occupations  for  every 
citizen  of  the  nation.  Military  training  will  make 
the  citizen  more  efficient,  in  forcing  him  to  see  the 
necessity  for  an  aim  in  life,  in  showing  him  that 
organization  and  co-ordination  among  his  fellow 
men  is  a  fundamental  necessity  in  the  progress  of 
the  community  and  of  the  nation.  It  will  teach 
him  efficiency  in  methods  of  doing  work  and,  above 
all,  will  give  him  an  ideal  of  honor  and  honesty 
without  which  a  man  can  be  nothing  but  a  waif. 

A  nation  whose  citizens  have  been  trained  in 
military  pursuits  will  of  itself  discard  those  polit- 
ical shams  of  government  where  the  community 
is  ruled  and  robbed  by  the  "boss"  politician. 
The  offices  in  our  government  service,  instead  of 
being  filled  through  favor  by  these  same  politi- 
cians to  work  their  own  selfish  ends,  would  be 
filled,  as  they  are  in  France  and  England,  by  men 
who  had  served  their  country  faithfully  as  sol- 
diers and  were  ready  at  their  country's  call  to  re- 


120  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

turn  again  to  the  active  duties  in  which  they  had 
been  trained. 

Even  now,  with  a  small  army  and  navy,  those 
men  who  have  gone  out  of  the  services  find  no 
difficulty  in  obtaining  positions  of  trust  and  ad- 
vantage. They  are  sought  after  by  the  great 
commercial  companies,  by  the  railroads,  by  the 
fire  departments  and  police  departments  because 
they  are  recognized  to  be  efficient,  self-respecting, 
and  trustworthy.  When  these  men  compete  in 
civil  life  with  those  who  have  not  had  the  military 
training  the  contrast  is  striking.  Universal  mil- 
itary service  will  give  every  citizen  this  necessary- 
postgraduate  course  to  fit  him  to  take  his  place 
in  an  orderly  and  well-organized  community. 

The  faults  of  our  military  policy  have  been 
caused  primarily  by  a  faulty  conception  in  our 
organization  of  government.  When  our  ances- 
tors framed  our  Constitution  they  feared  to  place 
too  much  authority  in  the  hands  of  one  man  or 
one  body  of  men.  They  thought  that  liberty 
would  be  conserved  better  by  a  divided  authority. 
The  President,  the  legislature,  and  the  judiciary 
are  therefore  coequal.  Between  the  two  former 
the  responsibility  of  a  lack  of  a  continuous  mil- 
itary policy  rests.  The  President  may  be  in  favor 
of  a  strong  military  policy,  and  he  has  the  oppor- 
tunity in  his  annual  message  to  Congress,  or 
through  special  messages,  of  expressing  his  views, 


MILITARY  POLICY  121 

yet  the  legislature  may  not  agree  with  the  opinions 
of  the  chief  magistrate.  Congress  reflects  the 
will  of  the  people.  Congress  can  go  no  faster 
than  the  people.  When  the  country  knows  and 
speaks  its  mind,  Congress  will  not  fail  to  act ;  but 
its  act  will  be  a  tardy  one,  for  time  is  required 
for  such  a  body  of  men  to  be  convinced  that  they 
have  heard  aright. 

Our  legislature,  therefore,  follows  the  people; 
it  does  not  lead  them.  Congress  holds  the  purse- 
strings,  and,  being  responsible  by  law  for  the 
money  allotted,  naturally  desires  accurate  and 
comprehensive  statistics  as  to  how  the  money  is 
to  be  spent.  Congress  or  the  committees  of 
Congress  having  jurisdiction  over  a  particular 
appropriation  bill,  feel  that  the  entire  respon- 
sibility and  authority  belongs  to  them.  Congress 
is  too  large  to  work  as  a  unit.  In  order  to  accom- 
plish results  it  has  been  forced  to  divide  itself  into 
innumerable  committees  that  handle  the  appro- 
priations for  government  service.  A  new  appro- 
priation bill  is  built  up  on  the  structure  of  the 
one  of  the  year  previous.  Many  items  of  the  bill 
are  repeated  from  year  to  year;  others  are  new 
items.  An  appropriation  bill  for  one  of  the  great 
military  services,  carrying  over  a  hundred  mil- 
lions of  dollars,  contains  as  many  as  three  hundred 
separate  items,  each  with  a  definite  amount  of 
money  to  be  spent  on  that  item  alone  before  the 


122  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

end  of  the  fiscal  year,  and  if  not  spent  that  money 
returns  to  the  treasury.  In  many  of  the  items  of 
an  appropriation  bill,  framed  in  a  committee  of 
Congress,  congressmen  may  have  more  than  a 
political  or  national  interest.  Much  of  this  money 
is  to  be  spent  in  their  own  congressional  districts. 
They  have  fathered  such  of  these  items  and  have 
insisted,  maybe,  against  the  sound  technical  ad- 
vice of  military  men,  that  these  items  remain 
in  the  bill,  threatening,  if  they  should  be  removed, 
that  their  vote  would  be  cast  against  items  in  the 
bill  that  are  more  vital  to  the  welfare  of  the  na- 
tion. Some  of  the  congressmen  may  have  been 
influenced  by  business  men  who  are  financially 
interested  in  certain  items  which  are  being  op- 
posed as  unwise  and  unnecessary  by  the  technical 
officers  of  the  army  or  navy.  These  congressmen 
are  not  necessarily  dishonest.  They  may  have 
been  convinced  by  the  fluent  and  persuasive 
manufacturers'  lobbyists  that  what  they  have  to 
sell  is  absolutely  necessary  for  the  welfare  of  the 
country.  The  consequent  result  of  this  quality 
of  legislation  is  to  give  the  army  and  navy  only  a 
part  of  the  things  they  need  and  a  great  many 
things  that  they  have  no  use  for  at  all.  Economy 
is  sacrificed  and  for  these  unnecessary  items  the 
government  spends  its  money.  Army  posts, 
which  should  have  been  abandoned  long  ago, 
lying  within  the  district  of  politically  powerful 


MILITARY  POLICY  123 

congressmen,  receive  large  money  appropriations 
yearly  for  up-keep  and  even  for  extensions  after 
the  general  staff  of  the  army  have  advised  their 
abandonment.  Needless  navy-yards  are  kept 
open  and  large  sums  of  money  are  annually  spent 
on  them,  when  the  general  board  has  year  after 
year  advised  their  closing  for  the  sake  of  economy 
and  efficiency.  And  this,  not  because  Congress 
believed  they  were  more  competent  to  decide 
than  the  naval  experts,  but  because  their  own 
interests,  no  doubt,  often  swayed  their  judgment. 

If  the  matter  were  not  so  serious,  it  would  be 
ludicrous  to  see  our  Naval  Committee,  after  taking 
testimony  from  all  the  professional  sources  at 
their  command,  in  the  end  allow  party  affilia- 
tions, as  it  would  seem,  to  control  their  decision. 
Fortunately  thus  far,  Congress,  while  reducing  the 
recommendations  of  the  General  Board  of  the 
Navy,  has  not  radically  departed  from  them,  but  it 
is  easily  within  its  power,  if  party  politics  require 
it,  to  disregard  altogether  the  labors  of  that  intelli- 
gent body  and  substitute  for  their  expert  recom- 
mendations those  evolved  in  the  committee  discus- 
sions. 

The  committee  of  Congress  calls  before  it  the 
heads  of  the  executive  departments,  the  secretary 
of  war,  the  secretary  of  the  navy,  the  chiefs  of 
bureaus  in  the  departments,  the  chief  of  staff  of 
the  army,  commandants  of  navy-yards,  etc.,  and 


124  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

puts  each  through  a  course  of  questions  which 
form  very  interesting  reading  and  are,  in  some 
cases,  very  instructive.  The  method  of  the  com- 
mittee is  good.  The  result  should  be  to  get  the 
facts  and  be  sure  the  money  is  appropriated  wisely. 
But,  unfortunately,  each  witness  before  the  com- 
mittee too  often  endeavors  to  obtain  for  his  par- 
ticular office  the  maximum  of  funds,  for  the 
greatest  power  is  wielded  by  the  official  having 
the  largest  appropriation  for  his  bureau  or  office. 
The  secretary  of  war  and  the  secretary  of  the 
navy  are  undoubtedly  honest  in  their  intentions, 
as  are  all  the  officers  called  before  the  committee, 
but  their  opinions  are  one-sided  and  never,  by 
any  chance,  co-ordinate.  The  method  is  one  of 
competition  between  departments  and  bureaus; 
each  witness  is  an  advocate  of  his  own  supposed 
needs,  without  first  fitting  those  needs  to  the  re- 
quirements of  the  service  as  a  whole.  Their 
opinions  betray  the  lack  of  a  co-ordinating  mili- 
tary education.  A  reading  of  the  hearings  before 
a  committee  of  Congress  reveals  the  startling 
fact  that  no  one  has  a  real  conception  of  the 
basic  purpose  and  use  of  the  army  and  navy. 
The  desire  actuating  each  of  them  is  to  obtain 
enough  money  to  get  through  the  following  year, 
not  to  make  the  army  and  navy  efficient  for  the 
purpose  of  defending  the  country.  There  is  no 
one  military  individual,  except  the  chief  of  staff 


MILITARY  POLICY  125 

of  the  army,  who  has  knowledge  comprehensive 
enough  at  his  disposal  to  bring  the  point  of  mil- 
itary efficiency  clearly  to  view.  The  chief  of  staff 
of  the  army  is  the  responsible  military  head  of  the 
army.  He  has  under  him  a  body  of  trained  offi- 
cers whose  study  is  entirely  along  the  lines  of  mil- 
itary efficiency.  Unfortunately  for  him,  he  is  the 
head  of  no  financial  bureau  and,  in  consequence, 
as  a  witness  before  the  congressional  military  com- 
mittee his  testimony  is  not  received  with  enthu- 
siasm. But  he  is  a  thorn  in  the  side  of  the  military 
committee.  He  gives  them  facts  which  they  can- 
not refute.  He  puts  his  fingers  on  weak  spots  in 
the  appropriation  bills.  He  shows  where  money, 
which  should  be  used  for  the  defense  of  the  nation, 
is  being  wasted.  His  co-workers  discover  the 
many  tricks  and  military  flaws  in  the  appropria- 
tion bill,  and  he  endeavors  to  have  them  removed. 
In  Elihu  Root  the  army  most  fortunately  had  a 
secretary  of  war  influential  enough  to  obtain  for 
that  branch  of  the  service  the  legal  establishment 
of  a  general  staff.  Its  creation  somewhat  weak- 
ened the  prestige  and  power  of  the  military  com- 
mittee. The  congressional  committee  cannot 
stand  up  against  its  organized  technical  knowl- 
edge. But  though  there  are  often  good  business 
men  on  that  committee,  they  know  little  of  the 
military  needs  of  the  army,  and  they  cannot 
therefore  understand  why,  if  a  large  amount  of 


126  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

money  is  spent  on  the  army  and  navy,  the  con- 
sequence is  not  efficiency.  Congress,  through  its 
committees,  has  not  been  able  to  realize  that 
legislative  control  over  executive  action  has  dis- 
astrous results.  Congress,  jealous  of  its  powers, 
fears  to  give  due  weight  to  military  opinions  and 
prefers  its  own  judgment  to  the  advice  of  men 
who  have  given  the  subject  a  life's  study.1 

1  See  Appendix  III. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
NAVAL  POLICY 

THE  officers  of  our  navy  for  years  have 
realized  the  desirability,  amounting  to  a 
necessity,  of  a  general  staff  for  the  navy. 
They  do  not  doubt  the  honesty,  integrity,  and 
earnestness  of  the  secretary  of  the  navy,  nor  the 
willingness  of  Congress  to  have  an  efficient  navy, 
but  they  see  that,  unless  there  exists  a  technical 
authority  in  control  of  naval  progress,  with  ade- 
quate responsibility,  great  sums  of  money  will 
continue  to  be  spent  without  gaining  efficiency 
for  the  navy. 

Under  our  statutes,  the  head  of  the  navy  is  the 
secretary  of  the  navy,  who  has  full  authority  and 
no  division  of  responsibility.  He  is  the  com- 
mander of  the  navy,  under  the  President,  his  su- 
perior, who  may  control  his  action,  as  may  Con- 
gress by  law;  but  this,  as  far  as  it  goes,  is  merely 
a  transfer  of  responsibility  in  its  entirety.  The 
secretary  of  the  navy  has  no  associates,  he  has 
only  subordinates.  In  them  he  has  capable  ad- 
visers, so  far  as  he  chooses  to  use  them,  but  they 
are  not  legally  constituted  advisers,  and  there  is 

127 


128  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

in  their  position  nothing  which  compels  the  secre- 
tary to  hear  their  advice,  still  less  to  accept  it. 
Unity  of  action  between  the  several  naval  tech- 
nical experts  is  not  provided  for  by  law.  The  mil- 
itary efficiency  of  our  navy  depends,  then,  entirely 
upon  the  co-ordinating  force  of  the  secretary,  who 
is  a  civilian.  What  may  result  from  this  vital 
defect  in  our  system  of  naval  administration  is 
not  pleasant  to  consider.  The  secretary  of  the 
navy,  believing  his  authority  and  responsibility 
to  be  unlimited,  can  dive  down  into  the  very 
bowels  of  a  battleship  and  make  a  change  in  policy 
or  reverse  the  time-honored  traditions  of  the  ser- 
vice. The  range  of  his  arm  is  unlimited;  against 
its  strength  the  navy  has  no  redress;  the  entire 
efficiency  of  the  fleet  for  battle  may  be  upset  and 
rendered  futile  by  one  stroke  of  his  pen. 

A  fleet,  with  all  that  goes  with  it,  has  a  reason 
for  its  existence.  That  reason  is  not  for  show,  or 
to  make  a  spectacular  display,  or  to  give  work 
to  labor  unions  at  navy-yards,  or  to  build  up  a 
political  reputation,  or  to  gain  votes  for  senators 
and  congressmen;  it  is  for  the  purpose  of  en- 
gaging in  battle  with  the  fleet  of  that  enemy  which 
may  challenge  us  in  our  struggle  for  national  ex- 
istence. That  enemy  stands  between  our  fleet 
and  life.  Our  congressmen  and  secretaries  can 
appreciate  the  necessity  of  team-work  in  a  base- 
ball nine,  and  yet — it  seems  incredible — they  do 


NAVAL  POLICY  129 

not  appear  to  see  the  necessity  of  team-work  for 
the  fleet,  which  plays  a  far  more  important  game 
— the  game  of  war.  A  defeat  on  the  diamond 
results  only  in  hurt  feelings,  in  a  transient  sad- 
ness among  the  team  and  its  supporters.  The 
fleet's  defeat  means  the  loss  of  thousands  of  lives, 
of  millions  of  dollars  in  money,  of  the  nation's 
honor.  The  up-keep  and  the  training  of  the  fleet 
for  battle  cannot  be  done  alone  by  the  command- 
ers of  the  fleet.  They  can  do  their  mortal  best, 
but  without  the  wise  support  of  the  Navy  De- 
partment and  Congress,  the  fleet  is  foredoomed 
to  destruction.  No  one  of  either  service  desires 
to  change  the  Constitution.  But  the  great  war 
in  Europe  has  opened  their  eyes  even  wider,  and 
shown  them  the  brink  upon  which  the  army  and 
navy  stand — brought  to  this  crucial  situation  by 
despotic  civilian  control  over  our  military  poli- 
cies. The  blame  for  this  rests  not  with  individ- 
uals, but  in  the  faulty  conceptions  held  by  those 
who  overstep  and  override  military  advice  on 
military  matters. 

In  the  next  year  we  shall  see  a  sudden  awaken- 
ing throughout  the  land.  Our  hopes  are  always 
for  peace.  Our  ideals  are  humanitarian.  Our 
desire  is  to  continue  quietly  on  the  path  of  our 
policies.  We  have  no  wish  to  acquire  more  ter- 
ritory, nor  do  we  desire  aught  but  our  share  in 
the  commerce  of  the  world.  We  have  seen  that 


130  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

to  gain  these  ends  we  must  keep  the  nation  from 
becoming  obese  and  flabby.  The  muscles  in  our 
arms  must  not  get  soft.  Those  who  are  crying 
out  against  armaments  and  militarism,  and  per- 
suading us  to  put  our  trust  in  treaties,  will  be 
disregarded.  Weak  statesmen  may  attempt  to 
undermine  such  legislation,  which  they  fear  may 
upset  their  calculation  for  peace,  but  the  good 
judgment  of  the  intelligent  citizens  should  resist 
the  attempt,  and  see  to  it  that  our  traditional 
national  policies  are  given  the  military  support 
which  alone  can  perpetuate  them.  The  United 
States  can  never  permit  a  hostile  Asiatic  or  Eu- 
ropean force  to  land  on  the  soil  of  this  continent 
for  the  permanent  acquisition  of  territory.  Once 
a  military  nation  gains  a  foothold,  then,  history 
tells  us,  its  tenure  is  a  long  one.  If  Germany 
should  defeat  the  British  fleet  and  the  allied 
armies,  and  turn  its  attention  upon  Canada,  our 
fleet  must  bar  the  way.  Nor  can  we  permit  a  mili- 
tary nation  to  land  a  force  on  this  continent  for 
the  purpose  of  chastising  a  Central  or  South  Amer- 
ican republic.  Our  safety  lies  in  thwarting  the  at- 
tempt. Once  the  military  occupation  is  an  ac- 
complished fact,  we  may  find  ourselves  incapable, 
like  China,  of  persuading  that  military  nation  to 
evacuate.  This  is  not  a  question  of  international 
law,  but  one  of  self-defense. 

That  our  navy  is,  to-day,  not  efficient  for  war 


NAVAL  POLICY  131 

with  a  first-class  power  is  no  longer  a  secret.  If 
Congress  is  satisfied  that  we  must  look  to  the 
fleet  primarily  to  provide  national  defense,  and 
is  seriously  anxious  to  economize  the  nation's 
money  in  order  that  not  a  cent  shall  be  spent 
that  does  not  increase  the  fleet's  efficiency,  is  it 
not  then  the  duty  of  Congress  to  see  that  these 
intentions  are  made  good  ?  A  congressional  func- 
tion is  to  audit  expenditures  upon  which  our  na- 
tional credit  is  based;  why,  then,  is  it  not  its 
duty  to  audit  the  fleet,  upon  which  our  national 
existence  is  based  ?  Unfortunately,  Congress  has 
difficulty  in  correctly  auditing  the  fleet.  Military 
and  naval  officers  are  held  strictly  to  secrecy  by 
departmental  regulations.1  They  must  make  their 
protests  and  criticisms  to  the  department.  But 
the  Navy  Department  resents  these  criticisms, 
seemingly  believing  that  they  reflect  upon  the 
work  of  the  department.  It  is  perfectly  evi- 
dent, then,  that  the  navy  cannot  improve,  cannot 
gain  efficiency  as  long  as  such  methods  are  en- 
forced. In  all  democratic  countries  the  greatest 
progress  is  gained  through  publicity  and  discus- 
sion during  peace.  Until  war  approaches,  secrecy, 
as  a  policy,  is  disastrous,  and  for  this  the  reason 
is  clear,  because  in  our  country  the  people  govern. 
By  maintaining  secrecy,  the  rulers — the  peopl< 


1  This  secrecy,  imposed  in  times  of  peace,  only  prevents  our  own 
citizens  from  knowing  what  the  military  authorities  of  other  coun- 
tries already  know  through  other  channels. 


132  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

are  kept  in  ignorance  of  the  real  efficiency  of  the 
fleet  and  of  the  readiness  of  their  country  for 
war.  Once  Congress  is  told  that  the  fleet  is  in- 
efficient, that  the  army  is  inadequate,  and  that 
our  vaunted  safety  is  a  myth,  and  once  this 
knowledge  is  frankly  admitted  to  the  people 
through  the  press,  then  the  people  will  supply 
the  remedy.  No  great  government  organization 
can  achieve  efficiency  through  internal  develop- 
ment alone.  Such  development  takes  no  account 
of  environment;  it  takes  no  account  of  difficulties 
to  be  overcome;  it  takes  no  account  of  an  enemy 
to  be  encountered.  Government  administration 
will  achieve  results  only  when  there  exists  a  force 
jealous  and  antagonistic,  and  compelling  it  to  be 
efficient,  and  this  force  must  be  outside  of  the 
control  of  the  administration.  If  the  country 
were  aware  of  a  menace — a  military  nation  armed 
and  ready  to  strike  them — then  the  force  com- 
pelling efficiency  would  be  supplied;  but  without 
this  open  menace  to  the  safety  of  the  country, 
free  and  open  discussion  upon  our  readiness  for 
war  is  the  only  solution. 

Even  blunders  in  the  handling  of  the  fleet  should 
be  given  out  to  the  nation,  in  order  that  the  peo- 
ple can  judge  the  competency  of  its  leaders. 
Certain  British  admirals  who  were  executed  for 
misconduct,  disloyalty,  and  want  of  courage 
during  the  eighteenth-century  wars  were,  we  are 
told,  not  culpable.  Their  dereliction  was  due  to 


NAVAL  POLICY  133 

an  insufficient  acquaintance  with  the  methods 
and  principles  of  the  tactics  of  that  day  and  to 
the  defective  signalling  systems  of  that  age.  In 
this  country  we  prevent  the  public  from  hearing 
of  our  tactical  blunders,  and  severely  censure  those 
who  publicly  discuss  them.  How  much  wiser  it 
would  be  to  thrash  the  whole  matter  out  in  free 
discussion,  and  decide  then  whether  these  mis- 
takes and  the  general  lack  of  readiness  for  battle 
is  not  due  to  insufficient  acquaintance  with  the 
methods  and  principles  of  the  tactics  of  this  day. 

The  unreadiness  of  the  navy  for  war  can  be 
laid  at  the  door  of  the  faulty  conceptions  of  re- 
sponsibility in  organization  and  administration. 
Whom  will  the  country  hold  responsible  if  our 
fleet  is  defeated?  The  statesmen  of  the  nation 
who  have  failed  to  provide  an  adequate  force? 
Or  the  secretary  of  the  navy  for  not  preparing 
what  was  given  him  for  battle?  Will  the  chiefs 
of  the  several  bureaus  in  the  Navy  Department 
be  held  responsible  for  not  providing  the  fleet 
with  those  necessities  which  are  essential  to  its 
preparedness?  Or  will  the  commander-in-chief 
of  the  fleet  be  held  responsible  for  not  having 
brought  his  fleet  up  to  the  highest  state  of  ef- 
ficiency for  battle  ? 

Can  we  not  see  that  there  must  be  some  one 
made  responsible  for  the  war  efficiency  of  our 
navy?  Can  we  not  appreciate  that,  by  divid- 
ing the  responsibility  among  many,  individual 


134  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

responsibility  is  sacrificed  and  successful  results 
are,  in  consequence,  impossible?  The  raison 
d'etre  of  the  navy  is  to  afford  protection  to  our 
shores  from  invasion  by  engaging  the  enemy's 
fleet.  This  duty  is  essentially  a  military  one,  and 
to  intrust  a  civilian,  an  untrained  man,  with  this, 
the  military  direction,  is  contrary  to  all  principles 
of  administration,  military  or  business.  By  the 
fleet  is  meant  the  War  Fleet,  and  not  the  peace 
fleets  under  their  several  commanders-in-chief. 

The  secretary  of  the  navy  has  a  duty  to  per- 
form, but  it  is  a  civil  duty.  It  concerns  the  pro- 
vision and  preparation  of  a  naval  force  for  the 
purposes  of  state.  He  should  bring  to  this  duty 
a  thorough  business  capacity,  and  for  the  exer- 
cise of  the  great  function  of  which  he  is  the  head, 
he  must  surround  himself  with  responsible  men  to 
control  the  different  activities.  His  principal 
manager  should  be  a  man  chosen  for  his  wide 
knowledge  of  military  affairs.  In  him  the  secre- 
tary should  repose  the  most  absolute  confidence. 
He  must  be  the  chief  military  adviser  to  the  sec- 
retary. His  decisions  on  military  subjects  must 
be  taken  unless  they  conflict  with  the  higher  de- 
cisions of  the  state  of  which  the  secretary  alone 
is  the  judge.  In  the  civil  duties  under  the  secre- 
tary, managers  would  also  have  to  be  appointed. 
These  managers  should  be  technical  men,  and 
they  likewise  should  be  the  secretary's  advisers 
in  their  own  special  fields.  The  military  manager 


NAVAL  POLICY  135 

will  perform  the  duties  of  a  chief  of  the  general 
staff  of  the  navy,  and  in  his  office  will  be  collected 
a  trained  personnel  with  the  military  wisdom  re- 
quired to  place  the  navy  on  a  sound  military 
footing,  and  make  it  ready  for  future  campaigns 
in  case  war  should  come. 

It  is  evident  to  any  student  of  government 
administration  that  efficiency  is  impossible  in  our 
army  and  navy,  and  still  less  in  our  Department 
of  State,  without  a  still  higher  co-ordinating  au- 
thority. Such  authority  in  other  countries  is 
called  "The  National  Defense  Board,"  "The 
Board  of  National  Defense,"  or  "The  Elder 
Statesmen."  An  agitation  for  such  an  authority 
was  made  in  this  country  several  years  ago  under 
the  title  of  "A  Council  for  National  Defense." 
The  duties  of  such  a  council,  composed  of  the 
President,  the  secretaries  of  state,  war,  and  navy, 
the  chairmen  of  the  financial  committees  of  Con- 
gress, the  chairmen  of  the  Senate  and  House 
committees  on  military  and  naval  affairs,  the 
presidents  of  the  Army  and  Navy  War  Colleges, 
and  the  chief  of  staff  of  the  army  and  an  officer  of 
the  navy — all  representative  men  of  intelligence, 
of  knowledge,  and  of  prestige,  selected,  as  it  were, 
irrespective  of  internal  politics — would  be  for 
the  purpose  of  providing  sufficient  military  power 
to  accomplish  the  purposes  of  the  nation. 

The  Council  for  National  Defense  would  supply 
the  authority  to  whom  the  people  of  the  nation 


136  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

could  always  appeal.  This  council  would  assume 
entire  responsibility  for  the  country's  safety. 
The  assumption  of  such  a  responsibility  would 
demand,  first,  a  military  organization  for  both 
the  army  and  navy.  Its  powerful  influence  would 
be  felt  by  Congress.  All  attempts  to  deflect 
money  for  defense  into  less  useful  channels  would 
be  barred.  The  Council  for  National  Defense 
would  assure  itself  that,  in  the  event  of  war, 
plans  had  been  prepared  beforehand  to  wage  the 
war.  It  would  assure  itself  that  the  military 
organization  and  the  naval  organization  were 
thoroughly  competent  to  carry  on  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  army  and  navy  under  the  dislocat- 
ing effects  of  war.  It  would  furnish  the  driving 
force  which  does  not  now  exist,  compelling  the 
War  Department  and  the  Navy  Department  to 
organize  themselves  for  the  business  of  waging 
war.  In  the  creation  of  such  an  organization  for 
war,  the  necessity  of  a  military  head  of  each 
organization,  the  army  and  navy,  would  be  ap- 
parent. The  Council  for  National  Defense  would 
exact  responsibility  from  the  chiefs  of  the  general 
staffs,  the  military  heads  of  the  army  and  the 
navy.  These  chiefs  would  surround  themselves 
with  men  who  are  capable  of  setting  before  them 
all  the  facts  of  the  military  system  under  their 
control — experts  in  the  art  of  war. 
At  present,  for  the  navy  there  exists  the  gen- 


NAVAL  POLICY 


137 


eral  board,  which  each  year  submits  to  the  secre- 
tary of  the  navy  the  number  of  ships  and  the 
types  which,  in  its  judgment,  should  be  built. 
The  board's  recommendations  are  based  upon  a 
comprehensive  study  of  probable  opponents,  and 
is  usually  a  minimum  for  the  needs  of  the  country.1 
Such  a  report  has  been  submitted  for  the  last  ten 
years,  but  in  no  one  year  has  more  than  one-half 
of  the  board's  recommendation  been  accepted  by 
Congress,  or  even  by  the  secretary  of  the  navy ! 
The  board  is  not  legalized  by  statute,  and  its 
findings  can,  therefore,  be  disregarded,  as  they 
generally  are,  if  "not  agreeable."  The  conse- 
quence has  been  that,  while  ten  years  ago  the 
navy  of  the  United  States  was  second  in  strength 
among  the  great  fleets  of  the  world,  it  has  slowly 
but  surely  dropped  from  that  position. 

The  following  table  will  show  the  results  of  our 
unwise  naval  programme: 

ANNUAL  DREADNAUGHT  STRENGTH 


Germany 

Great  Britain 

United  States 

1912  

it 

18 

6 

1913  

16 

26 

8 

20 

32 

10 

IOXC 

23 

36 

12 

1916 

26 

41 

14 

IOI7 

28 

A  <? 

16 

I9l8 

•»o 

4Q 

18 

IOIO 

•33 

r* 

20 

I02O 

•3* 

*C7 

22 

1  See  Appendix  I. 


138  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

This  table  includes  dreadnaughts  only,  for  the 
older  ships  are  fast  becoming  of  secondary  im- 
portance, and  it  is  based  upon  the  known  naval 
policies  of  Germany  and  Great  Britain  since  1912 
and,  for  the  United  States,  upon  the  policy  of  two 
dreadnaughts  a  year,  which  as  yet  has  not  been 
continuously  followed.  It  will  therefore  be  seen 
that  in  1915,  this  year,  Germany  will  have  almost 
double  the  number  of  dreadnaughts  in  our  fleet, 
while  Great  Britain  will  have  thrice  the  number. 
Japan,  on  the  other  hand,  in  1915,  when  her 
four  great  battle  cruisers  are  completed  and  her 
new  dreadnaughts  have  joined  her  fleet,  will 
have  in  dreadnaught  strength  a  force  equal  to 
our  own. 

It  has  been  pointed  out,  and  the  present  war 
in  Europe  has  demonstrated  the  point,  that  the 
nation  which  can  force  its  enemy  to  seek  it  out 
in  waters  near  its  great  naval  bases  will  have  all 
the  advantage  of  submarine  craft  and  torpedo 
craft  that  the  enemy  will  be  denied.  Our  great 
fleet,  waging  a  war  in  the  Orient  against  Japan, 
would  suffer  casualties  from  the  submarines'  tor- 
pedoes, and  the  loss  of  a  few  dreadnaughts  would 
quickly  reduce  our  fleet  to  one  of  inferiority. 
The  United  States  has  that  advantage  over  Ger- 
many, but  to  provide  for  such  casualties  Germany 
has  built  twice  the  fleet  of  the  United  States. 
We  can,  therefore,  readily  see  that  a  naval  war 


NAVAL  POLICY  139 

against  Japan  requires  a  force  sufficient  to  accept 
all  the  hazards  of  the  Japanese  submarine  operat- 
ing in  home  waters. 

All  these  questions  that  have  been  so  lightly 
and  quickly  passed  upon  by  our  civilian  legis- 
lators are  vital  to  the  nation's  welfare.  It  is  time 
that  the  nation  appreciated  its  dangers  and  de- 
manded a  reorganization  in  the  administration  of 
its  services  of  defense. 

Let  us  keep  clearly  in  mind  the  fundamental 
fact  that  the  creation  and  control  of  the  army  and 
navy  are  duties  that  should  be  intrusted  to  men 
trained  for  the  task;  that  the  control  of  such 
specialties  by  inexperienced  statesmen  or  politi- 
cians can  only  lead  to  discouragement  and  in- 
efficiency, and  furthermore,  that  congressional  ac- 
tion taken  against  competent  military  advice 
fritters  away  the  nation's  money.  The  demoral- 
ization in  our  military  organization  is  of  such 
long  standing  that  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  evil 
can  be  remedied  at  once,  for  the  organization  of 
our  naval  administration  is  built  upon  so  un- 
stable a  foundation  that  it  insures  nothing 
but  prodigality  of  expenditures  and  wasteful- 
ness. 

It  is  interesting  to  follow  the  development  of 
our  navy  as  shown  in  its  annual  appropriations 
for  new  construction.  The  following  tables,  pre- 
pared from  congressional  sources  since  the  begin- 


140  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 


ning  of  the  new  navy  in  1883,  are  suggestive. 
They  reveal  a  glaring  absence  of  definite  or  con- 
tinuous policy. 

TABLE  I 

CAPITAL  SHIPS 


BATTLESHIP 

3 

CRUISERS 

Num- 
ber 

Average 
Tonnage 

Average 
Speed 

Num- 
ber 

Average 
Tonnage 

Average 
Speed 

1883.. 

•9    POO 

16 

1884 

1885  
1886  

2 

6,408 

17 

2 
I 

3,7oi 

4  413 

18 
20 

1887  
1888  

2 

7" 

4,246 
^  70Q 

19 
10 

1889 

1890 

10  288 

16 

22 

1891  
1892  

i 

11,346 

17 

I 
I 

7,350 

0,21  ^ 

23 
21 

1893  

1804 

i8o< 

2 

II  520 

16 

1896  

3 

11,552 

17 

1897  
1898  
1899  
1900  

3 
3 

2 

12,500 
14,948 
14,948 

is 

19 
19 

9 

6 

6,690 
11,690 

18 

22 

1901  

1902  

2 

16,000 

18 

2 

I4,5OO 

IQO3 

q 

14,800 

17 

1904  
1905.  .  . 

I 
2 

16,000 
16,000 

18 
18 

5 

8,030 

24 

1906  

I 

20,000 

21 

1907  

I 

20,000 

21 

1908  

2 

21,825 

21 

1909.  . 

2 

26,000 

21 

1910  
1911 

2 
2 

27,000 
27,500 

21 

2O 

1912  

IQI3 

I 
I 

31,400 

•3  I   4OO 

21 
21 

1914  

3l 

32,OOO 

21 

Including  the  ship  being  constructed  with  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  to  Greece  of 
the  old  battleships  Idaho  and  Mississippi. 


NAVAL  POLICY 


141 


TABLE  II 
TORPEDO  CRAFT 


TORPEDO 

-BOATS  AND  DES 

TROYERS 

SUB- 
MARINES 

YEAR 

Number 

Average 
Tonnage 

Average 
SpeeS 

Number 

1886 

i 

MM 

22 

1887 

l888 

l88g 

1890     ,..  . 

i 

I2O 

24 

l8gi      ...- 

1892  

1803 

1894  

2 

142 

24 

1895  

3 

180 

28 

1896  

IO 

1  20 

24 

1897  

3 

291 

28 

1898  

24 

370 

28 

1899        

IQOO 

IQOI 

I9O2 

IQO3 

IQO4 

IQOq 

IOO6 

700 

28 

g 

IQO7 

2 

700 

«o 

IOO8 

IO 

74.2 

•3Q 

8 

IQOO 

74.2 

3O 

IOIO 

6 

742 

5Q 

IOII 

g 

I  O^O 

2O 

1912  

6 

I,O5O 

2Q 

8 

IOI3 

6 

I  IO? 

2O 

1014 

6 

I  IIO 

2O 

8 

The  above  tables  have  been  grouped  under 
the  heads  of  (i)  vessels  whose  main  armament  is 
the  gun  and  (2)  those  whose  main  offensive 
weapon  is  the  torpedo.  They  present  the  num- 
ber of  ships  authorized  in  each  session  of  Congress, 
the  total  tonnage  appropriated  for,  and  the  aver- 


142  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

age  tonnage  and  speed  for  the  vessels  of  both 
classes  from  1883  to  the  present  time.  It  will  be 
seen  that  the  building  policy  was  vacillating,  both 
as  to  numbers  and  as  to  types.  In  1886  modern 
armored  ships  first  came  into  favor.  In  1888  the 
first  armored  cruiser  was  laid  down,  and  in  1890 
the  first  first-class  battleship  was  built.  In  1891 
only  a  scout  cruiser  was  built,  then  in  1895  "two 
battleships  were  laid  down.  From  that  time  on 
three  battleships  were  built  each  year,  except  in 
1897,  when  none  was  authorized.  The  year  of 
the  Spanish-American  War,  the  monitor  type 
again  was  favored.  Then,  in  1899,  we  undertook 
the  building  of  large  armored  cruisers.  The  year 
following,  the  same  was  continued.  Two  and 
three  battleships  a  year  were  built  between  1902 
and  1904.  Then  from  1904  on,  two  battleships 
each  year  were  built  until  1912  and  1913,  when 
only  one  was  appropriated  for. 

A  study  of  our  national  policy  during  these 
years  shows  no  marked  change,  yet  in  our  naval- 
construction  programme,  in  the  number  of  ships 
built  and  in  their  tonnage,  there  was  no  progres- 
sive spirit.  In  design  we  followed  other  nations, 
principally  England.  But  after  developing  a  type 
of  ship,  a  long  time  was  wasted  before  the  type 
was  repeated  and  improved  upon.  In  fact  it  may 
be  seen  that  we  retrograded  during  certain  years. 
It  will  be  noted  that  no  armored  cruisers  of  high 


NAVAL  POLICY  143 

speed  and  offensive  power  were  laid  down  after 
1904,  nor  have  we  added  a  single  scout  cruiser  to 
our  fleet  since  that  year. 

Turning  to  the  torpedo  craft,  we  see  that  we 
began  the  construction  of  torpedo-boats  as  early 
as  1886,  a  few  at  a  time,  and  by  1898,  had  evolved 
a  vessel  of  nearly  300  tons,  displacement.  In  that 
same  year,  the  destroyer  came  suddenly  into 
favor.  Immediately  following  the  Spanish-Amer- 
ican War,  Congress  followed  a  creditably  ambi- 
tious programme,  making  amends,  apparently,  for 
its  lapses  during  the  preceding  years.  But,  after 
laying  down  a  large  number  of  these  vessels  in 
1898,  our  representatives  refused  to  appropriate 
for  torpedo  craft  until  1906,  when  they  began 
again  to  authorize  a  few  at  a  time.  This  second 
impetus  was  given  by  the  Russo-Japanese  War. 
Since  then  the  building  has  been  more  or  less 
progressive.  In  one  year,  1908,  ten  were  laid 
down;  in  the  remaining  years,  down  to  1913,  half 
a  dozen  were  authorized  at  each  session. 

Now  for  the  submarine.  The  first  submarines 
built  for  our  navy  were  what  is  known  as  the 
"A"  type.  They  had  a  tonnage  of  about  60  tons, 
and  seven  of  them  altogether  were  built.  Then  the 
tonnage  in  the  "B"  type  was  increased  to  about 
125  tons.  In  the  "C"  type  we  developed  craft 
of  about  200  tons;  the  "D"  type  were  of  280 
tons;  the  "E"  type,  about  300;  the  "F"  type, 


144  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

about  310;  and  so  on  up  to  the  present  "K"  and 
"L"  types,  which  are  vessels  of  about  500  tons. 
Class  for  class,  these  under-water  craft  are  con- 
sidered the  equal  of  those  in  foreign  navies.  But 
their  evolution,  in  our  case,  has  not  been  satisfac- 
torily progressive.  For  the  boats  may  be  said 
to  have  been,  in  practically  every  case,  experimen- 
tal, since  each  class  has  been  authorized  and  built 
before  the  previous  one  had  been  thoroughly 
tested  and  perfected. 

Since  the  general  board  came  into  existence  in 
March,  1900,  it  has  endeavored  to  guide  the 
building  policy  of  our  navy.  Its  effort  has  not 
been  entirely  successful.  Yet,  if  this  able  body 
of  men  had  not  existed,  we  should  undoubtedly 
have  been  in  a  very  much  more  precarious  state 
of  preparation  at  this  date.  But,  what  has  been 
a  serious  omission  during  these  years  of  advance 
in  construction,  the  personnel,  both  officers  and 
men,  was  not  increased  in  proportion  to  the  new 
tonnage  commissioned,  and  this  error  has  greatly 
impaired  the  navy's  efficiency. 

It  can  readily  be  seen  that  the  root  of  the 
trouble  has  been  our  lack  of  policy.  A  continu- 
ing policy,  in  construction  and  in  the  increase  of 
personnel  to  keep  up  with  the  construction,  can 
only  be  obtained  through  a  continuing  body  of 
military  thinkers.  Congress  must  make  use  of 
organized  military  knowledge,  such  as  can  be 


NAVAL  POLICY  145 

given  only  by  a  general  staff.  Sound  doctrine  of 
military  policy  is  also  required.  This  can  be 
secured  only  through  a  council  for  national  de- 
fense. 


CHAPTER  IX 

NAVAL  ORGANIZATION  AND 
ADMINISTRATION 

4  DMIRAL  MAHAN  said:  "The  test  of  a 
J-\  system  of  naval  administration  is  its  ca- 
pacity— inherent,  not  spasmodic — to  keep 
the  establishment  of  the  navy  abreast  of  the  best 
professional  opinion  concerning  contemporary 
necessities,  both  in  quality  and  quantity.  It  needs 
not  only  to  know  and  to  have  what  is  best  to-day, 
but  to  embody  an  organic  provision  for  watching 
and  forecasting  to  a  reasonable  future  what  will 
be  demanded.  This  may  not  be  trusted  to  vol- 
untary action  or  to  individual  initiative.  There 
is  needed  a  constituted  organ  to  receive,  digest, 
and  then  officially  to  state,  in  virtue  of  its  recog- 
nized office,  what  the  highest  instructed  profes- 
sional opinion,  the  opinion  of  the  sea  officers, 
holds  concerning  the  needs  of  the  navy  at  the 
moment  and  for  the  future,  as  far  as  present 
progress  indicates.  There  is  in  the  naval  admin- 
istration, as  constituted  by  law,  no  organized 
provision  to  do  the  evolutionary  work,  the  sift- 
ing process,  by  which  in  civil  life  the  rough  fight- 

146 


NAVAL  ADMINISTRATION         147 

ing  test  of  supply  and  demand,  of  competition 
in  open  market,  and  free  usage  pronounces  de- 
cisively upon  the  practical  merits  of  various  in- 
struments or  methods  of  manufacture.  The  body 
of  sea  officers,  the  workmen  of  the  navy,  receive 
for  use  instruments  upon  which  the  system  pro- 
vides them  no  means  of  expressing  the  profes- 
sional opinion  as  to  their  adaptability,  relatively, 
to  service  conditions  or  to  other  existing  instru- 
ments. Whatever  harm  may  result  from  this 
falls  not  upon  the  workmen  only,  but  upon  those 
also  for  whom  the  work  is  done;  that  is,  the 
nation.'*  This,  from  our  most  illustrious  thinker, 
is  an  open  plea  for  a  naval  general  staff. 

The  present  system  of  independent  bureaus  of 
the  Navy  Department  has  now  been  in  operation 
for  over  seventy  years.  It  is  a  machine,  designed 
and  constructed  in  1842,  but  never  properly  put 
together  as  a  complete  whole.  It  is  an  assem- 
blage of  parts  which,  since  their  first  performance 
in  the  days  of  sail,  have  been  oiled  and  urged 
until  they  have  developed  far  beyond  their  orig- 
inal designed  efficiency.  And  to-day  the  old  parts 
still  move  in  grooves,  converging,  diverging,  or 
running  parallel,  as  each  part  sees  fit  to  cut  its 
furrow.  But  within  this  machinery  there  exists 
neither  motive  force  nor  directive  impulse.  These 
are  factors  of  active  life  that  must  come  solely 
from  without. 


148  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

The  navy  has  been  efficient  under  certain  sec- 
retaries and  has  had  a  relapse  under  others.  Is 
it  right,  is  it  just  to  the  nation,  that  such  an  im- 
portant department  of  the  government  should  fail 
to  contain  within  itself  the  principle  of  continuous 
efficiency  and  be  dependent  upon  chance  for  an 
individual  to  awaken  it  from  inaction?  Other 
departments  of  government  are  represented  in 
the  continuous  interest  of  civil  life,  constituting 
an  impulse  more  or  less  abiding  to  keep  them 
abreast  of  the  times.  The  navy  and  army  have 
no  such  interest,  and  a  secretary,  a  civilian,  is  not 
sufficient.  As  Mr.  Meyer  wrote  in  1909:  "In  the 
past  seven  years  there  have  been  six  secretaries 
of  the  navy."  How  may  a  civilian,  lacking  ex- 
pert knowledge,  under  such  circumstances  ade- 
quately direct  all  the  varied  operations  of  the 
naval  service?  The  continuous  interest,  spoken 
of  above,  must  be  supplied.  It  must  be  some- 
thing subordinate  to  the  secretary,  embodying  the 
progressive  service  ideas,  touching  the  public  and 
the  administration  ashore  and  afloat.  This  is  a 
chief  of  the  general  staff  and  his  general  staff. 
This  Admiral  Mahan  referred  to  when  he  said: 
"To  supply  the  defect  inherent  in  temporary 
tenure  and  periodical  change,  there  is  required 
for  the  Navy  Department  a  tradition  of  policy 
analogous  in  fact  to  the  principles  of  a  political 
party,  which  are  continuous  in  tradition,  though 


NAVAL  ADMINISTRATION         149 

progressive  in  modification.  These  run  side  by 
side  with  the  policy  of  particular  administrations; 
not  affecting  their  constitutional  powers,  but 
guiding  general  lines  of  action  by  an  influence, 
the  benefit  of  which,  through  the  assurance  of 
continuity,  is  universally  admitted." 

Organization  and  system  are  effective  in  con- 
trolling large  operations  that  are  beyond  the 
grasp  of  the  individual.  System  is  the  method 
by  which  organization  works  to  secure  desired 
results  and  to  maintain  control  of  every  item  of 
work  in  hand  at  all  times.  But  system  will  be 
lacking  in  the  Navy  Department  until  we  accept 
and  act  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of 
organization.  Organization  implies  forethought 
and  preparation;  we  cannot,  therefore,  continue 
our  unsystematized  methods.  The  world  has  be- 
come too  scientific.  Other  nations  have  reor- 
ganized, realizing  that  organization  wins  battles, 
and  they  have,  in  consequence,  become  more  effi- 
cient. Organization  for  war  means  thorough  and 
sound  preparation  for  war  in  all  its  branches, 
from  the  higher  command  to  every  source  of 
supply. 

Unfortunately  for  the  United  States,  the  mis- 
conception and  jealousy  of  our  politicians  have 
prevented  the  navy  from  gaining  the  organization 
which  it  knows  it  must  have  if  the  fleet  is  to  be 
effective  in  war.  A  Council  for  National  Defense, 


ISO  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

being  higher  than  the  political  party  in  power, 
could  not  be  controlled  by  politics.  It  is  there- 
fore resisted  by  both  political  parties.  And  the 
creation  of  a  naval  general  staff,  established  by 
law  to  supply  the  country  with  a  continuous  and 
progressive  naval  policy,  is  likewise  refused  by 
Congress. 

While  the  appropriations  for  the  navy  have 
greatly  increased  during  the  past  generation,  un- 
fortunately for  the  navy  and  for  the  nation,  all 
this  capital  has  not  been  usefully  invested  for  the 
purposes  of  the  navy.  Some  of  this  money  has 
been  spent  and  is  being  spent  in  localities  and 
for  purposes  which  cannot  possibly  increase  the 
battle  efficiency  of  the  fleet.  In  perusing  the 
various  items  of  each  annual  appropriation  we 
must  bear  in  mind  that  capital  is  not  the  physical 
thing  enumerated.  It  is  the  value  represented  by 
them.  The  value,  rather  than  the  physical  thing, 
is  what  must  be  accounted  for.  As  an  example: 
a  naval  mobilization  represents  the  physical  thing, 
but  of  its  value  what  do  we  know  ?  If  the  service 
is  highly  trained  for  war  and  prepared  to  give 
battle,  then  the  value  of  that  mobilization  is 
high.  But  if  it  is  a  mere  assemblage  of  ships, 
inadequately  manned,  and  furnished  with  in- 
effective and  inefficient  material,  then  its  value  is 
small,  although  the  capital  represented  may  be 
great. 


NAVAL  ADMINISTRATION         151 

The  administration  of  the  Navy  Department, 
then,  consists  not  merely  in  building  ships,  in 
buying  material,  in  repairing  vessels,  in  supplying 
a  personnel,  in  educating  the  enlisted  men,  or  in 
developing  our  navy-yards;  it  is  the  co-ordinat- 
ing of  all  these  duties  and  their  welding  into  an 
effective  instrument  of  war.  The  responsibility 
for  the  efficiency  of  that  instrument  of  war  can- 
not, therefore,  be  divided.  Each  separate  activity 
must  be  thoroughly  controlled  and  made  to  co- 
operate toward  the  ultimate  object  of  developing 
the  battle  efficiency  of  the  fleet. 

We  saw  how,  in  1898,  on  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  with  Spain,  the  Navy  Department,  finding 
itself  without  a  military  board  of  strategy,  and 
realizing  the  urgent  need  of  a  regular  and  continu- 
ing policy  in  face  of  the  emergency,  was  forced 
to  supply  those  parts  of  its  organization  which  in 
time  of  peace  it  had  refused  to  create.  But  such 
a  desperate  course,  adopted  on  the  outbreak  of 
hostilities  with  a  nation  well  organized  and  well 
prepared,  may  not  again  result  so  happily. 

If  we  could  keep  clearly  in  mind  the  funda- 
mental reason  for  the  existence  of  the  navy,  and 
apply  this  aim  to  all  our  efforts,  confusion  would 
be  partially  if  not  wholly  eliminated.  The  men 
who  fight  the  ships  must  control  the  civil  output. 

In  the  great  dockyards  the  same  principle  of 
control  should  obtain.  Whether  a  navy-yard  is 


152  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

in  charge  of  a  naval  officer  or  a  civilian  manager, 
the  output  of  that  yard  should  conform  to  the 
requirements  and  standards  set  by  the  men  who 
will  use  the  ships  and  the  material  in  those  ships. 
For,  when  the  military  man  loses  control  over  the 
sources  of  supply  vital  to  his  needs,  then  efficiency 
vanishes  and  the  navy  decays. 

It  is  this  definition  of  the  word  "control"  that 
has,  perhaps  more  than  any  other  phrase,  aroused 
discussion  in  the  service.  It  is  claimed  by  some 
professional  writers  that  the  line  officers,  they 
who  will  fight  the  ships,  should  entirely  "control" 
the  output.  This  does  not  mean  that  officers  of 
the  line  should  interfere  with  the  work  of  the 
technical  branches,  but  that  they  should  pass  on 
the  value  of  the  finished  articles.  Their  training 
in  the  handling  at  sea  of  those  articles  often  gives 
them  the  knowledge  and  the  right  to  say  whether 
the  ships  or  the  articles  furnished  them  are  not 
suited  to  the  purpose.  It  is  then  the  duty  of  the 
technical  branches  to  endeavor  to  shape  their 
specialties  in  order  to  comply  with  that  decision. 
A  ship  is  an  instrument  of  war,  and  must  be  fash- 
ioned to  do  certain  things.  If  the  officers  who 
use  the  ships  find  that  they  will  not  do  the  things 
required  of  them,  then  the  technical  officers  must 
strive  to  alter  them  in  order  that  they  may  ac- 
complish the  purpose  for  which  they  were  de- 
signed. The  officers  who  fight  the  ships  must 


NAVAL  ADMINISTRATION         153 

not  invade  the  sanctum  of  the  technical  branches. 
A  choice  of  methods  belongs  to  the  technical 
branches,  but  this  choice  is  one  of  interest  only 
to  the  fighting  officers.  In  preparing  for  war, 
and  in  war,  time  is  an  important  element.  Time 
is,  therefore,  a  function  of  military  preparedness, 
and  the  civil  and  technical  branches  must  en- 
deavor to  co-ordinate  their  methods  in  order  that 
the  advantage  gained  through  the  time  element 
can  be  assured.  We  have  already  seen  how  the 
statesmen  control  the  use  of  the  military  forces 
in  peace  and  war,  while  the  method  of  control 
belongs  to  the  military.  Does  not  this  same 
analogy  hold  good  between  the  military  officers 
who  fight  the  ships  and  the  civil  and  technical 
officers  who  supply  and  repair  the  ships  ?  The  line 
officer  controls  the  use  of  the  ships,  but  the  de- 
signing and  construction  of  those  ships  for  their 
use  belongs  to  those  who  have  made  the  necessary 
specialties  their  life  study.  If,  in  an  organiza- 
tion, the  civil  and  technical  branches  become  so 
strong  and  so  powerful  as  to  disregard  the  funda- 
mental law  of  military  control,  then  we  shall  find 
that  the  articles  furnished  will  not  be  suited  to 
the  military  uses. 

The  army  is  rapidly  educating  its  officers  in 
the  art  of  war  at  the  Army  War  College.  This  co- 
ordinating education  will,  in  time,  bring  cohesion 
to  the  entire  military  service  and  make  correct 


1 54  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

reasoning  a  universal  attribute  among  the  officers 
themselves.  The  Naval  War  College1  is  attempt- 
ing the  same  work,  but  its  facilities  are  inadequate, 
and  the  officers  allowed  to  attend  the  course  are 
too  few  for  the  benefits  of  that  education  to  be 
felt  for  some  time  to  come.  Until  the  entire 
navy,  both  line  and  staff,  have  been  indoctri- 
nated in  the  true  principles  of  war  and  war  pre- 
paredness, we  cannot  expect  efficiency  for  the 
navy.  So  long  as  our  naval  officers  are  unable  to 
grasp  clearly  a  uniform  point  of  view  to  which  all 
individual  efforts  must  subordinate  themselves, 
harmony  cannot  be  achieved.  Our  civilian  secre- 
taries and  our  congressmen  of  the  naval  com- 
mittees complain  that  they  do  not  always  receive 
harmonious  recommendations  from  the  officers  of 
the  naval  service.  The  education  in  the  art  of 
war  of  the  naval  officer  has  only  begun.  Strange 
as  it  may  seem,  the  majority  of  the  naval  officers 

1The  Naval  War  College  is  educational,  not  executive.  It  is  not 
a  war  board,  nor  a  naval  general  staff.  It  forms  no  part  of  the 
working  organization  of  the  Navy  Department,  but  supplies  the 
material  wherewith  to  construct  such  an  organization.  It  devotes 
itself  to  the  study  of  naval  history,  naval  strategy  and  tactics,  the 
law  of  nations,  and  academic  discussions  of  all  conceivable  types  of 
naval  problems  of  war;  it  supplies  the  alumni  from  which  to  select 
officers  competent  to  command  our  fleets,  as  well  as  those  able  to 
solve  correctly  the  actual  problems  with  which  a  naval  general  staff 
is  bound  to  be  confronted,  a  duty  —  generally  of  a  nature  so  con- 
fidential as  to  prevent  its  being  delegated  elsewhere  —  which  should 
be  the  sole  function  of  a  board  sufficiently  strong  and  able  to  consti- 
tute, both  in  peace  and  in  war,  the  backbone  of  the  Department  of 
the  Navy. 


NAVAL  ADMINISTRATION         155 

are  steeped  in  materialism.  The  science  of  war 
has  been  subordinated  to  the  science  of  material. 
The  processes  of  manufacture  are  more  interest- 
ing to  the  majority  of  them  than  is  the  use  of  the 
instruments  in  war.  We  go  to  great  pains  to 
design  ships,  and  experiment  with  all  manner  of 
war  material,  but  when  it  comes  to  the  supreme 
test  of  all  these  inventions,  as  to  how  they  will 
be  employed,  how  they  will  be  grouped,  how  they 
will  be  supplied,  and  how  they  will  be  fought, 
these  questions  we  leave  unanswered. 

The  placing  of  our  navy  on  a  war  footing  is  a 
political  act  of  the  most  vital  importance.  In  war 
as  in  business,  successful  combination,  or,  better, 
concentration,  by  which  fe  meant  the  massing  of 
forces  for  a  concerted  effort,  depends  upon  the 
efficiency  of  the  chain  of  control  connecting  the 
brain  of  the  organization  through  all  activities 
down  to  the  lowest  group.  It  depends  upon  the 
intelligent  action  of  subordinates  in  grasping  and 
applying  the  plan  of  the  leader  of  the  organization. 
It  depends  upon  the  discipline  which  insures  in- 
telligent obedience  to  the  directing  will  of  the  or- 
ganization as  well  as  on  the  mobility  and  flexi- 
bility in  the  organization  which  gives  rapid  effect 
to  a  decision  by  the  leader  and  permits  the  taking 
advantage  of  fleeting  opportunities. 

In  the  Navy  Department,  for  seventy  years 
results  have  been  accomplished  only  through 


156  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

voluminous  correspondence,  regulations,  and  in- 
structions which  have  sapped  the  enthusiasm 
and  initiative  of  every  subordinate  of  the  navy. 
The  intelligent,  loyal  exercise  of  initiative  is  the 
true  secret  of  success  in  war  as  in  business.  Initia- 
tive is  the  word  which  expresses  the  mental  quali- 
ties of  the  subordinate  who,  knowing  the  general 
policy  of  the  organization  in  which  his  activity 
is  a  unit,  strives  to  attain  the  result  desired  by 
going  beyond  the  letter  of  his  instructions  while 
obeying  them  in  the  spirit.  If,  therefore,  subor- 
dinate officers  are  to  exercise  initiative,  they  must 
know  the  general  policy  of  the  military  leader  of 
the  organization  and  the  result  to  be  attained. 
Then,  with  his  knowledge  of  his  specialty,  he  can 
achieve  results  by  devising  methods  to  accomplish 
the  aim  desired.  The  principles  of  the  art  of  war 
for  the  navy  must  be  passed  through  a  critical 
and  constructive  mind  and  become  a  general 
body  of  instructions  before  they  can  be  of  prac- 
tical us.e.  Whether  in  war  or  in  the  preparation 
for  war,  that  critical  and  constructive  mind  will 
be  the  group  mind  of  a  reflective  and  inquiring 
general  staff  adequately  provided  with  an  instru- 
ment of  research  in  the  form  of  a  cultured  and  well- 
endowed  historical  section.  Before  there  can  be 
good  practice  there  must  be  a  true  theory,  and 
true  theory  can  be  acquired  only  from  historical 
study  pursued  according  to  recognized  methods. 


NAVAL  ADMINISTRATION         157 

Theory  cannot  have  an  independent  existence.  It 
must  always  derive  its  sustenance  from  fresh  con- 
tact with  the  historical  reality  of  which  it  is  the 
abstract.  On  the  other  hand,  historical  study 
which  does  not  yield  a  theory  is  barren  and  use- 
less. Such  a  group  mind  has  its  being  in  our 
existing  general  board,  but  what  authority  has 
such  a  body  when  it  is  shorn  of  the  responsibility 
of  carrying  out  its  recommendations  ?  Until  this 
grave  defect  in  our  organization  of  the  navy  is 
changed,  inefficiency  will  increase  year  by  year, 
as  its  material  and  the  number  of  its  personnel 
grow  larger.1 

1  Since  this  chapter  was  written  Congress  passed  the  naval  appro- 
priation bill  which  included  a  provision  for  the  creation  of  a  legal- 
ized chief  of  naval  operations.  This  is  most  important  legislation 
in  the  right  direction.  But  it  took  almost  thirty  years  to  obtain 
this  concession  from  our  legislators. 


CHAPTER  X 
THE  EMPLOYMENT  OF  THE  FLEET 

THE  correct  employment  of  the  fleet  is  to  be 
found  in  the  consideration  that  the  fleet 
is  an  instrument  of  national  policy.  Its 
efficiency  is,  therefore,  to  increase  the  prestige  of 
the  government's  diplomacy.  It  is  a  weapon 
which  diplomacy  holds  ready  for  use  when  the 
occasion  demands,  in  order  to  preserve  the  life 
and  happiness  of  the  nation  against  outside  foes. 
Its  duties  in  time  of  peace  are,  on  the  other  hand, 
twofold:  (i)  to  thoroughly  prepare  itself  so  as 
to  be  ready,  immediately  upon  the  outbreak  of 
war,  to  take  the  initiative  against  the  enemy's 
fleet;  (2)  to  protect  our  national  and  commercial 
interests  in  every  foreign  land. 

It  will  be  seen  that,  in  their  accomplishment, 
these  two  services  are  conflicting.  This  knowl- 
edge has,  therefore,  caused  the  evolution  of  a 
type  of  vessel  to  be  used  for  the  second  duty  only. 
These  ships  need  be  only  small  in  tonnage,  for 
they  are  merely  the  symbol  of  force  in  the  diplo- 
macy of  the  nation.  Their  guns  are  their  badge 
of  duty,  not  for  use  in  war  with  a  great  power, 

158 


EMPLOYMENT  OF  THE  FLEET    159 

but  against  unorganized  mobs  in  countries  where 
the  full  benefits  of  civilization  have  not  pene- 
trated. The  number  of  these  peace  ships,  or 
vessels  of  diplomacy,  will  depend  upon  the  extent 
of  the  nation's  responsibilities  abroad.  This  duty 
might  also  be  performed  by  vessels  in  reserve,  or 
by  the  small  cruisers  of  a  fleet,  when  not  actively 
engaged  in  manoeuvres  with  the  fleet. 

The  first  step  required  in  the  preparing  of  a 
fleet  for  war  is  the  making  of  a  plan  for  the  em- 
ployment of  the  entire  available  fleet  of  the  na- 
tion at  least  once  a  year  in  manoeuvres,  to  con- 
tinue until  the  commander-in-chief  is  satisfied  that 
the  weapons  intrusted  to  his  care  are  sufficient 
for  the  nation's  purpose.  The  plan-making  body, 
the  general  staff,  or,  in  the  absence  of  one,  the 
general  board,  should  complete  the  plan  for  the 
mobilization  exactly  in  the  manner  that  they 
would  prepare  the  navy  for  war,  except  that  the 
auxiliary  vessels  necessary  to  supply  the  fleet  in 
a  distant  area  of  operations  need  not  always  be 
fitted  out.  But  how  could  such  a  mobilization 
be  held  when  we  have  neither  officers  nor  men 
for  our  ships  in  ordinary,  nor  the  reserves  to  call 
upon  in  case  of  emergency?  With  what  Con- 
gress has  given  it,  the  navy  annually  accomplishes 
more  in  war  games  and  tactical  work  than  any 
other  navy  in  the  world.  Ours  is  a  real  sea-going 
navy — a  "fleet  in  being."  But  its  organization 


160  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

is  not  such  that  it  could  expand  in  times  of  mo- 
bilization or  of  war.  Its  organization  is,  on  the 
contrary,  fictitious  and  planned  solely  to  give  a 
constant  uniform  amount  of  work  at  the  navy- 
yards.  It  is  a  fleet  organization  that,  if  mobilized 
for  actual  exercise,  would  reveal  weaknesses  ap- 
parent even  to  the  most  casual  observer. 

Upon  the  completion  of  a  mobilization,  the  fleet 
should  be  divided  for  manoeuvres  and  a  problem 
devised  in  order  that  the  commanders  of  each  di- 
vision or  squadron  will  be  given  an  opportunity  to 
handle  their  ships  against  an  opponent,  in  the  man- 
ner that  would  be  done  in  war.  It  is  unnecessary 
to  go  further  in  the  description  of  such  a  mobiliza- 
tion and  manoeuvres.  All  nations  that  have  navies 
worthy  of  the  name  carry  on  manoeuvres  each 
year.  Their  records  can  be  found  in  all  the  cur- 
rent foreign  journals  and  in  naval  annuals.  The 
United  States  alone  refuses  to  expend  the  neces- 
sary money  to  train  its  fleet  systematically  in  this 
most  improved  and  scientific  manner. 

If,  by  chance,  the  navy  of  the  United  States 
were  mobilized  in  the  manner  described  above, 
we  should  find  that  the  personnel  of  the  navy  was 
totally  inadequate  to  put  in  effective  commission 
all  our  fighting  units.  There  would  be  lacking 
18,556  trained  men  and  933  line  officers  to  fully 
man  the  vessels  now  on  our  navy  list.  The  war 
material  available  would  not  fill  half  our  needs. 


EMPLOYMENT  OF  THE  FLEET    161 

We  should  find  that  our  destroyers  had  only  one 
torpedo  per  tube.  Having  expended  over  $1,000,- 
ooo  for  a  destroyer,  the  nation  refuses  to  spend 
more  than  $50,000  for  the  weapons  which  alone 
make  it  useful.  This  same  defect  we  should  find 
in  our  submarines,  while  for  the  ships  that  we  have 
armed  with  guns  we  may  discover  a  deficiency  in 
powder  and  shell.  Such  a  mobilization  and, 
afterward,  free  criticism  of  the  existing  condi- 
tions by  the  naval  officers  themselves,  will  be  the 
only  effective  method  of  bringing  to  the  notice  of 
the  country  the  unpreparedness  of  our  fleet.  Then 
a  remedy  will  be  applied.  Unfortunately,  the 
navy  has  been  so  long  the  football  of  politicians 
that  each  party  in  power  fears  the  exposures 
which  will  result  from  such  a  proceeding,  and, 
having  the  power  to  stop  it,  exercises  that  power 
and  leaves  the  nation  in  ignorance  of  the  true 
condition  of  its  defenses. 

In  a  small  way  actual  manoeuvres  have  been 
attempted  by  our  fleet,  but  they  have  been  held 
only  in  miniature,  and  were  quite  disappointing 
to  the  officers  who  participated  in  them.  Naval 
officers  who  are  asked  the  question  will  deplore 
the  lack  of  real  war  manoeuvres  in  the  war  train- 
ing of  the  fleet.  They  appreciate  the  necessity 
for  them,  yet  an  obstacle  insurmountable  stands 
in  the  way.  For  such  manoeuvres  money  is  re- 
quired; but  the  legislators  will  not  appropriate 


1 62  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

the  funds  to  cover  their  expense.  If  the  navy 
were  a  baseball  team,  Congress  would  understand 
that  it  was  necessary  for  it  to  play  rival  teams  to 
perfect  its  team-work  in  order  to  fit  it  to  play 
ball.  It  would  know  that  simply  practising 
pitching,  batting,  and  throwing  the  ball  around 
does  not  develop  the  team-work  necessary  to  beat 
a  rival  team.  The  navy  is  permitted  to  hold 
target  practice,  which  is  analogous  to  the  "bat- 
tery" practice  and  throwing  the  ball.  It  is  per- 
mitted to  take  cruises,  which  may  be  likened  to 
running  the  bases.  It  is  permitted  to  hold  tac- 
tical drills,  which  correspond  to  batting  prac- 
tice and  catching  flies.  But  at  no  time  during 
the  year  is  it  permitted,  as  a  team,  to  play  ball, 
to  engage  in  war  manoeuvres  on  an  extensive 
scale,  with  all  the  units  necessary  in  war — bat- 
tleships, cruisers,  scouts,  destroyers,  submarines, 
auxiliaries,  tenders,  fuel  ships,  and  hospital  ships — • 
yet  until  these  manoeuvres  are  held  successfully 
every  year  the  fleet  cannot  be  considered  as  pre- 
pared. 

Why  the  battleship  fleet  should  remain  on  the 
Atlantic  coast  is  a  subject  that  has  often  been 
discussed.  The  reason  is  evident.  The  Atlantic 
coast  of  the  United  States  is  the  centre  of  wealth 
and  the  centre  of  all  the  mechanical  and  industrial 
activities  of  the  nation.  There  the  great  fleet  can 
be  kept  prepared  and  maintained  in  repair  in  time 


EMPLOYMENT  OF  THE  FLEET    163 

of  peace.  The  facilities  on  the  Pacific  coast,  on 
the  other  hand,  are  inadequate.  The  Pacific  coast 
is  far  removed  from  the  sources  of  metal  and  fuel, 
the  vital  necessities  required  in  the  fleet's  up- 
keep. The  opening  of  the  Panama  Canal  has 
made  our  coast  continuous,  and  the  fleet  is  now 
able  to  move  as  a  unit  from  one  end  of  the  coast- 
line to  the  other  to  wherever  danger  may  threaten. 
All  that  is  needed  for  the  protection  of  the  coast 
is  a  delaying  force,  consisting  of  shore  batteries, 
soldiers,  submarines,  and  torpedo  craft.  With 
such  delaying  forces  based  at  important  strategic 
points  an  enemy  can  be  prevented  from  raiding 
the  coast  in  the  absence  of  the  battle  fleet  or  can 
be  held  in  check  until  the  fleet  can  reach  the  point 
attacked. 

From  the  strategic  point  of  view  the  United 
States  would  be  in  a  stronger  military  situation 
if  the  Philippine  Islands  were  not  a  part  of  its 
outlying  possessions.  For  they  lie  within  the 
strategical  control  of  Japan.  Even  Guam,  in  its 
present  state  of  defenselessness,  is  a  source  of 
weakness.  In  case  of  a  war  in  the  Pacific,  Ha- 
waii will  therefore,  if  sufficiently  garrisoned,  form 
our  most  western  position  of  safety.  From  this 
point,  securely  held,  some  claim  that  the  United 
States  might  be  able  to  fight  to  gain  the  domina- 
tion of  the  western  Pacific.  On  the  other  hand, 
if  Guam  could  be  securely  held,  which  is  now 


164  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

unlikely,  then  that  island  would  form  our  most 
western  salient.  All  these  strategical  considera- 
tions are  of  interest  to  the  nation,  but  it  is  this 
very  "military  road"  and  the  consequent  neces- 
sity of  bases  to  protect  the  communications  that 
most  of  our  people  do  not  appreciate.  Alaska  is 
not  meteorologically  possible  on  account  of  the 
prevailing  fogs  and  strong  currents.  Yet  Alaska 
is  rich  in  mineral  wealth  and  in  fuel,  and  some 
day  these  dangers  will  be  braved  by  a  victorious 
fleet,  in  order  to  gain  for  its  country  the  great 
resources  of  that  territory  which,  even  at  this 
date,  lie  undeveloped.  All  these  considerations 
show  us  how  vital  is  the  need  for  naval  prepared- 
ness. Naval  preparedness  alone  will  keep  united 
the  colonial  possessions  which  we  are  now  so  for- 
tunate as  to  own. 

Do  not  let  us  be  led  into  the  vain  belief  that 
disarmament  and  the  establishment  of  an  inter- 
national court  of  arbitral  justice  will  arise  after 
the  great  war  in  Europe  is  over.  For  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  decrees  of  such  a  tribunal  an  inter- 
national police  would  have  to  be  created.1  This 
is  an  Utopian  dream,  long  hoped  for  by  mankind, 
but  certainly  not  yet  to  be  realized.  Our  peace 
advocates  are  "appalled  by  the  great  economic 

1  It  would  be  well  for  us  to  recall  here  how,  from  1820  to  1862, 
such  a  police  was  proposed  by  Great  Britain  for  the  suppression  of 
the  slave-trade  on  the  west  coast  of  Africa,  and  opposed  by  the 
United  States. 


EMPLOYMENT  OF  THE  FLEET    165 

waste  of  the  war,  the  depletion  of  the  treasuries 
of  the  warring  nations,  the  loss  of  useful  man- 
hood, the  destruction  of  vast  industries,  and  the 
desecration  of  those  monuments  of  piety  and 
learning  for  which  the  whole  civilized  world  had 
reverence,"  but,  unfortunately,  such  consequences 
are  a  part  of  man's  evolution,  and  the  human  race 
must  continue  to  suffer  and  to  die  for  the  benefit 
of  future  generations.  We  of  this  generation 
must  suffer  for  the  sake  of  those  to  follow,  and 
each  generation  must  accept  its  share  of  the 
world's  sorrow  and  pain,  giving  its  life-blood  to 
cleanse  the  world's  morality. 

Fleets  and  armies  must  be  maintained,  and 
maintained  in  efficiency,  for  they  reflect  the  state 
of  the  nation  that  they  represent.  Otherwise  we 
must  acknowledge  our  moral  inferiority  and  ac- 
cept pusillanimously  our  moral  defeat  as  a  nation. 


CHAPTER  XI 
THE  PERSONNEL 

MOST  people  believe  that  a  navy  consists 
solely  of  ships.     In  alarm  the  press  cries 
for  ships  and  more  ships;  but  little  or  no 
attention  is  devoted  to  the  provision  of  men. 

There  is  a  wide-spread  misconception  through- 
out the  country,  and  even  in  the  councils  of  our 
service,  that  an  effective  navy  depends  only  upon 
the  building  of  an  adequate  number  of  ships, 
whereas  the  real  secret  of  naval  power  lies  in  the 
steady,  uniform  training  for  war  and  in  the  pro- 
vision of  men  and  ships  in  proper  proportion  to 
suit  the  ultimate  plan  of  campaign.  Public  opin- 
ion clamors  for  results;  yet  that  same  public 
opinion  refuses  the  funds  necessary  to  bring  about 
those  results.  Through  our  military  strength  only 
can  we  further  the  cause  of  peace.  A  strong  na- 
tion prepared  for  war  but  willing  to  arbitrate 
would  be  a  spectacle  of  which  our  peace  advocates 
could  well  be  proud,  but  a  weak  nation,  as  we  are 
forced  to  consider  ourselves,  raising  its  puny  voice 
for  arbitration  with  a  strong  military  power  desir- 
ing a  share  of  our  holdings  would  be  a  spectacle 

166 


THE  PERSONNEL  167 

too  despicable  to  be  heeded.  Yet  the  character 
of  our  race  is  such  that,  unless  danger  stares  us  in 
the  face,  we  are  indisposed  to  lay  out  money  as 
insurance  of  our  own  defense. 

When  we  consider  the  inadequacy  of  our  pres- 
ent naval  personnel  to  man  properly  the  ships  that 
we  have,  is  it  not  time  that  we  took  an  inventory 
and  found  out  the  true  value  of  our  naval  estab- 
lishment? Three  years  are  required  to  build  a 
battleship,  and  somewhat  less  time  for  the  smaller 
units,  but  after  the  vessel  is  completed  nearly 
six  months  are  necessary,  after  her  crew  has  been 
received,  before  the  creation  can  be  considered 
available  for  action  against  a  fully  trained  enemy. 

The  recruit  himself  requires  individual  train- 
ing. He  must  be  taught  self-reliance,  yet  be  im- 
pressed with  the  spirit  of  subordination  and  dis- 
cipline. He  must  learn  to  respect  authority  and 
accept  responsibility.  He  must  be  educated  in 
his  own  particular  technical  specialty.  After  this 
he  must  take  his  place  in  a  great  organization 
wherein  there  are  thousands  of  other  units. 
These  units  are  formed  into  groups,  and  the  groups 
again  assembled  into  larger  groups.  Over  each 
group  is  a  subleader.  The  intricate  organization 
of  a  battleship  has  been  evolved  through  a  process 
of  selection  that  has  required  hundreds  of  years 
for  its  development.  Its  roots  stretch  back  into 
the  sailing  days  of  Nelson,  of  Paul  Jones,  of  Van 


168  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

Tromp,  and  even  to  the  row-galleys  of  Marc 
Antony.  Once  the  crew  has  been  received  on 
board  a  battleship,  the  slow  process  of  evolution 
must  begin.  At  first  all  is  chaos.  Then  slowly 
order  arises.  The  process  is  slow,  necessitating 
much  training  and  a  vast  amount  of  instruction. 
The  ship's  complex  machinery  must  be  studied. 
The  officers  and  men  must  get  to  know  each 
other,  and  respect  and  appreciate  each  other's 
responsibilities.  Unless  mutual  trust  is  engen- 
dered throughout  the  entire  ship,  co-ordination 
cannot  be  achieved.  The  ship  must  be  trained 
to  shoot,  to  manoeuvre  in  company  with  other 
ships,  to  develop  the  full  power  of  her  machinery, 
to  coal  and  take  on  stores  with  efficiency  and  des- 
patch, to  signal  quickly  and  accurately.  Until  all 
these  details  have  been  developed  to  a  high  state 
of  efficiency,  the  ship  is  not  a  full  military  unit. 
With  the  navy's  personnel  short  of  officers  and 
men,  how  can  we  expect,  in  the  event  of  sudden 
war,  to  place  our  idle  ships,  now  in  ordinary  or 
in  reserve,  in  full  commission  and  send  them  im- 
mediately to  engage  an  enemy's  fleet?  Is  it  not 
murder  to  send  out  vessels  as  wofully  unpre- 
pared as  they  will  be  ?  The  casualties  on  the  sea 
in  the  present  war  give  us  an  idea  of  what  may 
happen  to  such  ships  if  they  encounter  an  efficient 
enemy.  In  the  fight  off  Chile,  two  modern  Brit- 
ish armored  cruisers  were  sunk  by  the  German 
squadron.  Not  a  single  member  of  their  crews 


THE  PERSONNEL 


169 


was  saved.  In  the  fight  off  the  Falkland  Islands, 
where  the  same  German  squadron  was  defeated 
by  a  stronger  British  squadron,  from  the  crews  of 
three  ships  carrying  nearly  2,000  men  only  90 
were  saved.  Does  the  nation  desire  to  place  its 
citizens  in  such  jeopardy  ?  On  land  the  casualties 
of  battle  are  not  so  appalling,  considering  them  on 
a  percentage  basis,  for  the  defeated  troops  can 
either  run  away  or  surrender.  An  army,  after 
defeat,  is  disorganized;  each  individual  looks  out 
for  himself.  But  a  sinking  ship  remains  an  or- 
ganization; every  man  follows  the  lead  of  the 
commander.  And  if  the  captain  wills  to  go  down 
with  his  ship  his  decision  spells  the  doom  of  his 
entire  crew. 

To  demonstrate  how  inadequate  our  present 
personnel  is  to  man  the  ships  already  built  or 
building  for  the  navy,  the  following  table  has  been 
prepared : 


England 

Ger- 
many 

United 
States 

France 

Japan 

Line  and  Engineer  Officers  — 
StaJ?  Officers— 
Medical 

4,78i 
W? 

3,441 
34O 

1,898 
336 

2,406 
3QO 

3,230 
364 

Pay 

7^o 

276 

231 

211 

388 

Naval  Constructors 

122 

162 

75 

187 

17  e 

Chaplains 

147 

3O 

24 

o 

o 

Warrant  Officers 

1,612 

2  7  4O 

808 

7,  183 

866 
867 

788 
147 

887 

i.«;6o 

Enlisted  men 

110  ^07 

0<  707 

$2.166 

60  so< 

•>O  O5O 

Marines  — 
Officers  

465 

177 

341 

o 

o 

Enlisted 

21  did 

C.7OI 

O  QIC 

o 

o 

1 70  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

This  table  is  illuminating.  It  reveals  an  alarm- 
ing shortage  in  the  personnel  of  our  navy.  It 
shows  that  the  vital  need  of  the  navy  to-day  is 
men,  more  men,  and  still  more  men.  In  his  hear- 
ings before  the  committee  on  naval  affairs  of 
the  House  of  Representatives,  last  December, 
the  assistant  secretary  of  the  navy  testified  that 
an  immediate  increase  of  18,000  enlisted  men,  as 
a  minimum,  was  necessary  to  man  properly  the 
vessels  already  on  the  navy  register.  And  the 
data  above  tabulated  show  us  that  we  are  not 
only  short  of  enlisted  men  but  also  in  need  of  offi- 
cers to  lead  them. 

The  number  of  petty  officers  and  enlisted  men 
allowed  by  Congress  by  the  Act  of  June  30,  1914, 
(for  the  number  is  fixed  by  law,  since  our  legis- 
lators are  the  final  arbiters  of  all  that  the  navy 
may  have)  is  51,500.  Not  one  additional  man 
may  the  navy  enlist  in  excess  of  that  number. 
Consequently,  although  there  were,  in  the  fiscal 
year  1913-14,  over  88,900  applicants  for  enlist- 
ment in  the  service,  but  18,948  could  be  accepted 
because  only  that  number  of  men  in  that  same 
period  left  the  service  at  the  expiration  of  their 
terms  of  enlistment,  or  for  other  reasons.  So 
that,  while  the  navy  is  to-day  recruited  up  to  the 
full  strength  allowed  by  law,  it  lacks,  nevertheless, 
over  18,000  men  of  the  full  number  (70,000)  re- 
quired to  properly  man  our  ships. 


THE  PERSONNEL  171 

In  officers,  whose  total  number  and  number  in 
each  grade  are  also  determined  by  Congress,  we 
find  a  similar  serious  shortage.1  Thus,  for  the 
present,  Congress  has  determined  that  there  shall 
be  1 8  rear-admirals,  70  captains,  112  commanders, 
200  lieutenant-commanders,  350  lieutenants,  and 
over  350  lieutenants  junior-grade  and  ensigns. 
Since  Congress  limits  the  number  06  officers  in 
each  grade,  promotions  from  the  lower  grades  can 
proceed  only  as  fast  as  vacancies  occur  from  re- 
tirements on  account  of  age  (sixty-two  years),  or 
from  deaths,  disablements,  resignations,  dismissals, 
or  from  other  causes.  Hence,  there  exists  a  situa- 
tion in  which  officers  enter  the  service  in  the  lower 
ranks  from  the  Naval  Academy  at  the  rate  of 
from  150  to  200  a  year,  while  in  the  higher  ranks 
only  about  40  leave  in  each  year  from  the  causes 
above  enumerated.  The  result  is  that  there  is 
an  ever-increasing  congestion  in  the  lower  grades. 
An  officer  remains  an  ensign  or  a  lieutenant  junior- 
grade  so  long  that  by  the  time  he  is  promoted 
to  command  rank  he  is  long  past  his  prime  and, 
therefore,  not  able  to  do  justice  to  himself  or  to 
the  service  under  the  more  exacting  duties  and 
graver  responsibilities  of  the  higher  grades. 

1  Whereas  in  1884  there  were  allowed  the  navy  1,114  officers  (line 
and  engineer)  and  8,250  enlisted  men,  to-day  there  are  authorized 
51,500  enlisted  men,  but  only  1,898  officers.  In  other  words,  while 
the  enlisted  personnel  in  thirty  years  was  increased  43,250,  the  num- 
ber of  officers  to-day  is  only  784  greater  than  hi  1884. 


172  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

The  personnel  question  is,  then,  most  vital  at 
the  present  moment.  Until  it  has  been  attended 
to  we  shall  not  be  able  to  say  that  we  have  a  navy 
ready  for  war.  The  training  of  the  enlisted  men 
cannot  be  accomplished  in  a  few  months;  it  takes 
years  to  educate  our  officers  in  the  professional 
subjects,  and  afterward  several  years  more  to 
give  them  the  practical  experience  essential  to 
supplement  their  technical  knowledge;  while  in 
the  highly  trained  warrant  officers,  those  men  who 
have  won  promotion  from  the  ranks  by  ability 
and  merit,  the  navy  has  a  strength  so  great  that 
they  should  be  encouraged  in  every  way  possible. 

The  duty  of  correcting  this  evil  devolves  upon 
our  legislators.  Such  a  remedy  has  been  proposed 
by  the  personnel  board,  appointed  by  the  secre- 
tary of  the  navy  last  July.  Will  Congress  heed 
the  warning  cry  ?* 

In  addition  to  the  regular  enlisted  personnel, 
there  should  exist  also  a  trained  naval  reserve 
such  as  the  great  naval  powers  of  Europe  have 
had  at  their  disposal  to  call  upon  in  time  of 
emergency.  But  we  have  no  reserves.  In  time 
of  war  we  would  not  even  know  beforehand  the 
name,  ability,  or  previous  training  of  a  single  man 
who  might  volunteer.  For  the  past  six  years  the 
Navy  Department  has  asked  for  legislation  au- 
thorizing the  establishment  of  a  naval  reserve  of 
1  See  the  report  of  the  personnel  board,  Appendix  II. 


THE  PERSONNEL  173 

officers  and  men,  but  Congress,  until  recently, 
turned  a  deaf  ear.  Our  naval  militia  is  too 
small  in  numbers  and  too  limited  in  its  train- 
ing to  provide  that  numerous  and  trained  body 
of  men  which  will  be  needed  at  the  outbreak  of 
hostilities.  In  such  a  crisis  the  navy  will  need  the 
services  of  the  ex-enlisted  men  of  the  service,  who, 
after  four  years  on  shipboard,  have  passed  back 
into  civil  life.  Undoubtedly  many  of  these  men 
would  return  to  the  navy  in  time  of  war,  but  Con- 
gress should  anticipate  the  emergency  and  provide 
forthwith  for  their  legal  enrollment. 

In  the  administration  of  its  personnel,  then,  as 
well  as  in  the  administration  of  its  material,  the 
navy  needs  a  continuity  of  policy.  This  involves 
the  training  of  both  officers  and  men.  And  this 
means  even  more.  For  it  concerns  not  only  their 
education  and  their  efficiency,  but  also  their  con- 
tentment, and  their  pride  in  a  service  that  glories 
in  the  traditions  of  such  men  as  John  Paul  Jones, 
John  Barry,  Edward  Preble,  Stephen  Decatur, 
Oliver  Hazard  Perry,  William  Barker  Gushing, 
and  David  Glasgow  Farragut. 


CHAPTER  XII 
EVOLUTION  AND  PROGRESS 

MAN,  in  the  development  of  his  mechanical 
achievements,  unconsciously  follows  the 
law  of  evolution.     He  prefers  to  go  step 
by  step,  feeling  the  way,  instead  of  advancing  by 
leaps  and  bounds  into  lands  unexplored.    The 
speed  of  evolution  depends,  therefore,  upon  the 
activity  of  the  times  or,  in  other  words,  upon  the 
pressure  of  outside  influences. 

In  times  of  peace  the  evolution  of  war-ships  has 
been  slow.  After  each  war  their  progress  has 
accelerated.  Each  type  reaches  its  fullest  devel- 
opment before  a  revolution  in  type  occurs.  But 
such  revolution  in  type  is  made  necessary  only  by 
the  discovery  of  new  or  improved  methods  of 
offense,  or  on  account  of  a  change  of  material  of 
which  the  existing  types  are  built.  In  the  last 
half-dozen  years  the  evolution  of  the  battleship 
has  been  extremely  rapid,  but  it  has  not,  as  yet, 
reached  its  height.  At  the  present  moment,  the 
indications  are  that  the  future  development  will 
be  rather  toward  a  combination  of  superior  speed 
and  gun  power  than  toward  armor  protection. 

174 


EVOLUTION  AND  PROGRESS      175 

The  vessels  with  the  torpedo  as  the  sole  weapon 
of  offense,  however,  have  periodically  shaken 
men's  convictions  in  first-line  ships.  To-day  the 
submarine  again  rivets  the  world's  attention. 

The  theme  of  the  small  vessel,  protected  from 
gun-fire  by  the  natural  armor  of  the  ocean,  has 
been  the  central  thought  in  many  flights  of  the 
imagination.  What  may  be  termed  the  torpedo 
peril,  is  not,  however,  a  new  acquaintance.  We 
have  met  it  frequently  before ;  first  in  the  days  of 
Fulton,  then  in  our  Civil  War  when  the  spar  tor- 
pedo was  designed,  and  still  later  when  the  auto- 
mobile torpedo  surprised  the  world  and  gave  food 
to  man's  imagination.  The  advent  of  the  automo- 
bile torpedo  threatened  the  battleship's  supremacy 
as  the  queen  of  the  seas;  yet  the  battleship  did 
not  disappear.  It  held  its  own,  emerging  greater 
and  more  powerful.  It  will  be  remembered  that 
France,  under  the  spell  of  this  marvellous  weapon, 
feverishly  built  torpedo  craft  for  a  number  of  years 
and  neglected  her  battleship  fleet.  Like  all  such 
radical  movements,  conceived  under  the  impulse 
of  hysteria,  the  pendulum  swung  too  far.  France, 
believing  that  her  logical  enemy  was  England  or 
Germany,  thought  that  with  countless  torpedo 
craft  she  could  sweep  the  seas.  But  it  was  soon 
shown  by  less  impulsive  thinkers  that  the  mastery 
of  the  sea  was  impossible  without  those  great  ves- 
sels armed  with  large-caliber  turret  guns,  and 


176  OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

France  was  obliged  to  again  take  up  her  interrupted 
battleship-construction  programme. 

This  year  the  torpedo  peril  is  again  with  us — 
this  time  cloaked  in  the  submarine.  These  ves- 
sels are  equipped  with  Diesel  Heavy  Oil  engines 
for  surface-cruising  and  electric  motor  for  sub- 
merged work,  and  carry  torpedoes  with  heavy 
explosive  charges.  These  two  advances  in  en- 
gineering progress  have  made  the  submarine  more 
reliable  than  heretofore,  and  have  demonstrated 
its  usefulness  as  an  arm  of  the  fleet,  but  not  as  a 
substitute  for  the  fleet  itself.1 

With  the  offensive  submarine  now  a  certainty, 
should  we  continue  to  build  battleships?  The 
new  cruising  submarine,  if  a  success,  may  become 
a  serious  menace  to  a  battleship  fleet,  but  it  does 
not  seem  a  sufficient  menace  to  stop  the  construc- 
tion of  those  ships  which  have  so  long,  and  in 
the  face  of  all  challengers,  held  command  of  the 
sea. 

The  ultimate  aim  of  war  is  to  command  the  sea. 
It  is  as  certain  now  as  always  that  this  command 
will  go  to  the  nation  with  the  most  mobile  and 
powerful  fleets  of  all  types,  each  to  be  used  in  its 

JFor  in  the  torpedo-boat  destroyer  there  has  been  developed  a 
defense  against  the  submarine  whose  value  is  more  pronounced  since 
it  is  equally  effective  against  the  enemy's  destroyer  and  submarine. 
In  this  respect,  the  facility  with  which  the  British  destroyers  have 
been  able  to  evade  submarine  attack,  and  in  some  cases  sink  the 
submarines  themselves  by  ramming  and  gun-fire,  has  been  one  of 
the  unexpected  developments  of  the  present  war. 


EVOLUTION  AND  PROGRESS      177 

proper  sphere  of  action.  The  submarine  and  the 
destroyer,  armed  with  long-range  torpedoes,  are  a 
natural  menace  to  the  advancing  enemy.  But 
they  can  be  met  by  changes  of  construction  in  the 
battleship  and  by  the  provision  of  a  sufficient 
number  of  similar  types  in  our  own  fleet. 

In  these  days  of  marvellous  mechanical  and 
electrical  devices,  men's  imaginations  are  apt  to 
soar  to  illimitable  heights.  But  a  vessel  designed 
to  dive  below  the  surface  of  the  sea  is  not  one 
upon  which  to  place  too  much  reliance.  As  long 
as  the  nations  of  the  earth  are  separated  by  great 
expanses  of  ocean  there  will  be  a  vital  necessity 
for  a  strong  fleet  of  capital  ships.  The  capital 
ship  may  change  her  shape  and  the  material  and 
methods  of  her  construction.  The  grand  old 
wooden  Victory,  Nelson's  line-of-battle  ship,  and 
the  present  dreadnaught,  New  York,  may  bear 
little  resemblance,  yet  each,  as  the  distinctive 
type  of  her  day,  stood  for  the  command  of  the 
sea.  The  future  mistress  of  the  ocean  will,  like- 
wise, be  a  vessel  in  which  there  can  be  placed  the 
most  absolute  confidence.  She  must,  therefore, 
be  a  thoroughly  trustworthy  type,  capable  of 
keeping  the  sea  in  all  weathers.  She  must  be 
habitable  for  a  large  crew  and  be  armed  with  the 
most  powerful  weapons.  She  must  be  able  to 
take  the  offensive  and  defensive  against  any  pos- 
sible opponent.  She  must  be  swift,  active,  and 


178    OUR  NAVY  AND  THE  NEXT  WAR 

dependable,  and  must  be  able,  with  the  aid  of  her 
auxiliaries,  to  control  the  entire  area  through 
which  she  will  have  to  operate. 

Nelson  said  that  his  ships  of  the  line  were  the 
best  diplomats  in  Europe,  and  the  history  of  Eng- 
land proved  the  truth  of  that  saying.  With  our 
own  peace  assured,  we  can  labor  successfully  for 
the  peace  of  the  world.  But  with  the  will  to  do 
this,  we  should  remember  that  we  must  have 
also  the  power  to  enforce  it.  Our  proclamation 
of  world  policies  has  imposed  upon  us  great  obli- 
gations, national  obligations,  of  making  secure 
our  influence  near  our  own  shores  and  in  the 
eastern  Pacific.  For  this  purpose  we  have  but 
one  main  defense — our  navy,  if  it  is  adequate,  ef- 
ficient, and  well  administered. 


APPENDIX  I 

THE  REPORT  OF  THE  GENERAL  BOARD 

DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  NAVY, 

GENERAL  BOARD, 
WASHINGTON,  November  17,  1914. 

To:    Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

Subject:     Increase  of  the  Navy;  building  program  and 
personnel,  1916. 

Reference:     Department's    indorsement    8557-146  :  n, 
September  22,  1914. 

Article  167,  paragraph  3,  United  States  Navy  Regula- 
tions, 1913,  reads  a  follows: 

"It  (the  General  Board)  shall  consider  the  number  and 
types  of  ships  proper  to  constitute  the  fleet,  the  number 
and  rank  of  officers,  and  the  number  and  rating  of  enlisted 
men  required  to  man  them,  and  shall  advise  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  respecting  the  estimates  therefor  (including 
such  increase  as  may  be  requisite)  to  be  submitted  an- 
nually to  Congress." 

The  General  Board  in  compliance  with  duties  thus  im- 
posed upon  it  by  this  and  similar  paragraphs  in  preceding 
regulations  has  from  year  to  year  recommended  to  the 
department  a  building  program  and  personnel  legislation 
that  would,  in  its  opinion,  produce  a  fleet  that  would  be 
adequate  to  the  needs  of  the  Nation. 

179 


i8o  APPENDIX  I 

2.  In  view  of  conditions  now  existing  the  General  Board 
has  given  particularly  careful  thought  to  its  recommenda- 
tions for  the  coming  fiscal  year.    To  make  its  position 
clear  and  place  before  the  department  the  full  meaning 
of  its  recommendations,  the  General  Board  considers  it 
necessary  to  review  at  length  all  that  has  preceded  these 
recommendations  and  led  up  to  them. 

CONSISTENT  POLICY  OF  GENERAL  BOARD  SINCE  1903 

3.  In  its  letter  No.  420-2,  of  October  17,  1903,  the 
General  Board,  after  mature  consideration  of  our  national 
policies  and  interests,  and  of  those  of  the  other  leading 
naval  nations  of  the  world,  expressed  its  opinion  of  what 
the  ultimate  strength  of  the  United  States  Navy  should 
be,  and  recommended  a  program  for  the  completion  of 
the  Navy  to  the  strength  then  believed  adequate  by 
1919. 

4.  The  basis  of  the  fleet  recommended  was  48  battle- 
ships; and  lesser  units  and  auxiliaries  were  recommended 
in  the  proportions  believed  to  be  best  to  complete  a  fighting 
fleet,  in  the  light  of  the  best  information  obtainable  at 
that  time.    The  influence  of  the  progress  made  by  new 
inventions  and  the  discovery  of  new  ideas  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  lesser  units  have  changed  the  proportions  and 
character  of  some  of  these  lesser  units;  and  have,  to  that 
extent,  modified  the  original  recommendations  of  the 
General  Board.     But  the  fundamental  fact  that  the  power 
of  a  fleet  is  to  be  measured  by  the  number  and  efficiency 
of  its  heavy  fighting  units,  or  battleships,  has  remained 
unchanged.    The  recommendations  of  the  General  Board 
heretofore  submitted  have  consistently  followed  a  policy 
looking  to  the  creation  of  a  fleet  founded  on  a  battleship 
strength  of  48,  in  accordance  with  its  recommendation 


APPENDIX  I  181 

made  in  1903,  of  what  it  considered  an  adequate  fleet  to 
meet  the  naval  needs  of  the  Nation  and  be  an  adequate 
insurance  against  aggression. 

5.  The  General  Board  believes  that  these  recommen- 
dations made  from  year  to  year  have  been  both  misun- 
derstood and  misconstrued  in  some  quarters.    An  im- 
pression prevails  that  the  General  Board  has  always 
recommended  an  annual  continuing  building  program  of 
four  battleships,  with  accompanying  lesser  units  and  auxil- 
iaries.   A  brief  analysis  of  the  recommendations  made 
by  the  General  Board,  beginning  with  the  original  formu- 
lation of  its  policy  in  1903,  to  the  present  time,  will  demon- 
strate the  error  of  this  impression,  and  show  that  the 
recommendations   made    were    consistent    and    contem- 
plated the  creation  of  a  battleship  fleet  of  48  vessels  by 
1919,  but  did  not  involve  a  constant  and  fixed  program  of 
building  four  battleships  a  year. 

BATTLESHIPS 

6.  In  October,  1903,  the  Navy  had  10  battleships  com- 
pleted and  14  more  either  under  construction  or  author- 
ized.   The  last  of  these  14  was  to  be  completed  by  1907. 
In  view  of  this  condition,  and  to  complete  a  fleet  of  48 
battleships  by  1919,  the  General  Board  in  paragraph  8 
of  its  letter  of  October  17,  1903,  recommended: 

"8.  To  sum  up,  the  General  Board  recommends  that 
Congress  be  requested  to  authorize  for  the  present  a 
yearly  building  program,  not  limited  by  the  amount  ap- 
propriated last  year,  composed  of  the  following  ships: 
Two  battleships,  etc." 

To  this  letter  was  appended  a  table,  quoted  below, 
showing  what  the  condition  of  the  Navy  would  be  in  bat- 
tleships, year  by  year,  to  1919,  starting  with  the  10  com- 


182 


APPENDIX  I 


pleted  and  14  already  building  or  authorized,  if  the  recom- 
mendation of  the  General  Board  for  a  two-battleship  per 
year  program  from  1904  were  followed. 


YEAR 

BATTLESHIPS 

YEAS 

BATTLESHIPS 

Com- 
pleted 

Author- 
ized 

Com- 
pleted 

Author- 
ized 

IQO3  

10 
12 

17 
19 
24 
26 
28 
30 
32 

14 

2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 

1912  
1913  
1014. 

34 
36 
38 

40 
42 

4i 
46 

48 

2 
2 
2 
2 

1904 

IQOS  
IQO6  

1915  

1907  

1916  

1908  

1917  

1909  

I9l8  
1010 

I9IO  
I9II 

7.  It  will  be  seen  from  the  foregoing  table  that  the 
General  Board's   recommendation  provided  for  a  two- 
battleship  program  consistently  pursued  from  1904  to  1915 
to  provide  a  fleet  of  48  battleships  by  1919.    In  these 
recommendations  replacements  were  not  considered,  nor 
had  limits  of  age  been  placed  on  battleships.    The  funda- 
mental idea,  however,  was  a  two-battleship  program  to 
provide  a  fleet  of  48  battleships  by  1919.    A  larger  pro- 
gram to  hasten  the  completion  of  the  fleet  had  been  con- 
sidered, but  had  been  rejected  because  it  was  believed  a 
fleet  of  48  battleships  by  1919  would  answer  all  needs, 
in  view  of  the  known  building  programs  of  other  coun- 
tries. 

8.  In  pursuance  of  this  policy  the  General  Board,  as 
stated  above,  began  its  yearly  recommendations  by  ask- 
ing that  two  battleships  be  authorized  in  1904.    The  fol- 
lowing table  shows  the  yearly  programs  recommended. 
The  reasons  for  an  increase  over  two  battleships  annually 
are  given  in  succeeding  paragraphs. 


APPENDIX  I 


183 


BATTL] 

:SHIPS 

BATTL. 

ESHIPS 

YEAR 

Recom- 
mended 
by 
General 
Board 

Author- 
ized by 
Congress 

YEAR 

Recom- 
mended 
by 
General 
Board 

Author- 
ized by 
Congress 

IOOA 

2 

I 

IOOO 

2 

IQOC 

2 

IOIO 

2 

1006 

I 

IQII 

2 

IOO7 

2 

I 

IOI2 

I 

1008 

2 

IQI? 

I 

9.  The  recommendation  for  the  laying  down  of  two 
ships  in  1904  failed  of  enactment,  and  only  one  was  pro- 
vided for,  leaving  the  program  for  the  creation  of  a  48- 
battleship  fleet  by  1919  one  ship  in  arrears.    To  make 
this  deficiency  good,  and  maintain  the  general  program, 
one  additional  ship,  or  three  in  all,  were  recommended  for 
the  1905  program.    Two  were  authorized,  still  leaving  a 
deficiency  of  one  for  the  two  years,  1904  and  1905.    To 
provide  for  this  three  were  again  recommended  for  the 
1906  program.    In  1906  and  again  in  1907  one  ship  only 
was  authorized,  leaving  by  1908  the  general  program  three 
ships  in  arrears.    To  begin  making  this  deficiency  good 
the  General  Board  for  the  1908  program  recommended 
the  authorization  of  four  ships.    From  1908  to  1911,  in- 
clusive, Congress  followed  the  original  program  and  pro- 
vided   for    two    battleships    yearly.    The    accumulated 
shortage  of  three  ships  still  remained,  however,  during 
these  four  years,  and  the  General  Board  recommended 
year  by  year  the  laying  down  of  four  ships  to  begin  mak- 
ing this  good,  since  each  succeeding  year  found  the  short- 
age still  there. 

10.  In  1910  a  new  element  entered,  not  considered  in 
the  original  program.    The  fleet  of  48  battleships  con- 
templated in  the  program  put  forward  in  1903,  on  a  two- 


1 84  APPENDIX  I 

battleship  per  year  building  program,  to  be  ready  by  1919, 
contained  all  battleships  then  borne  on  the  list,  beginning 
with  the  Indiana.  Experience  had  not  yet  in  1903 
demonstrated  the  effective  life  of  battleships,  nor  had 
any  exhaustive  study  been  made  of  it.  Beginning  with 
the  program  recommended  for  1911  in  General  Board's 
letter  No.  420-2  of  May  24,  1910,  this  matter  was  se- 
riously taken  into  consideration,  since  experience  had 
shown  that  the  three  older  battleships,  the  Indiana, 
Massachusetts  and  Oregon,  then  20  years  old  from  date 
of  authorization,  were  approaching  the  limit  of  their 
effective  life.  Further  studies  from  our  own  experience 
and  from  that  of  other  navies,  and  from  practice  abroad 
convinced  the  General  Board  that  the  effective  life  of  bat- 
tleships is  about  20  years  from  time  of  completion;  and 
that  hence,  to  maintain  a  fleet  at  a  given  strength,  it  is 
necessary  to  lay  down  a  replacement  ship  20  years  from 
the  time  of  the  laying  down  of  the  original  ship.  Hence, 
replacement  ships  for  the  Indiana,  Oregon  and  Massa- 
chusetts should  have  been  laid  down  in  1910,  for  the  Iowa 
in  1912,  and  new  replacement  ships  should  be  begun  for 
the  Kentucky  and  Kearsarge  in  1915.  These  matters, 
together  with  the  shortage  of  three  battleships  already 
existing  in  1911,  were  taken  into  consideration  by  the 
General  Board  in  making  its  recommendations  for  a 
four-battleship  program  in  both  1912  and  1913.  One 
battleship  only  was  authorized  in  each  of  these  two  years, 
increasing  the  shortage  in  the  original  program  to  five, 
without  considering  replacement  ships  for  the  Indiana, 
Oregon,  Massachusetts  and  Iowa,  already  overdue  for 
authorization. 

ii.  The  preceding  analysis  shows  clearly  the  error  in 
the  prevailing  impression  that  the  General  Board  has 
heretofore  advocated  a  navy  based  on  a  continuous  build- 


APPENDIX  I  185 

ing  program  of  four  battleships  a  year,  and  proves  that 
up  to  the  present  it  has  advocated  continuously  and  con- 
sistently a  program  to  produce  a  fleet  of  48  battleships  by 
1919.  This  would  have  called  for,  considering  replace- 
ments, a  general  two-battleship  program  with  a  third 
added  every  three  years.  The  number  of  battleships 
called  for  by  this  policy,  48,  and  the  date  set  for  their 
completion,  by  1919,  were  fixed  by  a  calm  and  logical 
review  of  the  policies  and  amis  of  the  Nation  and  the 
known  laws  and  prospective  developments  and  aims  of 
other  countries;  and  the  policy  was  to  provide  and  main- 
tain at  all  times  a  fleet  equal  to  or  superior  to  that  of  any 
nation  likely  to  challenge  our  policies. 

12.  The  1903  program  given  in  paragraph  6  of  this  let- 
ter, as  modified  by  the  replacement  policy  in  1910,  called 
for  at  this  date,  November,  1914: 

(a)  Effective  battleships  completed  and  ready  for  service,  less 

than  20  years  old  from  completion 38 

(b)  Battleships  under  construction 7 

(c)  Battleships  authorized  in  1914 2 

Total 47 

13.  The  actual  situation  of  the  fleet  as  relates  to  battle- 
ships at  this  date,  November,  1914,  is  as  follows: 

(a)  Effective  battleships  completed  and  ready  for  service,  less 
than  20  years  old  from  completion  (since  the  sale  of  the 

Mississippi  and  Idaho) 30 

(6)  Battleships  under  construction 4 

(c)  Battleships  authorized  in  1914 2 

(d)  To  replace  Mississippi  and  Idaho i 

Total "37 

14.  This  shows  that  we  are  now  deficient  10  battleships, 
built,  building,  and  authorized,  from  that  contemplated 
in  the  1903  program. 


1 86  APPENDIX  I 

15.  The  General  Board  has  made  the  foregoing  brief 
analysis  to  set  forth  clearly  the  reasons  for  and  meaning  of 
all  the  recommendations  it  has  made  for  battleship  con- 
struction up  to  this  time;    and  to  show  the  conception 
under  which  the  General  Board  has  acted  in  the  perform- 
ance of  its  duty,  under  the  Regulations,  as  the  responsible 
advisers  of  the  Secretary  in  all  matters  relating  to  the 
strength  of  the  fleet,  and  the  number  and  character  of  the 
units  composing  it.    In  the  matter  of  battleships,  the  final 
result  of  all  recommendations,  and  of  all  action  taken 
thereon  up  to  this  date,  has  been  to  produce  a  completed 
battle  line  of  8  units  less  than  the  General  Board  believed 
to  be  safe,  and  with  2  units  less  under  construction  and 
authorized  than  was  needed  to  continue  the  expansion 
of  the  fleet  to  the  strength  laid  down  in  the  policy. 

1 6.  The  General  Board  believes  the  policy  it  has  con- 
sistently advocated  for  the  production  of  an  adequate 
Navy  is  to  the  best  interests  of  the  country,  and  that 
any  Navy  less  than  adequate  is  an  expense  to  the  Nation 
without  being  a  protection.    It  cannot,  therefore,  too 
strongly  urge  the  adoption  by  the  Government  of  a  policy 
looking  to  the  making  good  of  the  deficiencies  of  the  past, 
and  the  building  up  of  this  arm  of  the  national  defense 
until  it  becomes  equal  to  the  task  that  war  will  put  upon 
it.    That  point  will  not  be  reached  until  the  Navy  is 
strong  enough  to  meet  on  equal  terms  the  strongest  prob- 
able adversary. 

17.  The  wisdom  of  such  a  policy  is  well  illustrated  by 
recent  events,  and  is  reinforced  by  the  teachings  of  all 
history.    For  a  review  of  the  history  of  all  ages  will  show 
that  no  nation  has  ever  created  and  maintained  a  great 
over-sea  commerce  without  the  support  of  sea  power. 
It  will  further  show  that  trade  rivalry,  which  is  the  active 
expression  of  the  most  universal  of  all  human  traits — 


APPENDIX  I  187 

desire  for  gain — has  been  a  most  fruitful  cause  of  war; 
and,  when  the  clash  has  come,  the  commerce  of  the 
weaker  sea  power  has  been  broken  up  and  driven  from 
the  seas.  That  has  been  true  for  all  time,  and  is  true 
to-day;  and  has  a  particular  bearing  on  the  United  States 
at  the  present  time,  when  such  strenuous  efforts  are  being 
made  to  build  up  a  national  merchant  marine  and  extend 
our  foreign  commerce. 

18.  In  the  matter  of  national  defense,  history  teaches 
still  another  great  lesson  particularly  applicable  to  our- 
selves.   That  is,  that  a  nation,  insular  in  character  or 
separated  by  bodies  of  water  from  other  nations  can  and 
must  rely  on  its  Navy — when  that  Navy  is  adequate — 
for  protection  and  freedom  from  invasion  and  may  keep 
its  own  soil  free  from  all  wars  other  than  civil.    The 
United  States  is  one  among  the  few  nations  of  the  world 
that  occupy  this  happy  position,  being  insular  in  so  far 
as  any  nation  capable  of  making  serious  war  upon  us  is 
concerned,  since  any  opponent  that  need  be  considered 
must  come  to  us  from  across  the  seas.    Our  main  defense 
and  protection  from  invasion  must,  therefore,  always 
rest  with  the  Navy,  which  must  ever  remain  our  first  and 
best  line  of  defense.     This  defense,  unless  adequate,  is 
impotent;  and,  as  before  stated,  adequacy  is  not  reached 
until  the  Navy  is  strong  enough  to  meet  on  equal  terms 
the  Navy  of  the  strongest  probable  adversary. 

19.  In  the  matter  of  battleships  the  General  Board  re- 
mains of  the  opinion  that  it  has  always  held,  that  com- 
mand of  the  sea  can  only  be  gained  and  held  by  vessels 
that  can  take  and  keep  the  sea  in  all  times  and  in  all 
weathers  and  overcome  the  strongest  enemy  vessels  that 
may  be  brought  against  them.    Other  types  are  valuable 
and  have  their  particular  uses,  all  of  which  are  indispensa- 
ble, but  limited  in  character.    But,  what  has  been  true 


1 88  APPENDIX  I 

throughout  all  naval  wars  of  the  past,  and  what  is  equally 
true  to-day,  is  that  the  backbone  of  any  navy  that  can 
command  the  sea  consists  of  the  strongest  sea-going,  sea- 
keeping  ships  of  its  day,  or,  of  its  battleships.  The  Gen- 
eral Board  recommends,  therefore,  in  the  light  of  all  the 
information  it  has  up  to  this  present  date  that  the  devel- 
opment of  the  battleship  fleet  be  continued  as  the  primary 
aim  in  naval  development,  and  that  four  (4)  of  them  be 
authorized  in  the  1916  program. 

DESTROYERS 

20.  For  the  general  purposes  of  war  on  the  sea  the  Gen- 
eral Board  has  placed  the  destroyer  as  the  type  of  warship 
next  in  importance  to  the  battleship,  and  has  based  the 
programs  it  has  recommended  on  that  idea.    After  very 
mature  consideration  of  all  the  elements  involved,  and  a 
study  of  the  results  obtained  from  fleet  maneuvers,  the 
General  Board  came  to  the  conclusion  that  a  well-balanced 
fighting  fleet,  for  all  the  purposes  of  offense  and  defense, 
called  for  a  relative  proportion  of  four  destroyers  to  one 
battleship.     Hence,  for  every  battleship  built  four  de- 
stroyers should  be  provided.    The  General  Board  still 
holds  this  opinion  and,  therefore,  recommends  that  six- 
teen (16)  destroyers  be  provided  in  the  1916  program. 

FLEET  SUBMARINES 

21.  For  several  years  past  all  leading  navies  have  been 
striving  to  perfect  a  submarine  of  an  enlarged  type  with 
habitability,  radius  and  speed  sufficient  to  enable  it  to 
accompany  the  fleet  and  act  with  it  tactically,  both  in 
offense  and  defense.    Our  designers  and  builders  have 
been  devoting  their  efforts  to  the  same  end  and  are  now 
ready  to  guarantee  such  a  type  and  one  such  vessel  was 


APPENDIX  I  189 

provided  for  in  the  appropriation  act  of  1914.  The  great 
difficulty  in  the  past  in  the  production  of  this  type  has 
been  the  lack  of  a  reliable  internal  combustion  engine  of 
the  requisite  power  to  give  the  necessary  speed.  This 
difficulty  has  been  overcome,  and  the  General  Board  is 
assured  that  engines  have  been  designed  and  fully  tested 
that  will  meet  the  requirements;  and  the  builders  stand 
ready  to  guarantee  the  results.  The  value  of  such  a  type 
in  war  for  distant  work  with  the  fleet  can  hardly  be  over- 
estimated, and  the  General  Board  recommends  that  three 
(3)  be  provided  in  the  1916  program.  These  with  the 
one  already  authorized,  will  form  a  fleet  submarine  divi- 
sion of  four  for  work  with  the  fleet  and  be  the  beginning 
of  a  powerful  arm  of  the  fleet. 

COAST  SUBMARINES 

22.  For  the  submarine  for  coast  defense  and  for  occa- 
sional acting  with  the  fleet  in  home  waters,  the  General 
Board  sees  no  necessity  for  boats  of  as  great  speed  and 
size  as  the  later  designs,  made  before  the  sea-going  sub- 
marine was  believed  to  be  in  sight.  In  fact,  any  increase 
of  size  is  detrimental,  in  that  it  increases  draft  and  debars 
them  from  shallow  waters;  and  any  increase  of  speed  in 
this  class  of  submarines  is  not  needed,  and  is  gained  at 
the  expense  of  other  desirable  qualities.  Between  the 
coast-defense  submarine  and  the  submarine  of  sufficient 
size,  radius,  habitability  and  surface  speed  to  accompany 
and  act  with  the  fleet  tactically,  the  General  Board  sees 
no  necessity  in  naval  warfare  for  an  intermediate  type. 
It  is  therefore  recommended  that  the  submarines  for  the 
coast  work  be  of  the  general  characteristics  already  pre- 
scribed in  General  Board  letter  No.  420-15,  of  June  10, 
1914,  and  that  sixteen  (16)  of  these  be  provided  for  in  the 
1916  program. 


igo  APPENDIX  I 

SCOUT  CRUISERS 

23.  In  the  struggle  to  build  up  the  purely  distinctive 
fighting  ships  of  the  Navy — battleships,  destroyers  and 
submarines — the  cruising  and  scouting  element  of  the  fleet 
has  been  neglected  in  recent  years,  and  no  cruisers  or 
scouts  have  been  provided  for  since  1904,  when  the  Mon- 
tana, North  Carolina,  Birmingham,  Chester  and  Salem  were 
authorized.    This  leaves  the  fleet  peculiarly  lacking  in 
this  element  so  necessary  for  information  in  a  naval  cam- 
paign, and  of  such  great  value  in  clearing  the  sea  of  tor- 
pedo and  mining  craft,  in  opening  and  protecting  routes 
of  trade  for  our  own  commerce,  and  in  closing  and  pro- 
hibiting such  routes  to  the  commerce  of  the  enemy.    The 
General  Board  believes  that  this  branch  of  the  fleet  has 
been  too  long  neglected  and  recommends  that  the  con- 
struction of  this  important  and  necessary  type  be  resumed. 
For  the  1916  program  it  is  recommended  that  four  (4) 
scout  cruisers  be  provided. 

AIR  CRAFT 

24.  The  General  Board  in  its  endorsement  No.  449  of 
August  30, 1913,  and  accompanying  memorandum  brought 
to  the  attention  of  the  department  the  dangerous  situa- 
tion of  the  country  in  the  lack  of  air  craft  and  air  men  in 
both  the  naval  and  military  services.    A  resume  was  given 
in  that  endorsement  with  the  accompanying  memorandum 
of  conditions  in  the  leading  countries  abroad  at  that  date, 
showing  the  preparations  being  made  for  air  warfare  and 
the  use  of  air  craft  by  both  armies  and  navies,  and  con- 
trasting their  activity  with  our  own  inactivity.     Certain 
recommendations  were  made  in  the  same  endorsement 
looking  to  the  beginning  of  the  establishment  of  a  proper 
air  service  for  the  Navy. 


APPENDIX  I  191 

25  The  total  result  of  that  effort  was  the  appointment 
of  a  board  on  aeronautics  October  9,  1913.  That  board 
made  further  recommendations,  among  them  the  estab- 
lishment of  an  aeronautic  school  and  station  at  Pensacola 
and  the  purchase  of  50  aeroplanes,  i  fleet  dirigible  and 
2  small  dirigibles  for  training.  At  the  present  time,  more 
than  a  year  later,  the  total  number  of  air  craft  of  any 
kind  owned  by  the  Navy  consists  of  12  aeroplanes,  not 
more  than  two  of  which  are  of  the  same  type,  and  all  re- 
ported to  have  too  little  speed  and  carrying  capacity  for 
service  work. 

26.  In  view  of  the  advance  that  has  been  made  in  aero- 
nautics during  the  past  year,  and  the  demonstration  now 
being  made  of  the  vital  importance  of  a  proper  air  service 
to  both  land  and  sea  warfare,  our  present  situation  can  be 
described  as  nothing  less  than  deplorable.     As  now  devel- 
oped air  craft  are  the  eyes  of  both  armies  and  navies,  and  it 
is  difficult  to  place  any  limit  to  their  offensive  possibilities. 

27.  In  our  present  condition  of  unpreparedness,   in 
contact  with  any  foe  possessing  a  proper  air  service,  our 
scouting  would  be  blind.    We  would  be  without  the  means 
of  detecting  the  presence  of  submarines  or  mine  fields  or 
of  attempting  direct  attack  on  the  enemy  from  the  air, 
while  our  own  movements  would  be  an  open  book  to  him. 
The  General  Board  can  not  too  strongly  urge  that]  the 
department's  most  serious  thought  be  given  to  this  matter, 
and  that  immediate  steps  be  taken  to  remedy  it,  and  recom- 
mends that  Congress  be  asked  for  an  appropriation  of  at 
least  $5,000,000,  to  be  made  available  immediately,  for 
the  purpose  of  establishing  an  efficient  air  service. 

GUNBOATS 

28.  The  Navy  is  very  deficient  in  gunboats.    Though 
the  Navy  list  gives  30  names  under  "gunboats,"  only  a 


192  APPENDIX  I 

very  limited  number  of  these  30  are  in  a  condition  to  be 
available  for  general  service.  Some,  like  the  Villalobos, 
Callao,  Samar,  Sandoval,  etc.,  are  old  boats  of  little  value 
taken  over  from  Spain,  of  from  400  to  250  tons  and  less. 
Of  the  others,  with  the  exception  of  the  light-draft  river 
gunboats  Monocacy  and  Polos,  and  the  Sacramento,  no 
gunboats  have  been  authorized  since  1902.  Seven  are  at 
present  assigned  to  Naval  Militia  duty,  and  three  others 
have  been  recently  withdrawn  from  that  service  because 
of  the  crying  need  for  more  gunboats  for  general  duty. 
Those  remaining  on  the  list  serviceable  and  fit  for  general 
duty  are  so  limited  in  number  that  it  has  been  necessary 
in  recent  years  to  detail  battleships,  large  cruisers  and 
destroyers  to  do  gunboat  duty.  This  has  been  markedly 
demonstrated  during  the  past  year  on  the  Mexican  coast. 
It  would  seem  superfluous  to  point  out  the  harmful  in- 
fluence this  has  on  the  efficiency  and  training  of  the  fleet 
for  war  and  the  General  Board  advises  strongly  against 
such  practice  whenever  it  can  be  possibly  avoided.  It  is 
therefore  recommended  that  a  beginning  be  made  to  re- 
place the  old  and  worn-out  gunboats,  that  there  may  be 
sufficient  of  them  to  do  the  police  and  general  diplomatic 
duties  required  of  such  vessels  in  time  of  peace  without 
disrupting  the  battle  fleet.  To  this  end  it  is  recommended 
that  four  (4)  be  authorized  in  the  1916  program.  With 
the  exception  of  the  Sacramento,  authorized  in  1911,  no 
seagoing  gunboat  has  been  authorized  since  1902. 

AUXILIARIES 

FUEL  SHIPS 

29.  In  the  matter  of  auxiliaries  needed  for  the  fleet  the 
General  Board  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  most  serious 
situation  exists  in  the  matter  of  fuel-oil  supply,  and  that 


APPENDIX  I  193 

provision  for  oil-fuel  ships  should  be  given  first  considera- 
tion. This  is  serious  from  the  point  of  view  of  economy 
in  time  of  peace,  and  would  be  disastrous  in  the  event 
of  hostilities  arising.  We  have  41  oil-burning  destroyers 
built  or  building,  to  be  followed  by  others,  8  ships  of  the 
dreadnaught  type  using  oil  as  an  auxiliary  fuel,  and  in 
1915  the  two  first  all-oil-fuel  battleships  will  be  added  to 
the  fleet,  to  be  followed  by  others.  To  supply  this  oil- 
burning  fleet  with  fuel  the  Navy  possesses  the  Arethusa, 
an  old  tank  ship  of  3,629  tons  capacity  and  not  more  than 

10  knots  speed,  and  seven  fleet  colliers  fitted  to  carry 
some  fuel  oil  in  addition.    The  total  oil  capacity  is  23,728 
tons,  3,629  tons  of  which — that  in  the  Arethusa — could 
not  accompany  the  fleet;    so  that  the  present  available 

011  supply  that  could  accompany  the  fleet  is  20,109  tons. 
Logistic  studies  show  that  to  maintain  our  present  oil- 
burning  fleet  in  active  service  across  the  ocean  requires 
the  delivery  of  about  23,000  tons  of  fuel  oil  per  month. 
To  maintain  this  supply  we  have  the  seven  colliers  men- 
tioned above  capable  of  delivering  an  average  of  about 
10,000  tons  per  month.    This  situation  will  be  very  much 
aggravated  on  the  addition  to  the  fleet  of  the  two  all- 
oil-burning  battleships,  Oklahoma  and  Nevada,  and  the 
other  destroyers  now  under  construction.    Nor  can  com- 
mercial oil  carriers  be  relied  upon  to  remedy  this  deficiency, 
since  ocean  tankage  both  at  home  and  abroad  is  not  yet 
adequate  to  meet  the  demands  of  commerce  and  industry. 

30.  To  partially  meet  this  situation  two  oil-fuel  ships 
of  a  combined  cargo  capacity  of  15,108  tons  were  author- 
ized in  August,  1912.    On  November  i,  1914,  one  of  these 
ships  was  only  82.4  per  cent  completed  and  the  other 
only  57.2  per  cent  completed. 

31.  To  remedy  this  serious  defect  in  our  preparedness 
for  war  the  General  Board  recommended  the  construction 


194  APPENDIX  I 

of  two  (2)  oil-fuel  ships  in  the  1915  program.  These  were 
not  authorized  and  the  General  Board  therefore  emphatic- 
ally repeats  this  recommendation  for  the  1916  program, 
and  further  recommends  that  the  construction  of  the  two 
ships  authorized  in  August,  1912,  more  than  two  years 
ago,  be  hastened  with  all  possible  speed. 

DESTROYER  TENDERS  AND  SUBMARINE  TENDERS 

32.  The  auxiliaries  of  next  importance  to  the  fleet  at 
the  present  time,  after  the  oil-fuel  ships,  are  destroyer 
tenders  and  submarine  tenders.    Of  the  three  improvised 
vessels  used  as  destroyer  tenders  the  Iris,  built  in  1885, 
is  past  her  period  of  usefulness  and  should  be  replaced. 
The  General  Board  recommended  one  (i)  destroyer  tender 
in  the  1915  program.    This  was  not  authorized,  and  the 
recommendation  is  repeated  for  the  1916  program. 

33.  Of  the  six  vessels  used  as  submarine  tenders,  all 
are  of  the  improvised  variety,  and  none  is  well  fitted  for 
the  service.    Three  of  them  are  old  monitors,  two  of  them 
old  gunboats,  and  one  the  old  sailing  ship  Severn.    To 
begin  replacing  these,  one  submarine  tender  was  author- 
ized in  1911,  another  in  1912,  and  one  (i)  was  recom- 
mended in  1913  for  the  1915  program.    This  last  was  not 
authorized,  and  this  recommendation  is  repeated  for  the 
1916  program. 

TRANSPORTS 

34.  The  General  Board  has  from  time  to  time,  in  nu- 
merous letters  extending  over  a  series  of  years,  called  the 
attention  of  the  department  to  the  inadequacy  of  prepa- 
ration in  the  Navy  for  advanced  base  work  and  to  the 
vital  importance  of  this  work  to  success  in  war.    The 
prerequisite  for  any  advanced  base  work  is  the  necessary 


APPENDIX  I  195 

means  for  transportation  of  the  personnel  and  material 
of  the  advanced  base  outfit;  and  for  this  reason  the 
General  Board  has  recommended  the  construction  of  the 
two  transports  needed  for  the  purpose — ships  of  the  size 
and  speed  necessary  and  especially  designed  for  what 
they  were  intended  to  accomplish.  Their  primary  use 
was  to  be  for  war,  but  secondarily  they  could  be  used  in 
general  transportation  service  at  all  times.  Not  one  of 
the  four  improvised  transports  now  in  service  in  the  Navy 
-—the  Hancock,  Rainbow,  Prairie  and  Buffalo — is  of  the 
size,  or  is  fitted,  for  the  work  required,  nor  of  the  character 
of  construction  needed  for  safety  in  ships  carrying  large 
bodies  of  men.  All  are  old  single-skin  ships  without 
proper  water-tight  subdivision.  Of  the  two  transports 
needed,  one  was  authorized  in  1913,  and  the  other  recom- 
mended in  the  1915  program.  This  was  not  authorized, 
and  the  General  Board  repeats  this  recommendation  for 
the  1916  program. 

HOSPITAL  SHIP 

35.  The  General  Board  in  making  the  foregoing  recom- 
mendations has  given  preference  to  what  is  needed  for  the 
fighting  efficiency  of  the  fleet  over  all  other  matters.    Two 
other  types  of  auxiliaries,  however,  are  required  for  the 
successful  administration  of  the  fleet — hospital  and  supply 
ships. 

36.  The  two  hospital  ships  now  borne  on  the  Navy  list 
—the  Solace  and  the  Relief — are  both  improvised  and 
small,  and  neither  adapted  to  the  service.    They  have 
done  good  service  in  time  of  peace  in  connection  with 
subdivisions  of  the  fleet,  but  the  Relief  is  now  unseaworthy 
and  the  Solace  would  be  of  limited  value  in  time  of  war. 
To  remedy  this  defect,  the  General  Board  recommended 
the  construction  of  one  (i)  hospital  ship  in  the  1915  pro- 


196  APPENDIX  I 

gram.    This  was  not  authorized,  and  the  General  Board 
repeats  this  recommendation  for  the  1916  program. 

SUPPLY  SHIPS 

37.  Of  the  four  ships  borne  on  the  Navy  list  as  supply 
ships,  all  are  improvised  and  were  hurriedly  bought  and 
fitted  in  1898  to  meet  the  exigencies  of  the  Spanish  War. 
The  Supply  is  already  beyond  her  period  of  usefulness, 
and  has  been  discarded  as  a  supply  ship.    The  Culgoa  is 
approaching   her   limit   of   usefulness.    The   Celtic  and 
Glacier,  while  old  and  inadequately  fitted,  are  still  good 
for  some  years  service.    One  new  ship  was  authorized  in 
1913.    Another  is  needed,  and  to  meet  this  situation  the 
General  Board  recommended  the  construction  of  one  (i) 
supply  ship  in  the  1915  program.    This  was  not  authorized 
and  the  General  Board  repeats  this  recommendation  for 
the  1916  program. 

SUMMARY 

38.  To  summarize,  the  General  Board  recommends  for 
the  1916  program — 

4  battleships. 
1 6  destroyers. 

3  fleet  submarines. 
1 6  coast  submarines. 

4  scouts. 

4  gunboats. 
2  oil-fuel  ships, 
i  destroyer  tender. 
i  submarine  tender, 
i  Navy  transport, 
i  hospital  ship, 
i  supply  ship. 
Air  service — $5,000,000. 


APPENDIX  I  197 

PERSONNEL 

39.  The  General  Board  can  not  too  strongly  urge  upon 
the  department  the  necessity  of  using  its  best  endeavors 
to  carry  out  the  repeated  recommendations  of  the  Gen- 
eral Board,  made  from  year  to  year,  to  provide  the  fleet 
with  a  personnel,  active  list  and  trained  reserve,  equal  to 
the  manning  of  the  fleet  for  war. 

40.  In  the  opinion  of  the  General  Board  this  is  a  matter 
of  even  more  serious  import  than  that  of  construction, 
for  it  can  not  be  too  often  repeated  that  ships  without  a 
trained  personnel  to  man  and  fight  them  are  useless  for 
the  purposes  of  war.    The  training  needed  for  the  pur- 
pose is  long  and  arduous,  and  can  not  be  done  after  the 
outbreak  of  war.    This  must  have  been  provided  for  long 
previous  to  the  beginning  of  hostilities;  and  any  ship  of 
the  fleet  found  at  the  outbreak  of  war  without  provision 
having  been  made  for  its  manning  by  officers  and  men 
trained  for  service  can  be  counted  as  only  a  useless  mass 
of  steel  whose  existence  leads  only  to  a  false   sense   of 
security. 

41.  The  strength  of  fleets  is  measured  too  often  in  the 
public  mind  by  the  number  and  tonnage  of  its  material 
units.    The  real  strength  of  a  fleet  is  a  combination  of  its 
personnel — with  their  skill  and  training — and  its  material; 
and  of  these  two  elements  the  more  important — the  per- 
sonnel— is  too  often  forgotten  and  neglected  in  making 
provision  for  our  fleet.    The  General  Board  can  not  im- 
press this  point  too  strongly  on  the  department  or  recom- 
mend too  earnestly  that  every  effort  be  made  to  correct 
it,  and  that  legislation  be  urged  to  provide  for  a  personnel 
on  the  active  list,  supplemented  by  a  trained  reserve, 
sufficient  to  man  every  vessel  of  the  fleet  when  the  call 
comes. 


198  APPENDIX  I 

42.  No  nation  in  time  of  peace  keeps  all  the  ships  of  its 
Navy  fully  manned  and  in  full  commission.    But  all 
leading  nations  except  ourselves  provide  an  active  list, 
officers  and  men,  sufficient  to  keep  the  best  of  their  fleet 
in  full  commission  and  all  the  serviceable  ships  of  their 
fleet  in  a  material  condition  for  war;   and  in  addition  a 
trained  reserve  of  officers  and  men  sufficient  to  complete  the 
complements  and  fully  man  every  serviceable  ship  of 
their  navies,  and  furnish  a  reserve  for  casualties.    Thus, 
every  nation  with  which  conflict  is  possible  is  prepared 
to  mobilize  its  entire  navy,  by  order,  with  officers  and  men 
trained  for  the  service.    We  alone  of  the  naval  powers 
provide  no  such  reserves,  and  an  active  personnel  too 
scant,  and  trust  to  the  filling  of  the  complements  of  our 
ships  by  untrained  men  recruited  after  war  is  imminent  or 
declared.    To  quickly  man  all  of  the  ships  of  the  Navy 
serviceable  for  war  (including  ships  which  are  now  in 
reserve  or   ordinary)  with  trained   crews  is  impossible 
owing  to  the  absence  of  a  trained  reserve. 

43.  In  view  of  all  that  has  been  herein  set  forth,  the 
General  Board  recommends: 

(a)  That  legislation  be  asked  for  providing  an  active 
personnel,  officers  and  enlisted  force,  capable  of  keeping 
in  full  commission  all  battleships  under  15  years  of  age 
from  date  of  authorization,  all  destroyers  and  submarines 
under  12  years  of  age  from  authorization,  half  of  the 
cruisers  and  all  gunboats,  and  all  the  necessary  auxiliaries 
that  go  with  the  active  fleet;   and  of  furnishing  nucleus 
crews  for  all  ships  in  the  Navy  that  would  be  used  in  time 
of  war,  and  the  necessary  men  for  the  training  and  other 
shore  stations. 

(b)  That  the  general  policy  be  adopted  of  expanding 
the  active  personnel  with  the  expansion  of  the  fleet  in  the 
proportions  indicated  in  (a). 


APPENDIX  I  199 

(c)  That  immediate  steps  be  taken  to  form  a  national 
naval  reserve  of  trained  officers  and  men,  and  that  this 
work  be  pushed  until  this  reserve  in  connection  with  the 
Naval  Militia  has  reached  the  point  where,  combined  with 
the  active  list,  it  will  be  possible  to  fully  man  the  entire 
fleet  with  war  complements  and  furnish  10  per  cent  ad- 
ditional for  casualties. 

(d)  That  the  Naval  Militia  be  expanded  in  number  and 
that  the  department  encourage  the  continuance  and  im- 
provement of  its  training  to  the  end  that  it  may  still 
more  efficiently  serve  to  re-inforce  the  regular  service  at 
need. 

GEORGE  DEWEY. 


APPENDIX  II 

THE  REPORT  OF  BOARD  ON  INCREASED  EFFI- 
CIENCY OF  THE  PERSONNEL  OF  THE  NAVY 

DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  NAVY, 

WASHINGTON,  January  23,  1915. 

From:    The  Personnel  Board. 
To:    The  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 
Subject:    Report  of  the  board. 

1.  The  Board  on  Increased  Efficiency  of  the  Personnel 
of  the  Navy  submits  herewith  the  draft  of  a  bill  to  pro- 
vide for  proper  distribution  of  officers  of  the  Navy  in  the 
various  grades  in  accordance  with  the  needs  of  the  ser- 
vice; to  insure  a  uniform  flow  of  promotion;  and  to  give 
all  officers  equal  opportunity  for  advancement. 

2.  The  bill  abolishes  the  so-called  plucking  board.    In 
lieu  thereof  it  establishes  the  principle  of  promotion  by 
competitive  methods  and  the  selection  of  the  most  effi- 
cient, together  with  the  creation  of  an  active  reserve  list 
for  those  officers  not   chosen  for  promotion.    Officers 
placed  on  this  reserve  list  will  continue  to  render  active 
service  but  will  not  be  promoted  except  for  special  meri- 
torious services. 

3.  The  competitive  method  of  promotion  recognizes 
three  factors:  First,  professional  knowledge;  second,  the 
official  record  of  past  performances;  and,  third,  service 

200 


APPENDIX  II  201 

opinion  obtained  from  the  recommendations  of  officers 
senior  in  the  service. 

4.  The  paramount  problem  in  all  matters  relating  to 
personnel  is  that  of  fairly  disposing  of  the  unavoidable 
surplus  of  officers  from  the  lower  grades  as  they  pass  to 
and  through  the  upper  grades.    As  to  the  existence  of 
this  surplus,  it  is  sufficient  to  refer  to  the  fact  that  the 
complement  of  a  battleship  contains  one  captain  and 
from  10  to  15  ensigns.    The  experience  of  our  Navy  has 
shown  that  out  of  150  ensigns  fresh  from  the  Naval  Acad- 
emy there  will  be  at  the  end  of  34  years  but  5  needed  for 
the  grade  of  rear  admiral.    The  experience  of  other  nations 
is  in  substantial  agreement.    Death  and  disability  will 
not  sufficiently  reduce  the  original  numbers;    artificial 
means  must  therefore  be  resorted  to. 

5.  Under  the  system  we  propose  a  midshipman  on 
entering  the  Naval  Academy  becomes  a  member  of  a 
class  varying  in  number  from  250  to  300.    After  four 
years'  work,  with  the  consequent  elimination  of  the  least 
fit,  about  150  should  be  taken  into  the  service  as  ensigns 
at  an  average  age  of  about  22.    After  three  years'  ser- 
vice as  ensign  a  competitive  examination  will  be  held, 
establishing  their  order  of  merit.    Of  the  original  150, 
then  reduced  by  natural  causes  to  about  135,  100  will  be 
continued  in  the  line  of  the  Navy  and  approximately  25 
others  in  the  Pay,  Construction,  Civil  Engineer,  and 
Marine  Corps.    The  remaining  ensigns,  approximately 
10  yearly — those  at  the  bottom — will  be  honorably  dis- 
charged with  one  year's  pay,  as  was  the  case  for  many 
years  in  the  past  with  surplus  midshipmen. 

6.  The  100  ensigns  remaining  in  the  line  will  be  com- 
missioned lieutenants  (junior  grade).    At  the  end  of  six 
years  those  remaining  will  be  promoted  to  the  grade  of 
lieutenant  subject  to  the  usual  examinations.    They  will 


202  APPENDIX  II 

remain  in  the  grade  of  lieutenant  for  a  similar  period  of 
six  years,  those  remaining  will  become  candidates  for 
promotion.  At  this  point  will  begin  the  process  of  pro- 
motion by  selection  and  the  transfer  to  the  active  reserve 
list  of  those  not  promoted.  Normally  two  out  of  every 
three  lieutenants  will  be  promoted  to  the  grade  of  lieu- 
tenant commander,  and  the  length  of  service  in  this  grade 
is  also  six  years.  At  the  end  of  that  period  those  remain- 
ing will  become  candidates  for  promotion  to  the  grade  of 
commander.  About  one-half  will  be  promoted  and  the 
other  half  transferred  to  the  active  reserve  list.  Those 
promoted  will  serve  as  commanders  for  six  years.  About 
one-half  will  then  be  promoted  in  the  same  manner  to  the 
grade  of  captain.  Seven  years  is  the  period  of  service 
prescribed  for  captain,  and  the  class  originally  composed 
of  150  ensigns  will,  on  arriving  at  the  top  of  the  list  of 
captains  at  the  end  of  34  years'  service,  be  reduced  to 
approximately  10  on  the  active  list.  Of  this  number  5 
will  go  up  to  the  grade  of  rear  admiral  and  the  remainder 
will  be  placed  on  the  active  reserve  list. 

7.  The  foregoing  outline  applies  to  the  normal  course 
after  the  proposed  system  is  in  full  operation.    Existing 
"humps"  in  the  personnel  of  the  service  will  take  a  number 
of  years  to  smooth  out,  but  it  is  believed  that  the  process 
laid  down  will  be  carried  on  with  the  greatest  possible 
fairness  to  the  officers  affected.    For  a  number  of  years 
to  come  the  transfers  to  the  active  reserve  list  will  be  less 
numerous  than  when  the  bill  is  in  full  operation,  especially 
transfers  from  the  lower  grades. 

8.  The  same  general  principles  applied  to  the  line  of 
the  Navy  have  been  applied  to  the  various  staff  corps. 

9.  In  like  manner  provision  is  made  for  the  advance- 
ment to  the  grade  of  master  of  the  most  efficient  commis- 
sioned warrant  officers.    The  board  believes  that  the 


APPENDIX  II  203 

principle  of  promotion  by  selection  after  fair  competition 
should  apply  to  their  case  as  recommended  for  all  other 
officers.  As  a  further  step,  all  masters  who  are  qualified 
will  enter  the  line  or  the  various  staff  corps  with  the  rank 
of  lieutenant  (junior  grade),  in  the  line  of  promotion. 
This  is  in  addition  to  the  opportunities  now  afforded  by 
law. 

10.  This  board  is  directed  by  the  precept  creating  it 
not  to  consider  increases  in  the  total  number  of  officers 
now  provided  by  law  and  to  recommend  as  small  increase 
in  cost  as  may  be  practicable.    After  consideration  of 
practically  the  entire  history  of  personnel  proposals  and 
legislation,  the  board  believe  that  it  has  arrived  at  a 
most  economical  plan  to  accomplish  the  purpose,  although 
efficiency  has  been  the  primary  consideration. 

11.  Special  attention  is  invited  to  the  fact  that  any  in- 
crease or  decrease  in  the  personnel  which  Congress   may 
desire  to  make  in  the  future  can  be  effected  without  change 
in  the  general  plan. 

12.  To  sum  up:  The  bill  provides  for  proper  distribu- 
tion in  grades,  for  uniform  and  fair  promotion  at  proper 
ages,  without  material  increase  in  cost.    Detailed  esti- 
mates of  cost,  etc.,  and  a  discussion  of  the  bill  by  para- 
graphs will  appear  as  an  appendix  to  this  report. 

FRANKLIN  D.  ROOSEVELT, 
Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Senior  Member. 

VICTOR  BLUE, 
Chief  of  Bureau  of  Navigation,  Member. 

D.  W.  TAYLOR, 
Chief  of  Bureau  of  Construction  and  Repair,  Member. 

C.  M.  AUSTIN, 
Lieutenant,  United  States  Navy,  Recorder. 


APPENDIX  III 

THE  PRICE  OF  UNPREPAREDNESS 

The  faulty  military  policy  of  the  United  States  in  re- 
fusing to  keep  a  sufficiently  large  trained  force  of  soldiers 
and  upon  the  outbreak  of  war  calling  great  numbers  of  un- 
trained recruits  to  the  colors,  has  been  the  cause  of  vast 
expenditures.  Thousands  of  men  have  been  enlisted  in 
even  our  smallest  wars  to  serve  for  only  a  short  time. 
The  consequence  has  been  that  a  great  many  more  men 
have  been  risked  in  a  war  than  really  were  necessary. 
These  untried  and  untrained  masses  have  been  sent  out 
to  do  battle,  and  have  been  slaughtered  on  every  battle- 
field. Trained  troops  will  stand  until  one- third  have  been 
annihilated,  but  untrained  troops  will  break  and  run  some- 
times at  the  first  shot.  This  is  the  reason  why  great  masses 
have  been  employed  in  our  wars,  and  is  the  reason  why 
the  sum  of  our  pensions  has  been  so  tremendous.  The 
history  of  the  sums  expended  by  our  government  for 
pensions  for  each  of  our  wars  since  1790  spells  a  sad 
experience: 

The  Revolutionary  .War $70,000,000 

The  War  of  1812 45,923,014 

The  Indian  Wars 12,241,273 

The  War  with  Mexico 47,632,572 

The  Civil  War 4,294,596,944 

The  War  with  Spain  and  the  Philippine  Insurrection.  42,185,230 

Regular  established  and  sundries 44,960,800 

$4,557*539,833 
204 


APPENDIX  III  205 

In  1866  there  were  126,722  pensioners.  In  1897,  just 
before  the  war  with  Spain,  there  were  993,714  names  on 
the  pension  roll.  After  the  war  with  Spain,  in  1902,  this 
number  had  increased  to  999,446,  and  that  number  is 
still  increasing,  although  fifty  years  have  passed  since 
the  Civil  War  was  over,  and  the  veterans  of  that  struggle 
are  to-day  dying  at  the  rate  of  35,000  a  year. 

It  has  cost  the  country,  since  1866,  $125,871,965  sim- 
ply to  maintain  the  Bureau  of  Pensions  through  which 
the  pensioners  receive  their  money.  This  is  the  price 
we  have  already  paid  for  non-preparation. 


»«« 


DATE 


AN  INITIAL  FINE  OF  25  CENTS 

OVERDUE. 


LD  21-95m-7,'37 


r«/<1* 


YC  03057 


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